The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong 1949-1997: A History by Chun, Michael Hon-Chung
  
The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in 
Colonial Hong Kong 1949-1997: A History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Michael Hon-Chung CHUN 
B.A., M.A. (Auckland) 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Asian Studies) of  
The Australian National University 
 
 
31 July 2010 
ii 
 
Declaration 
 
I, the undersigned, Michael Hon-Chung Chun, declare that this thesis is my own 
original work; where the work of others is used, I have acknowledged 
accordingly throughout. 
 
 
Signed ________________________________ 
      Michael Hon-Chung CHUN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is a personal endeavour to make sense of Hong Kong‘s post-
war history.  Yet, the project could not have been completed without the 
encouragement and support of various people.  I am indebted to my supervisors 
at The Australian National University, without whom this project could not reach 
fruition: Professor John Makeham and Professor Jonathan Unger.  They have 
patiently offered valuable suggestions to better both my writing skills and 
thinking process.  I also want to thank the administrative staff of the Faculty of 
Asian Studies at The Australian National University, in particular Ms. Harriette 
Wilson for troubleshooting and help with the administrative paperwork. 
I would like to thank my supervisors at the University of Hong Kong, Dr. 
Peter Cunich and Professor John Carroll, who provided guidance and 
encouragement during the first year of my doctoral degree.  I am also grateful to 
all colleagues at the University of Hong Kong‘s Department of History, who 
provided me a welcoming atmosphere.  Special thanks are due to Dr. Peter 
Cunich, who assisted with my transfer to The Australian National University in 
2006. 
This thesis owes much to the very helpful staff of the University of Hong 
Kong library, Chinese University of Hong Kong library, The Australian National 
University library, and Hong Kong Public Records Office.  Special thanks are 
due to the staff members of the Hong Kong Special Collections in the University 
of Hong Kong library.  I am particularly grateful to Dr. Lisa Lines, who 
proofread the thesis. 
iv 
 
 This thesis would also never have existed had I not pursued my 
undergraduate and postgraduate studies in New Zealand.  Therefore, I would like 
to thank all staff members in the School of Asian Studies at the University of 
Auckland, particularly Professor Paul Clark, who supervised my MA thesis and 
encouraged me to pursue a doctoral degree.  I would also like to thank Dr. 
Richard Phillips and Dr. Matthew Allen, who taught me the rigor of historical 
thinking. 
 I would like to extend my gratitude to my interviewees: Mr. Chui Pak-tai, 
Mr. Leung Kwok-hung, Dr. Joseph Lian, Mr. Mok Chiu-yu, and Mr. Szeto Wah, 
who shared their memories of the events in which they participated. 
During my research work, I was aided financially by two scholarships 
awarded through the University of Hong Kong and The Australian National 
University.  Of course, I should not forget the support from my parents in Hong 
Kong. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abstract 
This thesis is the first comprehensive study of the history of China-
orientated nationalism in post-World War II (WWII) colonial Hong Kong.  The 
thesis examines events in each decade diachronically and links them together in a 
broader perspective.  It shows the continuities and changes in the meaning and 
politics of China-orientated nationalism and how the focus of that nationalism 
became increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China in 
the long period from 1949 to 1997. 
Three types of China-orientated nationalism emerged in Hong Kong 
during the 1949-1997 period: cultural nationalism, political nationalism, and 
popular nationalism.  Some of the exiled Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s 
promoted cultural nationalism, while political nationalism in Hong Kong 
revolved around the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang (CCP-GMD) 
struggle.  Popular nationalism in the post-1967 period was tied primarily to Hong 
Kong politics. 
This thesis demonstrates how the various nationalist sentiments were a 
product of the China factor, the Hong Kong factor, and colonialism.  China-
orientated nationalism was open to interpretation and its rise and evolution was a 
haphazard process.  Over time, the rhetoric of political nationalism that revolved 
around the CCP-GMD struggle became less significant as younger generations of 
Hong Kong Chinese who had little interest in Chinese politics became politically 
active in the 1970s.  In this new phase, nationalism was tied not to the pro-
CCP/pro-GMD rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s, but to young Hong Kong 
vi 
 
people‘s concern about problems in Hong Kong society and Hong Kong politics.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, expressions of popular nationalism were linked to Hong 
Kong people‘s concern over the future of Hong Kong following the Tiananmen 
Square incident and on the eve of the 1997 handover. 
 This study of the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in colonial 
Hong Kong also provides an understanding of how the colonial government 
responded, and how some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community 
manoeuvred vis-à-vis the colonial administration and other Hong Kong-based 
groups by using their own strategically constructed nationalism. 
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Chapter One: The Politics of China-Orientated 
Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong: An Introduction 
Attachments to specific stretches of territory, and to certain places 
within them, have a mythical and subjective quality.  It is the 
attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession 
of the land that matters for ethnic identification.
1
 
    - Anthony D. Smith, National Identity 
Chinese nationalism as a phenomenon is not confined to China.  Colonial 
Hong Kong serves as an example of how China-orientated nationalism could 
develop in a British colony where East met West.  The Chinese community in 
Hong Kong had a strong emotional attachment to the ‗motherland‘,2 or zuguo (祖
國).  Such an attachment was not at all hampered by colonialism.  The China 
factor, colonialism, and the Hong Kong factor all contributed to the development 
of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong.  By ‗the China factor‘ I 
refer to political upheavals in China and by ‗the Hong Kong factor‘ I refer to the 
social and political developments in Hong Kong, in the post-1949 period.  
Colonialism in this thesis refers to the actions of the Hong Kong colonial 
government to control its subjects.  As the development of China-orientated 
nationalism was closely linked to Chinese and Hong Kong politics, the 
                                                     
1
 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp.22-23. 
2
 Prasenjit Duara has observed that linguistically speaking the nation is a ‗gendered phenomenon‘ 
as often its ‗common signifier is fatherland or motherland.‘  See Prasenjit Duara, ‗De-constructing 
the Chinese Nation‘, in Chinese Nationalism ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 
pp.31-55. 
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overarching theme of my thesis is the politics of this China-orientated 
nationalism. 
This thesis is a study of China-orientated nationalism in the field of Hong 
Kong colonial history, focusing principally on the last four decades of that history, 
up to 1997 when China reasserted sovereignty over Hong Kong.  In post-1949 
Hong Kong, several varieties of China-orientated nationalism existed at various 
times, and represented a significant issue for the colonial government, for Hong 
Kong politicians, and for some sectors of the populace.  China-orientated 
nationalism has been an essential part of political life throughout Hong Kong‘s 
history.  Although there have been some narrow case studies of episodes 
representing the expression of China-orientated nationalism in the field of Hong 
Kong history, my thesis is the first study that covers this significant issue over a 
period of several decades, linking together episodes into a broader portrait and 
analysing changes and continuities in the meaning and politics of China-
orientated nationalism in Hong Kong during this long period from 1949 to 1997.   
This thesis is not specifically about Chinese nationalism, but rather is 
about how various constituencies of Hong Kong residents manoeuvred vis-à-vis 
the colonial administration and vis-à-vis other Hong Kong-based groups by 
turning to their own strategically imagined constructs of nationalism. The 
significance of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong is that, first, 
it prompted Hong Kong Chinese to think about what China meant for them.  
Second, it provided Hong Kong Chinese a means to express their concern over 
China as well as Hong Kong.  Third, nationalism was used as a tactic by Hong 
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Kong-based political groups to promote their agenda and mobilise the masses.  
Fourth, China-centred nationalism created both divisions and solidarity among 
some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community through the decades.  Fifth, 
nationalism at times jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens and threatened 
the colony‘s security, and, as a result, the Hong Kong government was forced to 
take measures against it, and in the process, nationalism brought the coloniser 
and the colonised closer as both sides desired security.  Understanding these 
various and changing facets of China-orientated nationalism provides us with a 
fuller and more focused insight into the forces that shaped the dynamics of Hong 
Kong political life over the course of this turbulent period in Hong Kong‘s 
modern history.  Sixth, China-orientated nationalism permeated not only some of 
the major disturbances that impacted on the lives of Hong Kong residents, but 
also discussions about China in the Chinese-language press as well as Hong 
Kong-orientated political movements.  Thus, China-orientated nationalism was a 
matter that generations of Hong Kong Chinese were exposed to whether they 
were politically active or not. 
In more general terms, these six points highlight the fact that Hong Kong 
is a society of immigrants where people had both a Chinese identity and a 
colonial identity.  To varying degrees, China-centred nationalism also underlay 
political factionalism in Hong Kong politics.  Hong Kong Chinese, despite being 
colonial subjects under British rule, were willing to speak up for their interests 
and concerns using nationalism.  Thus, nationalist movements were a major form 
of political activism and Hong Kong people were clearly not politically apathetic.  
Lastly, my study highlights the fact that political activism in Hong Kong was on 
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some occasions characterised by clashes between colonialism and some sectors 
of the Chinese community. 
  In the following section of this introductory chapter I discuss in brief the 
extant literature on China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. I then discuss 
the methodology used in my research. In the section after that, I draw on some of 
the existing theories of nationalism to define Chinese nationalism in post-1949 
Hong Kong.  Finally, I briefly outline the objectives, main arguments and 
structure of the thesis. 
Research Background: A Brief Literature Review 
While much has been written about Chinese nationalism within China, 
little research has been conducted on China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong 
during the period from 1949 to 1997.   Academic works on Hong Kong history 
tend to focus on Hong Kong identity or on the period before 1949.  The only 
comprehensive study of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong is 
Cai Rongfang‘s The Hong Kong People’s History of Hong Kong 1841-1945 (香
港人之香港歷史).  Looking at historical events diachronically, Tsai examines 
the complexity of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong from 1841 to 1945.  
His work shows that what was occurring in both China and Hong Kong were 
significant in giving rise to discourses about Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong. 
In Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation in China, He 
Baogang and Guo Yingjie focus on the links between Hong Kong‘s 
democratisation, Beijing‘s manipulation of Hong Kong‘s political future, and the 
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political rhetoric of Chinese nationalism promoted by the People‘s Republic of 
China (PRC).
3
  They briefly discussed issues relating to Hong Kong‘s struggle 
for democracy.  As the book‘s focus is Chinese nationalism in China, their 
discussion of Hong Kong does not examine in detail the political history of Hong 
Kong or Hong Kong‘s response to the 4 June suppression of the Tiananmen 
protests in 1989.   
Similarly, Maria Hsia Chang‘s Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded 
Nationalism focuses on the history of Chinese nationalism in China and contains 
only a small section on Hong Kong and the Defend Diaoyu Islands (Baodiao 保
釣) campaign in Hong Kong in 1996.4  In contrast, the works of Zheng Hailin (鄭
海麟 ) are more useful for providing a documentary history of the Baodiao 
movement in Hong Kong and overseas, and the history of the Diaoyu Islands.
5
  
Zheng, however, does not provide a comprehensive account of the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign in Hong Kong.  Nor does he critically examine the reasons behind the 
emergence of the Baodiao fever in 1996.  The 1996 Baodiao campaign is 
significant because it was the last major expression of China-orientated 
nationalism before the 1997 handover and the Baodiao fever had its origins in the 
1970s.  The 1996 campaign is a classic example of how Hong Kong‘s political 
situation contributed to the rise of nationalism in colonial Hong Kong. 
                                                     
3
 He Baogang and Guo Yingjie, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation ( Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000), pp.175-176. 
4
 Maria Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2001), pp.210-213. 
5
 Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, Diaoyudaolieyu zhi lishi yu fali yanjiu 釣魚島之歷史與法理研究 (A 
Study of the History and Legal Issues Relating to the Diaoyu Islands) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 
2007); and Zhongri diaoyutaizhizheng yu donghai hujie wenti haiwai Baodiao shinian jilu 中日釣
魚台之爭與東海劃界問題 (The Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan and 
the Problem of Territorial Divisions in the Eastern Sea: A Record of 10 Years of the Overseas 
Baodiao Movement) (Taibei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2007). 
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A useful and significant work on post-1949 Hong Kong politics is Lam 
Wai-man‘s Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong.6  Lam critically 
examines political movements in Hong Kong and her work touches upon various 
the themes of political activism and nationalism.  In examining various social and 
political movements Lam refutes the view that the Hong Kong Chinese 
community was politically indifferent.  Although Lam does discuss China-
orientated nationalism in her brief examination of the 1956 riots and the rise of 
nationalistic sentiments among Hong Kong youth in the 1970s, the focus of her 
book is social and political movements and Hong Kong people‘s political 
participation. Lam‘s work does not examine Hong Kong‘s response to 4 June in 
1989, as her book focuses on events that occurred between 1949 and 1979 and 
the idea of political activism.  The main purpose of her work is to challenge the 
claim that Hong Kong people were politically apathetic.   
Studies that focus specifically on patriotism and nationalism in Hong 
Kong include Gregory P. Fairbrother‘s Toward Critical Patriotism: Student 
Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China, and Ma Jiewei‘s 
Aiguo zhengzhi shencha ( 愛 國 政 治 審 查 , A Political Investigation of 
Patriotism).
7
  Fairbrother examines the attitudes of students in China and Hong 
Kong who received their secondary education in the 1990s, towards nationalism 
and civic education in Hong Kong and patriotic education in China.  Taking into 
account the political and educational contexts of Hong Kong and China, 
Fairbrother found that Hong Kong students had a neutral and ambivalent attitude 
                                                     
6
 Lam Wai-man, Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 
2004). 
7
 Ma Jiewei 馬傑偉 and Zhou Peixia 周佩霞, Aiguo zhengzhishencha 愛國政治審查 (A Political 
Investigation of Patriotism) (Xianggang: Ci wen hua tang, 2005). 
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towards patriotism, while mainland Chinese students were more nationalistic.
8
  
While Fairbrother‘s work provides some information about the Hong Kong and 
Chinese governments‘ policies on political education in Hong Kong and China, 
and the influence of education on students‘ attitudes towards nationalism, his 
study does not tell us about the development of China-orientated sentiments 
outside an educational context between 1949 and the 1990s.  Similarly, the 
limitation of Ma Kit-wai‘s study is that it focuses almost entirely on patriotism in 
post-1997 Hong Kong. 
A recent book that focuses on national identity in Hong Kong is the edited 
volume Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation by Gordon Mathews, 
Ma Kit-wai and Lui Tai-lok.
9
  However, much of this book focuses on the post-
1997 period and national identity vis-à-vis Hong Kong identity.  It does not 
examine in detail the different types of nationalist rhetoric that emerged in 1949-
1997, nor does it provide a detailed study of the evolution of China-orientated 
nationalism in Hong Kong during that period. 
Research Methodology 
Collectively, these studies fail to provide a macro-level study of the 
historical development of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong 
from 1949 to 1997.  My thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of China-
orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong.  Rather than discussing Hong 
Kong identity, my research focuses on the political history of China-orientated 
                                                     
8
 Gregory P. Fairbrother, Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in 
Hong Kong and China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), p.185. 
9
 Gordon Mathews, Ma Kit-wai and Tai Lok Lui, Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a 
Nation (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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nationalism in Hong Kong.  I use the same multiple-case approach that Tsai and 
Lam used in their work by studying, diachronically, historical events that saw the 
construction and expression of a variety of China-orientated nationalistic 
sentiments in Hong Kong from 1949 to 1997.  Although the events that I will 
describe only saw the participation of a minority of the Chinese community, they 
illustrate, when examined separately, the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism 
at a particular period, and, when examined together, the evolution of nationalist 
discourses over 50 years.  Like most historians of Hong Kong history, I have 
used the materials in the Hong Kong Government Records Office.  As I am 
studying the construction of nationalist rhetoric, I also made extensive use of 
Chinese-language publications.  However, archival materials and Chinese-
language publications alone do not provide sufficient information about the 
personal perspectives of actors involved in nationalist movements.  Therefore, I 
interviewed five people from diverse backgrounds who were deeply involved in 
nationalist movements at various periods.
10
 
Defining Chinese Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong: Some 
Theoretical Issues 
 At the centre of nationalism is the idea of the nation.  My research on 
Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong was inspired by Benedict Anderson‘s concept 
of the nation as an ‗imagined community‘.  Anderson defined the nation as an 
                                                     
10
 Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁), Martin Lee Chu-ming (李柱銘) and Tsang Kin-sing (曾建成) 
did not respond to my requests for an interview.  Tsang Shu-ki (曾澍基) declined to be 
interviewed. 
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‗imagined political community‘.11  The nation also refers to an imagined ethnic 
and cultural community tied together by culture, language, history, and myths.
12
  
The term ‗nation‘, as used in this thesis, is different from the term ‗state‘.  Studies 
of Chinese nationalism in China often make note of this distinction, which 
applies to China-orientated nationalistic movements in Hong Kong as well.  The 
term ‗state‘ refers to the political institution or sovereign ‗possessing tangible 
territorial, demographic, and governmental attributes regardless of ethnic or 
cultural divisions.‘13  In my thesis, I refer to the PRC and the Republic of China 
(ROC) as Chinese states.
14
 
Ethnicity is an important factor in the imagination of the nation.  Anthony 
Smith‘s idea of ethnicity provides a useful theoretical framework for 
understanding the origins and nature of China-orientated nationalism in post-
1949 Hong Kong.  In National Identity, Smith lists six main attributes of ethnic 
community: (i) a collective proper name; (ii) a myth of common ancestry; (iii) 
shared historical memories; (iv) one or more differentiating elements of common 
culture; (v) an association with a specific ‗homeland‘ and (vi) a sense of 
solidarity for significant sectors of the population.
 15
  Although Smith‘s 
conceptual framework is useful for understanding China-orientated nationalism 
in Hong Kong, we need to apply it carefully, for some of the attributes are 
                                                     
11
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 2002), p.6. 
12
 Sui Shengzhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Naitonalism 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.60. 
13
 Ibid.  See also Montserrat Guibernau, ‗Globalisation and the Nation-State‘, in Understanding 
Nationalism ed. Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 
pp.242-268. 
14
 It should be noted that there is an exception.  As I shall discuss in Chapter Three, some of the 
Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong viewed the ROC and the GMD as different. 
15
 Smith, National Identity, p. 21. 
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problematic when applied to the Hong Kong case.  Attributes (i), (ii), (v) and (vi) 
are relevant to the case of Hong Kong, where ‗China‘ was the common proper 
name, and was referred to as ‗motherland‘ in nationalist rhetoric.  In the 1950s, 
Chinese who fled to Hong Kong after 1949 still regarded China as their homeland.  
The Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong had an emotional attachment to 
traditional Chinese culture, which became the basis of their cultural 
nationalism.
16
  Pro-China university students in the 1970s perceived China 
rhetorically as the ‗motherland‘.  When Hong Kong people responded to 4 June 
1989 in support of the Chinese democracy movement they identified themselves 
as being part of the Chinese nation, although their response was fuelled by 
concern over Hong Kong‘s political future.  However, (iii) and (iv) are 
problematic in Hong Kong‘s case, for there is no evidence that ‗common culture‘ 
was the only significant motif in the expression of China-orientated nationalism 
in post-1949 Hong Kong.  Cultural nationalism promoted by the Chinese 
intellectuals in exile in the 1950s was based specifically on traditional Chinese 
culture, which had little impact on the development of China-orientated 
nationalism outside academia; and the emergence of popular nationalism from 
the 1970s onwards was fuelled by local politics not ‗common culture‘ or ‗shared 
historical memories‘. 
Three types of nationalism emerged in Hong Kong in 1949-1997: cultural 
nationalism, political nationalism, and popular nationalism.  By ‗cultural 
nationalism‘ I refer to the type of nationalism tied to a revival of traditional 
                                                     
16
 These intellectuals included Qian Mu (錢穆), Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), 
and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀). 
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Chinese culture.  By ‗political nationalism‘ I refer to the nationalist rhetoric based 
on pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP)/pro-Guomindang (GMD) sentiments 
and nationalist sentiments that grew out of the CCP-GMD struggle.  By ‗popular 
nationalism‘, I refer to the type of nationalism that had no connection with pro-
CCP/pro-GMD sentiments or the CCP-GMD struggle.  The three categories 
accentuate the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in 1949-
1997.  Up until 1949, the focus of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong 
was on China, but in the post-1949 period, increasingly the focus was on what 
was happening in Hong Kong rather than China. 
The fact that Hong Kong is a society of immigrants helps explain the 
emergence of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong.  Many in 
the Chinese community fled from China during and after the Chinese Civil War 
of 1946-1949 and thus had a personal relationship with Chinese history.  
Therefore, it is possible that some of the later generations of Hong Kong Chinese 
inherited this emotional attachment to China due to the influence of family 
members.  The fact that the colonial education system contributed to Chinese 
students‘ identification with China culturally also helps explain the rise of 
nationalism. 
We can see that the sense of being Chinese in Hong Kong included one‘s 
personal background and descent, Chinese culture, emotional attachment to 
China as a nation, as well as, sometimes, political allegiances to the CCP or the 
GMD.  The significance of descent in the emergence of national identity has been 
noted by Frank Dikotter.  Dikotter used the term ‗racial nationalism‘ and argues 
12 
 
that ―a discourse of patrilineal descent has emerged as a very powerful and 
cohesive form of national identity in China, which has been capable of 
transcending the extreme diversity of religious practices, family structures, 
spoken languages, and the regional cultures of population groups that all define 
themselves as ‗Chinese‘‖. 17   Dikotter argues that in Taiwan, Singapore and 
mainland China, blood and descent define ‗Chineseness‘.18  To that list of places 
I would add Hong Kong.  In this thesis, by ‗Chinese‘ I refer not only to Chinese 
people in China but also to Hong Kong people of Chinese descent, whether they 
be those who were in the colony before 1949, those who fled from China during 
and after the Chinese Civil War, or those who grew up in Hong Kong after 1949. 
Smith has noted that nationalism was not only ‗imagined‘ but also ‗deeply 
felt and acted out‘. 19   The historical episodes representing the expression of 
China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong are the actions; and my 
thesis shows how nationalism in Hong Kong was not simply an act of 
imagination.  Those in the Hong Kong Chinese community involved in 
nationalist movements had such a strong emotional attachment to China, whether 
it is to the state or the nation, that they expressed their nationalistic feelings 
passionately whenever the opportunity arose. 
I emphasise that the nationalist movements examined in my study saw the 
participation of only a minority of Chinese in Hong Kong.  In the post-1949 
period, up until the 1980s at least, the majority of the Chinese community had 
                                                     
17
 Frank Dikotter, ‗Culture, ―Race‖, and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth 
Century China‘, Journal of International Affairs, 1996, 49, 2, pp.590-605. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of 
Nations and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2001), p.137. 
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little interest in Chinese politics, Hong Kong politics, or China-orientated 
nationalism.  As I shall demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the evolution of 
China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was also related to that of the ethnic 
Chinese community‘s political participation.  In any case, ethnicity alone does 
not provide a satisfactory answer to the development of China-orientated 
nationalism in colonial Hong Kong.  We must also take into account the external 
factors: the China factor, Hong Kong factor, and colonialism. 
Main Arguments 
My thesis has six main arguments.  First, China and China-orientated 
nationalisms were constructions by some sectors of the Chinese community in 
post-1949 Hong Kong.  These constructions demonstrate that there were always 
divisions among activists within nationalist movements in Hong Kong.  At times, 
such divisions were caused by local political differences.  Second, the China 
factor, the Hong Kong factor and colonialism contributed to the development of 
China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.  Third, the nature and rhetoric of 
China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong evolved significantly in the period 
between the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the end of British colonial 
rule in 1997, and throughout that period China-centred nationalism served a 
variety of political purposes within Hong Kong.  Fourth, many of Hong Kong‘s 
people, in reacting to events in China, particularly from 1967 onwards, imagined 
the Chinese nation as different from the political state.  Fifth, nationalist fevers 
disrupted and endangered the lives of Hong Kong citizens as well as those 
involved in the nationalist movements.  These five points highlight the complexity 
14 
 
of China-centred nationalism and the impact that nationalism had on Hong Kong 
society in the post-1949 period. 
Structure of the Thesis 
My thesis consists of three parts, with six case studies examined 
diachronically.  Part 1 examines in brief the different dimensions of the politics 
of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  However, the focus of the thesis is on the post-1949 period, and thus 
there is much more material in Parts 2 and 3.  Part 2, which consists of two 
chapters, examines China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 
1960s.  Chapter Three discusses the development of cultural and political 
nationalisms under the influence of post-civil war politics in the 1950s revolving 
around the effort to recruit and mobilise supporters in Hong Kong by the local 
bodies in Hong Kong that backed the PRC or alternatively the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan.  In Chapter Four I examine the construction and failure of 
the Hong Kong leftists‘ anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric during the 1967 
riots inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China.  In Part 3, I analyse the 
emergence of popular China-orientated nationalist sentiments and strategies in 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which were related more to Hong Kong politics than 
to Chinese politics.  The subject matter of Chapter Five is the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign and the rise of the China Faction in the student movement in the 1970s.  
In Chapter Six I examine Hong Kong‘s response to the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre in 1989, and in Chapter Seven I discuss the 1996 Baodiao campaign.  
Chapter Eight serves as a Conclusion. 
15 
 
Chapter Two: Dimensions of China-Orientated 
Nationalism in Hong Kong 1900s-1949 
China-orientated nationalism has existed in Hong Kong since the early 
twentieth century.  Although the focus of the thesis is on the post-1949 period, to 
understand how the interaction between Chinese history and Hong Kong 
influenced China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong it is pertinent to examine 
in brief the politics of China-orientated nationalism in the pre-1949 period.  Up 
until 1949, China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was more about China 
than it was about Hong Kong.  By examining a series of case studies this chapter 
aims to provide a brief analysis of the influence of Chinese history and the social, 
economic, and political situations in Hong Kong on expressions of China-
orientated nationalism in early twentieth-century Hong Kong.  These case studies 
have been chosen because they clearly show how China-orientated nationalism 
was open to interpretation and a significant issue with which the colonial 
government and some sectors of the Chinese community had to grapple.  In 
addition, these case studies accentuate the multi-dimensional nature of China-
orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the pre-1949 period.  In the long period 
between 1900 and 1949, China-orientated nationalism at times jeopardised the 
security and economy of Hong Kong.  It was used as a tactic by both the colonial 
government and some in the Chinese community for political and economic 
purposes.  It also created divisions among some sectors of the Chinese 
community. 
16 
 
In the first section, I discuss in brief the historical background of the 
colony in the first half of the twentieth century.  In the second part of the chapter, 
I examine the case of Chinese elites who, although they were collaborators with 
the British, did have a sense of China-orientated nationalism.  In the third and 
fourth sections, I examine the surge of nationalistic sentiments among the 
Chinese community in Hong Kong, as a result of the China factor, in three strikes 
and boycotts: the Tramway Boycotts of 1912, the May Fourth boycott of 1919 
and the Canton-Hong Kong General Strike of 1925.  The General Strike in 
particular shows how China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation.  In 
the fifth section, I examine the ‗national goods‘ movement of the 1930s to 
demonstrate how China-orientated nationalism was used as a tool by Chinese 
businesses in Hong Kong to protect their economic interests.  In the final parts of 
the chapter, I examine the politics of China-orientated nationalism during the 
Sino-Japanese conflict and the Chinese Civil War.  Although Chinese businesses 
in Hong Kong contributed to the war effort, the fact that their business interests 
were tied to the British limited the ways in which they expressed nationalism.  In 
addition, two competing expressions of nationalist rhetoric in Hong Kong 
emerged during the Sino-Japanese conflict as the exile community from China 
promoted the war effort, while the Wang Jingwei faction promoted its 
collaborationist agenda through its propaganda apparatus in the colony.  Like the 
1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike, these competing forms of wartime nationalist 
rhetoric show that China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation.  The 
work of the Hong Kong branch of the CCP during the Chinese Civil War shows 
how nationalism served as a tool for the CCP to promote its political agenda. 
17 
 
Hong Kong in the Early Twentieth Century 
Before World War Two (WWII), Hong Kong was not a particularly large 
city.  In 1911, Hong Kong‘s population was approximately 450,000. 20   The 
population of the colony increased steadily from 501,304 in 1914 to 598,100 in 
1919.
21
  By 1920, Hong Kong‘s population was about 650,000.22  There was an 
influx of immigrants into the colony in the 1920s and during the Sino-Japanese 
conflict in the late 1930s.
23
  From 1921 to 1931, the Hong Kong population 
increased from approximately 625,000 to 850,000.  According to the Hong Kong 
Census Report there were 849,751 people living in the colony in 1931, 96.85 per 
cent of whom were Chinese.
24
   
Hong Kong was relatively more stable, politically and economically, than 
mainland China.  During the decades when China was plagued by political 
turmoil, more people came to Hong Kong to settle.  Before WWII, Hong Kong 
was an entrepot.  Although the colony‘s economy had been hit hard by World 
War One (WWI), the Great Depression, and various strikes, local commerce and 
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industries began to develop in the 1920s and early 1930s and expanded rapidly a 
few years before 1941.
25
   
During the Sino-Japanese war there was a further influx of migrants from 
China into the colony.  However, shortly afterwards, the population declined as 
many again left Hong Kong for the mainland.  While the population had steadily 
increased in the pre-war years, Hong Kong before 1949 was an emigration port.  
The city‘s population was extremely mobile, for, up to 1939, over six million 
Chinese had travelled overseas from or through Hong Kong.
26
  The Hong Kong 
population make-up of the 1930s was largely lower class, born in China, while 
the upper class compradores, merchants, and the colonisers were a minority.  The 
professional middle class was very small.
27
   
Hong Kong occupied a special position in the history of modern China.  
Not only was the colony the birthplace of modern Chinese newspapers, but it was 
the nursery of prominent Chinese in the political circles of late-Qing and early-
Republican China.   Some of these prominent Chinese political figures, such as 
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Sun Yat-sen, received their education in Hong Kong.
28
  As the China factor had 
such a huge impact on Hong Kong society, it was only natural for the Hong Kong 
government to implement specific policies to curb the development of China-
orientated nationalism for the sake of maintaining political and social stability in 
the colony.  In the next section, I shall examine how the colonial government 
controlled the promotion of nationalist discourses. 
Colonialism: Containing and Promoting China-Orientated 
nationalism to Maintain Stability 1910s - 1920s 
Colonialism in the early twentieth century acted as both a contributing 
and a limiting factor in the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong 
Kong.  John Carroll, using the case of Ho Kai (何啓, 1859-1914), argued that the 
‗Hong Kong government itself encouraged the growth of China-orientated 
nationalism by providing schools and selecting students for further training in 
Europe, and by generally encouraging the idea of citizenship‘, for what the 
colonial officials envisioned to be a new China.
29
  However, at the same time, for 
the sake of maintaining political stability, the Hong Kong government promoted 
Confucianism in schools in the wake of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and 
the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike.
30
  The British feared that radical ideas 
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originating from the May Fourth Movement would undermine its rule in Hong 
Kong.
31
  Thus, following the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike governor Clementi 
emphasised the need for Chinese people to learn about their own culture.  
Moreover, in an attempt to combat anti-British sentiments and the influence of 
the May Fourth movement, the Hong Kong government proposed to set up a 
department of Chinese at the University of Hong Kong, with an emphasis on 
promoting Confucianism and traditional Chinese literature.
32
  Chinese elites, too, 
emphasised the need to promote Confucianism, for like the government they 
were concerned about political and economic stability.
33
 
The colonial government in its own political interests selectively 
promoted certain aspects of Chinese culture and allowed only the kind of Chinese 
cultural nationalism that would not threaten its rule.  However, colonialism was 
not the only factor influencing the development of China-orientated nationalism 
in the colony.  The political and economic interests of the Chinese elites, too, 
served as a major influence.  This is illustrated by the stories of Chinese elites 
who collaborated with the British. 
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Patriotic Collaborators: Local Influential Chinese and China-
Orientated nationalism in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Century 
Local influential Chinese who collaborated with the colonial government 
had existed in Hong Kong before the twentieth century.  They formed various 
organisations not only to promote trade in Hong Kong, but also to help those in 
need.  Hong Kong Chinese elites were significant in that together they formed 
key associations that constituted an influential force in the colony, as noted by 
sociologist Henry Lethbridge.  He has argued that key associations in the Chinese 
community formed by the elites contributed to the relative stability of Hong 
Kong, and that these associations gave them a position of influence and allowed 
them to ‗sit at the right hand of the governor‘.34  Historically, Chinese elites were 
closely involved in the affairs of Hong Kong as they were consulted, or absorbed 
into the administrative process of the colonial government.
35
  The elites were 
both representatives of the Chinese community and partners of the colonial 
government. 
The Chinese elites‘ relationship with the Hong Kong government, and 
with the local Chinese community was not always amicable.  The Chinese elites 
who collaborated with the British were at times accused by other Chinese of 
collaborating with the British imperialists.
36
  However, the fact that these Chinese 
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elites collaborated with the British did not mean that they were not patriotic.  
With the development of a Chinese bourgeoisie since the late nineteenth century 
and the emergence a new Chinese business and professional class in the early 
twentieth century,
37
 a new form of nationalism emerged.  Chinese elites in Hong 
Kong such as Ho Kai held the belief that economic and political reforms were 
necessary to strengthen the Chinese nation.
38
  They also believed that working 
with the British through trade would help China fight other foreign powers such 
as Russia and France.
39
 
Analysis: Chinese Elites and Collaboration as Patriotism 
The cases of Ho Kai and Chinese elites in Hong Kong in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries show that the fact that local influential 
Chinese collaborated with the colonial government did not mean that they were 
not patriotic.  There are no pre-defined or objective criteria as to what it means to 
be a patriot.  One did not need to be anti-colonial to be nationalistic.  The fact that 
Chinese elites‘ political and economic interests were tied to the British meant that 
their nationalist rhetoric was inseparable from the colonial situation of Hong 
Kong and thus served as a limitation to their expression of China-orientated 
nationalism.  
The term ‗collaborationist nationalists‘ has been used to refer to the 
patriotic Chinese elites who collaborated with the British in Hong Kong.
40
  
Through collaboration with the colonizers, these patriotic Chinese elites sought to 
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protect the interests of China and to contribute to the strengthening of the Chinese 
nation.
41
  However, collaborationist nationalists only sought to protect mercantile 
interests, not the interests of the lower classes.
42
 
 Other cases also show that Chinese merchants‘ expressions of 
nationalism were at times motivated not by ethnic consciousness, but by 
economic interests.  Cases from the WWII period show that Chinese merchants 
were unable to support the war effort openly due to their economic and political 
interests in Hong Kong.  I shall discuss these cases later in the chapter.  In the 
next two sections, I continue to explore the concept of the politics of nationalism 
by examining the Tramway Boycott of 1913 and the May Fourth Boycott of 1919.  
I have chosen these two case studies because they illustrate how the interaction 
between Chinese history and Hong Kong‘s economic and political circumstances 
triggered and shaped the expression of China-orientated nationalism in the colony.  
The two case studies also demonstrate how nationalism was used as a tactic and 
was open to interpretation. 
The Politics of National Pride: The Tramway Boycott 1913 and 
the May Fourth Boycott 1919 
 The 1911 revolution sparked the rise of popular nationalism in Hong 
Kong.  This is evidenced by the Chinese community‘s positive reaction to the 
revolution since the Wuhan uprising of 10 October 1911.  Within a few days after 
the Wuhan uprising thousands of men in Hong Kong cut off their queue.  On 18 
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October, about 400 Chinese attacked the offices of a Qing-loyalist newspaper and 
the Bank of China, and forced them to remove the Manchu dragon flags.  When 
the Chinese press in Hong Kong received news (which was later found to be 
untrue) that Peking had fallen to the revolutionaries, there was much celebration 
among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.
43
 
  The increased national pride among the Chinese community in Hong 
Kong after 1911 is evidenced by the Tramway boycott and the May Fourth 
boycott.  In April 1912, in an attempt to strengthen the local monetary system 
against the flow of depreciated Chinese coins into the colony, the Hong Kong 
government passed the Foreign Copper Coin Ordinance.
44
  The Ordinance 
banned the importation and circulation of foreign copper and bronze coins.  The 
move by the colonial government was seen by many Chinese in Hong Kong as 
disrespectful to the new ROC.
45
  The Hong Kong government‘s attempt to 
enforce the ordinance eventually led to a three-month tramway boycott during the 
winter of 1912-1913.  In November 1912, the two tramway companies and the 
Star Ferry Company were told by Governor Francis Henry May to refuse Chinese 
coins for fare payment.  However, nationalism alone did not result in the tramway 
boycott, for there were economic factors involved.  When the new fare payment 
policy came into force on 18 November 1912, many European and Chinese 
passengers were unable to pay their fares due to a shortage of Hong Kong coins.  
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The new fare policy also had an adverse impact on the economic interests of 
Chinese merchants such as small bankers and traders, who made significant 
profits from the exchange business.  Further, many Chinese employers paid their 
employees‘ salary in Chinese coins and thus the new fare policy upset Chinese 
workers.
46
 
During the boycott, which broke out shortly after the new fare policy 
came into effect, the trams were often stoned and shopkeepers either refused to 
serve those who got off the trams or charged them exorbitant prices.
47
  Along the 
tram route there were posters threatening tramway riders with death and 
promoting an anti-imperialist rhetoric as well as nationalistic sentiments.
48
  To 
combat the boycott, the Hong Kong government passed a law that essentially 
made boycotts illegal and allowed the government to impose a special punitive 
rate over a boycotting area and pay the rate to those incurring loss due to the 
boycott.
49
  The Tramway Company also issued tickets to merchants for sale to 
their employees and by February, the boycott had ended. 
 As a nationalist movement, the Tramway Boycott grew out of the 
interaction between the China factor, the Hong Kong factor and nationalistic 
sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.
50
  The economic factor, 
combined with the rise in nationalism in Hong Kong, served as the main trigger.
51
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The boycott resulted in economic losses and caused inconveniences to the 
Chinese community.  The boycott also reflected the surge of nationalistic 
sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong following the 1911 
revolution.   
China-Orientated Nationalism and Anti-Japanese Sentiments: 
The May Fourth Boycott 1919 
 The May Fourth Movement resulted in a surge of nationalistic sentiments 
in both China and Hong Kong.  There have been many studies done on the May 
Fourth Movement as well as its implications in Chinese history; therefore, I will 
only discuss it briefly.
52
  On 4 May 1919, student representatives from thirteen 
area colleges and universities gathered in Peking and staged a protest involving 
3,000 students,
53
 after hearing that China was unable to recover Qingdao in the 
Shandong province from Japan at the Versailles Peace Conference.  The 
Shandong settlement also led to a series of nationwide demonstrations, boycotts 
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and strikes from late May to late June against both the Beijing regime and 
Japan.
54
 
 The May Fourth Movement in China sparked boycotts of Japanese goods 
and anti-Japanese protests in Hong Kong as well.  Many Chinese removed 
Japanese goods from their households.
55
  The Chinese community criticised some 
of the major Chinese businesses in Hong Kong for selling Japanese goods.  In 
order to protect their economic interests, these businesses decided to promote the 
products they sold as ‗national goods‘.56  Teachers and students, too, promoted 
patriotic sentiments and the idea of national goods.
57
  
Determined to maintain political stability, the colonial government 
stepped up its efforts to suppress the rise of patriotic sentiments.  As mentioned 
previously, to combat the influence of the May Fourth Movement both the 
colonial government and the conservative Chinese elites promoted Confucianism.  
During the May Fourth protests, the education department inspected Chinese 
schools and checked teaching materials.  The police also searched bookstores and 
confiscated textbooks that were ‗undesirable‘.58  Thus, two types of nationalism 
emerged in Hong Kong during the May Fourth Movement.  One was 
conservative cultural nationalism promoted by the colonial government, and the 
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other was based on anti-Japanese sentiments resulting from the May Fourth 
Movement. 
The Hong Kong government reinforced armed police patrols on the 
streets.  On 3 June, the Hong Kong police arrested eight students who were 
marching along Queen‘s Road Central while holding Chinese-made umbrellas 
bearing the Chinese characters ‗national goods‘.  However, the arrest only served 
to provoke the Chinese community further as more boycotts took place and 
Japanese stores were stoned.
59
 
The May Fourth Boycott of 1919 shows that Chinese businesses 
supported nationalism as a tactic to protect their business interests and how 
colonialism served as a limiting and contributing factor in expressions of 
nationalist sentiments.  The emergence of the two different kinds of nationalism 
in 1919 illustrates how China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation.  
The Canton-Hong Kong General Strike of 1925, the subject of the next section, 
also shows how nationalism was open to interpretation as the Chinese community 
had different opinions on the strike.  Once again, Chinese businesses turned to 
nationalism in combating the strike to protect their economic interests, and others 
who supported the strike did so in the name of patriotism. 
The Canton-Hong Kong General Strike 1925-1926 
The 1925-1926 General Strike-Boycott in Canton and Hong Kong was 
triggered by the May Thirtieth Incident (五卅慘案), which took place on 30 May 
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1925.
60
  A general strike took place and it was followed by a sixteen-month 
boycott.  In May 1925, a group of Chinese workers in Shanghai, who were on 
strike and locked out of a Japanese-owned textile mill, broke into the mill and 
destroyed some of the machinery.  Japanese guards opened fire and killed one of 
the workers.  The incident sparked public outrage, demonstrations and more 
strikes.  On May 30, thousands of workers and students gathered in Nanjing Road 
to demand the release of six Chinese students who had been arrested by the 
British, and to protest against foreign imperialism.
61
 
The Shakee Massacre of 23 June 1925 in which of the hundred thousand 
or so protesters 52 were shot dead and 167 were injured by British troops in 
Canton further provoked the Chinese community in Hong Kong.
62
  While it is 
clear that Chinese in Hong Kong were ‗spurred to action by patriotism and 
nationalism‘,63 China-orientated nationalism alone could not have sustained the 
strike.  Other contributing factors included political forces from Canton, 
economic hardships of Chinese workers in the colony, Chinese students‘ 
increased political awareness as well as the masses‘ dissatisfaction with the 
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colonial government.
64
  Moreover, many workers were forced to go on strike by 
the strike committee.
65
  Leftist forces in the GMD and the CCP in Canton were 
directly involved in organising the strike-boycott,
66
 and the Chinese Communists 
exploited the nationalistic sentiments of Hong Kong workers sparked by the May 
Thirtieth Incident.
67
 
The strike-boycott in Canton and Hong Kong had a significant economic 
and social impact on the colony.  The Hong Kong government‘s revenue 
decreased significantly.  As many as 3,000 shops went bankrupt in November 
and December 1925.
68
  The strike drew approximately 250,000 Hong Kong 
strikers and their families back to the Canton Delta, and exposed the nationalistic 
sentiments of the strikers, as noted by Ming K. Chan: 
[T]he Hong Kong strikers not only echoed the call for the abolition of 
unequal treaties and the other requirements of the Shanghai May 
Thirtieth protesters but also presented six specific demands to the 
colonial regime to redress local Chinese grievances‘
69
   
While there was confrontation between the workers and their employers, 
there was also collaboration between the merchants, the residents of Hong Kong, 
and the Hong Kong government as it was in the interest of all three sides that law 
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and order be maintained and things return to normal as soon as possible.
70
  The 
Hong Kong government under Sir Reginald Stubbs believed that there was a 
Communist plot going on,
71
 and was determined to suppress Communist 
influence in the colony.  The fact that the General Strike and Boycott of 1925 had 
its roots in the May Thirtieth Incident shows that the surge of nationalistic 
sentiments in Hong Kong was triggered by events in China.
72
   
Not all in the Chinese community supported the strike.  Chinese elites 
such as Shouson Chou (周壽臣) were caught in a difficult position, for although 
they did not support the strike due to economic interests, they were reluctant to 
oppose it openly for political reasons, as they did not wish to severe their 
relations with the Canton government.
73
  In any case, local Chinese 
businesspeople and the Hong Kong government took steps in an attempt to stop 
the general strike.  In fact, Chinese businesses turned to China-orientated 
nationalism in an attempt to persuade workers to return to work by saying that 
‗true patriots‘ should return to work and they accused the Canton government of 
being a ‗traitor‘ and puppet of the Soviet Union.74  The disruption caused by the 
Communists to business in Hong Kong, and other areas in China, gave rise to 
anti-Communist sentiments among Chinese merchants in Hong Kong in 
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particular.  Chan Lau Kit-ching has even argued that ‗the entire Hong Kong 
society could be said to be anti-Communist‘.75 
Analysis: China-Orientated nationalism and the Canton-Hong 
Kong Strike Boycott 
As far as the politics of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong is 
concerned, the strike-boycott illustrates several matters.  First, as a nationalist 
movement the strike-boycott was sparked by both the Chinese political context as 
well as by Hong Kong‘s social context.  Second, because the strike-boycott, as an 
expression of nationalism, adversely affected Hong Kong‘s economy as well as 
the livelihood of those who were forced to leave Hong Kong or those who stayed 
in Hong Kong, a sense of fear for the Communists began to emerge among the 
Hong Kong population.  Third, the strike illustrates how an event in China could 
stir up nationalist sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.  
Fourth, for the CCP and the GMD, the interests of the people of the colony were 
only secondary to politics and the country itself.
76
   
The strike illustrates how the tide of nationalism originating from the 
Mainland could sweep across the British colony, and how nationalism was open 
to interpretation as the strike resulted in political divisions within the Chinese 
community in Hong Kong.  On the one hand, there were the strikers and students 
who supported the Canton revolutionary government as a way to express their 
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patriotism.  On the other hand, the local merchants and right-wing workers who 
opposed the strike claimed that they did so in the name of nationalism as they 
believed the strikes would have an adverse effect on Chinese businesses in the 
colony.
77
  Both sides claimed to be ‗nationalistic‘ and criticised each other as 
‗traitors‘.78   
The debate over nationalism during the 1925 General Strike accentuates 
two features of nationalism in pre-1949 Hong Kong.  First, the socio-economic 
and socio-political environment of the colony had a significant impact on the 
expressions of nationalism.  Secondly, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong 
Kong would make use of China-orientated nationalism to protect their economic 
and political interests.  In fact, at times Chinese businesses used China-orientated 
nationalism as a tactic to promote their products.  In the following section, I 
examine the dynamics of that nationalism in the business context in the 1930s. 
Chinese Businesses in Hong Kong and the Politics of China-
Orientated nationalism in the Late 1920s and 1930s 
Chinese businesses in Hong Kong at times turned to nationalism to 
protect their economic interests.  The marketing of Hong Kong products as 
guohuo (國貨), or ‗national goods‘, and the use of nationalist rhetoric by Chinese 
businesspeople in Hong Kong in the 1930s illustrate how issues of identity and 
China-orientated nationalism extended to the commercial scene.
79
  Local 
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industries expanded in the 1920s and 1930s, as Hong Kong became an industrial 
society.
80
  At that time Hong Kong products were not regarded as Chinese 
products in mainland China, but in the Exhibition of Chinese Products held in 
February 1938, most of the participants were Hong Kong-based factories and 
companies.  The irony is that Hong Kong products became guohuo (Chinese 
national goods) in the exhibition, yet the manufacturers seldom labelled their 
goods as guohuo.
81
  The Chinese Manufacturers‘ Union of Hong Kong, 
established in 1934 tried to promote to the public a Chinese identity for Hong 
Kong goods.
82
   
 In the 1930s, Chinese businesses in Hong Kong were faced with the 
imposition of high tariffs in China on non-Chinese goods, and were 
disadvantaged by the British Imperial Preference System, which was designed to 
protect British capitalists‘ interests at the expense of Hong Kong-Chinese 
merchants‘ interests.83  In response to these challenges, Chinese businesses in 
Hong Kong turned to nationalism by promoting their products as ‗national goods‘.  
However, their quest for ‗transnational economic citizenship‘ failed because the 
Chinese Nationalist government did not officially recognise products made in 
Hong Kong as national goods.
84
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During the first phases of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Chinese businesses 
in Hong Kong once again turned to patriotism to promote their products.  In 
commercial advertisements, for example, Chinese businesses claimed that buying 
their products meant supporting the war in China.  In other words, Chinese 
businesses attempted to exploit the Chinese community‘s anti-Japanese 
patriotism by claiming that using their products was supporting China.
85
  Chinese 
businesses also chose names for their companies that carried a nationalistic 
tone.
86
  In fact, the tactic of exploiting nationalism for the sake of protecting 
business interests had been used by Chinese merchants in the 1905 anti-United 
States (US) boycott and the 1908 anti-Japanese boycott.
87
  
Moreover, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong Kong took a cautious 
approach in supporting the war against Japan.  For example, when the Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce and the Tung Wah Hospital organised a 
fundraising campaign during the Jinan Incident of 1928, they emphasised that the 
Jinan Incident was only one of the many disasters in China that needed donations, 
thus downplaying the political implications of the Sino-Japanese conflict.
88
  The 
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce Hong Kong and the Tung Wah Hospital 
ensured that the fundraising campaign was conducted as a charitable movement 
rather than a nationalist one.  They wired the donations to the Red Swastika 
Society rather than the Nationalist Army.
89
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Analysis: Chinese Elites and Businesses Confronting and 
Supporting China-Orientated nationalism  
In the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong Kong 
possessed an ambivalent attitude towards China-orientated nationalism.  On some 
occasions they confronted nationalism out of fear that the surge of nationalist 
sentiments would have an adverse impact on their economic interests, which 
were tied to British interests in the colony.  At times, Chinese businesses turned 
to China-orientated nationalism as a tactic to protect their economic interests by 
promoting their products as ‗national goods‘ and thus China-orientated 
nationalism was essentially a construction in the business context. 
That business interests served as a limiting factor in expressions of 
nationalism was reflected clearly in Hong Kong‘s response to the Sino-Japanese 
conflicts.  Chinese businesses were unable to support the war effort openly as 
their interests were tied to colonialism and the Hong Kong government was 
determined to maintain neutrality during the Sino-Japanese conflict.  In this sense, 
private interests and colonialism acted as limitations on expressions of China-
orientated nationalism. 
With the outbreak and escalation of the Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 
1930s and 1940s, there was a surge of anti-Japanese sentiments in Hong Kong.  
The colony became a secondary battleground for Chinese political propaganda.  
The national crisis in China became the new source of the rise of China-
orientated nationalism in the colony.  I will examine briefly the responses of the 
Chinese community to the Shenyang Incident in 1931 and the emergence of two 
37 
 
competing types of nationalist rhetoric during the Sino-Japanese conflict: 
resistance and collaboration.   
The Politics of Anti-Japanese Patriotism I: Violent and Non-
Violent Expressions of Nationalism 
There were numerous examples of how the Chinese community in Hong 
Kong reacted to the Sino-Japanese conflicts following the Shenyang Incident in 
the early 1930s, and made substantial contributions, financial or otherwise, to the 
war effort in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
90
  For example, some left Hong 
Kong for China to contribute to the war effort, including students and 
professionals.
91
  Numerous anti-Japanese and relief societies emerged in Hong 
Kong during the war.
92
  Due to space limitations, I am unable to examine in detail 
Hong Kong‘s response to the Sino-Japanese conflicts.  In this section, I will 
discuss briefly how nationalism was expressed through violent and non-violent 
means. 
The surge of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese community in 
Hong Kong following the Shenyang Incident resulted in a series of anti-Japanese 
riots in September 1931.  There was violence against Japanese residents in Hong 
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Kong and Japanese shops were stoned.  Victims of the violence included 
Japanese families and children.
93
  However, not all in the Chinese community 
supported the use of violence in the expression of nationalism.  Chinese elites 
and some journalists condemned the use of violence against Japanese residents.  
Some in the Chinese community chose to express their patriotism by more 
peaceful means such as the boycott of Japanese goods.
94
 
Collaboration vs. Resistance: Competing Nationalist Rhetoric in 
the Sino-Japanese Conflict 
The Hong Kong government‘s determination to preserve Hong Kong‘s 
neutrality, and its lack of preparation for the war contrasted sharply with the 
dynamics of Chinese wartime politics in the colony.  As the Japanese pushed 
towards the south in China, several well-known Chinese newspapers and 
publications moved to Hong Kong in 1937.
95
  As a result of the activities of 
mainland writers and journalists who supported either the war against Japan, or 
collaboration with Japan, there emerged two types of nationalist rhetoric during 
the Sino-Japanese conflicts in the Chinese-language press.   
Writers from China continued to promote the war effort after fleeing to 
Hong Kong, and the Nationalist government endeavoured to rally the Chinese 
community in Hong Kong to China‘s defence by organising fund-raising 
activities in the colony.  Conversely, Wang Jingwei (汪精衛) and his people 
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involved in the ‗peace movement‘ (和平運動) collaborated with Japan and used 
Hong Kong as a base for propaganda purposes.
96
  In Hong Kong the Wang 
Clique (汪派) used its propaganda arm the South China Daily News (南華日報) 
to promote its political agenda.
97  
Initially the Wang Clique kept a low profile in 
its activities but began promoting its collaborationist agenda and criticised the 
idea of ‗the war of resistance‘ in the late 1930s.98  Following Wang‘s defection in 
1939 the South China Daily News continued to actively promote the Wang 
Clique‘s collaborationist agenda by claiming that only by making peace with 
Japan could China be revived and rebuilt (復興建設).99   
Promoting the War of Resistance I: Chinese Writers in Hong 
Kong (1930s and 1940s) 
During the war, prominent writers who came to Hong Kong from China 
contributed to a new wave of cultural development in the colony.  It has been 
argued that at this time Hong Kong ‗prospered briefly as a centre of literary 
activity‘. 100   Even though Hong Kong was lagging behind the New Culture 
Movement on the mainland, the colony remained closely connected to China 
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socially and culturally.
101
  With the influx of prominent nationalistic cultural 
figures from China into Hong Kong, there was a high level of anti-Japanese 
sentiments in the colony and much propaganda for the war of resistance.
102
  
Mainland publications such as the Dazhong shenghuo (大衆生活), whose editor 
was Zou Taofen (鄒韜奮), moved to Hong Kong after the fall of Shanghai to the 
Japanese in the late 1930s.  Writers in these publications promoted the war of 
resistance and criticised the Wang clique as traitors.
103
 
The promotion of the war of resistance in the cultural scene was 
connected to Chinese politics.  The CCP did a great deal of work in Hong Kong 
in contacting and organising the Chinese writers in Hong Kong in promoting the 
war effort.  For the CCP the ultimate goal of such a move was to promote their 
agenda and to gain the support of both the international community as well as the 
Chinese community in Hong Kong.
104
  This is another example of how China-
orientated nationalism was used as a tool for promoting one‘s political agenda. 
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Promoting the War of Resistance II: The Politics of China-
Orientated nationalism in the Cinema  
In the Hong Kong film industry, too, there was a surge of nationalistic 
sentiments triggered by the Sino-Japanese war.  Poshek Fu‘s study of the Hong 
Kong cinema during the war against Japan has shown how local filmmakers 
remained politically aloof in their productions, whilst filmmakers who fled from 
Shanghai attempted to promote a nationalist discourse in the colony.
105
   
The war-related nationalist fever put Chinese filmmakers in Hong Kong 
in a difficult position.  They were told not to produce patriotic films expressing 
anti-Japanese sentiments by the Hong Kong government, which was determined 
to maintain neutrality in the war and banned several Chongqing-made short films.  
At the same time, local filmmakers were under pressure from the Nationalist 
government and the exile community to produce films with a nationalist rhetoric 
for promoting the war effort.  Some local filmmakers even received death threats.  
Between 1937 and 1938, a number of war-related films were released.  However, 
such ‗patriotic‘ films were ‗suffused with commercial generic [sic] elements‘, 
and attracted criticisms from the Nationalist government.
106
  The popularity of 
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patriotic films declined soon after 1938 as the patriotic fever in the colony started 
to fade away after Canton fell to the Japanese late that year.
107
 
The promotion of patriotism in Chinese cinema in Hong Kong during the 
Sino-Japanese war shows how Chinese politics influenced the development of 
China-orientated nationalism in the colony.  Even though on the surface war story 
films appeared to be ‗patriotic‘ films, in essence they were commercial films 
typical of the Hong Kong cinema in the 1930s.  In this sense, the Hong Kong 
factor once again served as a limitation to the expression of China-orientated 
nationalism.  The fact that popularity of patriotic films declined quickly 
illustrates how a nationalist fever was often short-lived.  Local filmmakers 
suffered at the hands of China-orientated nationalism politically as they were 
threatened and criticised by the exile community and the Nationalist government.  
They also suffered financially as some of the war-related films were ‗box-office 
disasters‘.108   
The emergence of two competing nationalist discourses in Hong Kong in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s showed that China-orientated nationalism was 
open to interpretation.  For some Chinese, being a patriot meant supporting the 
war of resistance.  For others, such as those in the Wang Clique, only through 
collaboration with Japan could China be saved.  Hong Kong essentially became a 
secondary battleground for propaganda purposes and the Chinese press in Hong 
Kong served as an important platform for the promotion of nationalist rhetoric.  
Wartime China-orientated nationalism was not simply a rhetoric, for the Hong 
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Kong Chinese community acted out their patriotism by making substantial 
financial contributions to the war effort and by participating in a series of anti-
Japanese boycotts. 
The Politics of Anti-Japanese Patriotism II: Chinese Politics and 
the Hong Kong Students’ Relief Association 
While the Hong Kong Students Relief Association (香港學生賑濟會) 
served as a significant force in supporting the war effort,
109
 it was not immune to 
the influence of Chinese politics, which ultimately led to an internal split.  Many 
in the patriotic student movement favoured the nationalist rhetoric of fighting the 
Japanese promoted by the CCP.  In an attempt to combat Communist influence, 
the GMD not only recruited in GMD-controlled schools but also interfered in the 
affairs of the Hong Kong Students Relief Association.  Some schools were 
pressured by the GMD to remove some of their representatives from the 
association.  Some students who were GMD members joined the association and 
there were political divisions within the association.  As a result of such divisions, 
member groups began leaving and the association eventually disappeared by 
early 1940.
110
 
The case study of the Hong Kong Students Relief Association shows how 
Chinese students in Hong Kong in particular formed a significant voice in the 
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expression of nationalism during the Sino-Japanese conflict.  In fact, in the post-
1949 period, too, Hong Kong students and young people would continue to be 
major actors in the construction of nationalist rhetoric, particularly in the 1970s.  
However, as with any nationalist movement in Hong Kong, there were divisions 
among the Hong Kong Chinese who participated in them.  The split within the 
Hong Kong Students Relief Association due to GMD influence is a classic 
example.  Divisions within the Chinese community were also evidenced by the 
fact that some Chinese chose to express their patriotism through violence in anti-
Japanese riots, while others did so by participating in the peaceful boycott of 
Japanese goods.  
The Hong Kong government, determined to maintain political neutrality, 
took steps to censor the media promoting anti-Japanese feelings.  In August 1939, 
the Hong Kong government established a special office, which checked all 
Chinese magazines and newspapers.  All anti-Japanese comments in the Chinese 
publications were replaced by either crosses or squares.
111
  In addition, the Hong 
Kong government banned Chongqing-made films promoting the war effort and 
patriotism.  In this sense, colonialism once again served as a limitation to the 
expressions of China-orientated nationalism in the colony. 
Armed Resistance versus Collaboration: Hong Kong under 
Japanese Rule (1940s) 
In the 1940s, under the Japanese occupation the Chinese community in 
Hong Kong expressed its patriotism in two ways: armed resistance against the 
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Japanese and collaboration with them.  During the Japanese invasion, Hong Kong 
was in chaos and the British surrendered the colony on 25 December 1941 after 
only eighteen days of fighting.  Thereafter, the resistance efforts were mainly 
carried out by two groups, the British Army Aid Group (BAAG), led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay Ride, and the Chinese guerrilla fighters, the most 
famous of whom was the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River 
Column (東江縱隊港九獨立大隊).  The brigade was primarily led by the 
Chinese Communists, although many of the soldiers were born in Hong Kong or 
in other British colonies such as Singapore and Malaya.
112
  Several detachments 
of the Column were formed in the early 1940s.  One of these was the Hong 
Kong-Kowloon Anti-Japanese Guerrilla established by the Chinese Communists 
and local villagers in Sai Kung on 3 February 1942.  Many guerrilla members 
were local young anglers.
113
  Other young Hong Kong Chinese also contributed 
to the fight against the Japanese in the urban areas during the occupation 
period.
114
  The Chinese Communists developed a bond with the local residents, 
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and promoted China-orientated nationalism among them.
115
  The guerrilla 
members were well-known for assassinations of Chinese collaborating with the 
Japanese.
116
 
The Chinese guerrilla fighters‘ resistance efforts were not immune from 
the influence of Chinese politics.  The Communists served as command and 
political commissars in the East River Column.  Knowing that the BAAG had 
formal relations with the GMD, the Communists did not wish to absorb Chinese 
personnel from the BAAG as they suspected that the Chinese staff might be 
working for the GMD or the Wang Jingwei faction.
117
 
Conversely, Chinese elites and merchants collaborated with the Japanese.  
Some of them did so not only to protect themselves but also to help the Chinese 
community.  There were also those who were forced to collaborate with the 
Japanese for the sake of restoring law and order, and those who wholeheartedly 
and actively supported the Japanese.
118
 
The response of the Chinese community to Japanese rule during the 
occupation period shows that there were different ways to express patriotism.  
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Chinese elites and merchants once again became collaborationist nationalists, 
only this time they collaborated with Japan instead of the British. 
Outbreak of the Chinese Civil War and the Politics of Anti-War 
Nationalism 
 With the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1946, there emerged anti-
war sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.  Several pro-
democracy political groups that opposed the Chiang Kai-shek regime were set up 
in Hong Kong.  At the same time, the Hong Kong branch of the CCP made use of 
the rise in anti-war and pro-democracy patriotic sentiments in the colony to 
promote its anti-Chiang agenda.  For example, the Hong Kong branch made 
contact with pro-democracy activists in exile in Hong Kong and promoted 
patriotism and democracy in its newspapers in Hong Kong.
119
 
From the response of the Chinese community to the Chinese Civil War, 
we see how nationalism was promoted by not only democracy activists in exile 
but the CCP as well.  For the CCP, the fact that many Chinese democracy 
activists fled to Hong Kong and the rise of anti-war and pro-democracy 
nationalism in the colony were a valuable asset for promoting its political agenda.  
In this sense, nationalism in Hong Kong once again served as a tool in the context 
of Chinese national politics. 
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Conclusion: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of China-Orientated 
nationalism in Pre-1949 Hong Kong 
 The interaction between Chinese history, the Hong Kong factor and 
colonialism contributed to the development of China-orientated nationalism in 
Hong Kong.  Expressions of China-orientated nationalism were not always 
motivated by ethnic consciousness, as nationalism was used on some occasions 
as a tactic by the Chinese community to protect their economic interests.  Both 
Chinese business interests and colonialism served as contributing and limiting 
factors in the expression of China-orientated nationalism.  Concerned about 
internal political stability, the Hong Kong government took steps to promote 
traditional Chinese culture in an attempt to combat the progressive ideas, 
particularly anti-imperialism, brought about by the May Fourth Movement in 
China. 
The Sino-Japanese conflict led to a surge of nationalistic sentiment in 
Hong Kong.  Students in particular were actively involved in supporting the war 
effort.   As far as wartime propaganda was concerned, two competing types of 
nationalist rhetoric emerged during the Sino-Japanese conflict: collaboration and 
resistance.  The emergence of these two competing types of rhetoric showed that 
nationalism was open to interpretation and how a national crisis could unite the 
Chinese community in Hong Kong.  Determined to remain politically neutral, the 
colonial government attempted to limit the expression of China-orientated 
nationalism.  During the Japanese occupation, some in the Chinese community 
chose to collaborate with the Japanese to protect the Chinese community while 
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others chose to fight the Japanese and kill Chinese who collaborated with the 
Japanese. 
In the 1930s, Japanese residents in Hong Kong became victims of China-
orientated nationalism, for the surge of anti-Japanese sentiments in the late 1930s 
led to a series of violent acts against Japanese in the colony and boycotts of 
Japanese goods.  In fact, violence would continue to be a central motif in 
nationalist movements in the post-1949 era.  The 1956 riots and the 1967 riots, 
which I shall discuss in Chapters Three and Four, were examples of violent 
political nationalism.   
The split in the Hong Kong Students‘ Relief Association shows that 
political differences among activists involved in nationalist movements are 
unavoidable.  Indeed, history would repeat itself as the 1971 Defend Diaoyu 
Islands movement was also plagued by political differences among the activists.  
The discourses of nationalism continued to be influenced by Chinese politics in 
the civil war period as the war resulted in the rise of anti-war nationalist 
sentiments in the colony.  Further, the rise of anti-war sentiments provided the 
CCP with a tool to promote its political agenda in Hong Kong. 
In the following chapters, I shall demonstrate how the interaction between 
the China factor, colonialism, and the Hong Kong factor continued to be 
significant in influencing the development of China-orientated nationalism in 
Hong Kong after the Chinese Civil War.  However, the focus of China-orientated 
nationalism in Hong Kong in 1949-1997 was increasingly on what was 
happening in Hong Kong rather than in China. 
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Chapter Three: The Chinese Civil War, the CCP-GMD 
Struggle and the Politics of Nationalism in the 1950s 
 Political upheavals in China continued to be a significant contributing 
factor in the expression of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 
post-1949 period.  After the Chinese Civil War, Hong Kong became a significant 
battleground for both the CCP and the GMD in terms of political propaganda.  
Nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was a product of the Chinese Civil War 
and an extension of the CCP-GMD struggle, and was open to interpretation.  The 
case studies in this chapter demonstrate that China-orientated nationalism was a 
significant political issue in the 1950s, which concerned the Hong Kong 
government as well as some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community.  
Nationalism created political divisions among some in the Chinese community 
and was a tactic used by several Hong Kong-based groups to promote their 
political agenda.  Some promoted nationalism to express their concern over 
China‘s future and to seek solutions to China‘s political problems.  China-centred 
nationalism also jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens and threatened the 
colony‘s security, to the dismay of the colonial government. 
I begin my investigation with the discussion of the post-war, socio-
political environment of Hong Kong as well as the Cold War context, which to 
some extent contributed to the dynamics of nationalism in Hong Kong in the 
1950s.  I then examine case studies of political nationalism based on pro-CCP 
and pro-GMD sentiments, and discuss a third type of political nationalism that 
was neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD.  In the final section of the chapter, I examine 
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the case of Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong and promoted cultural 
nationalism with a focus on traditional Chinese culture.   
Post-war Hong Kong: Rebuilding 
 The colony was plagued by economic problems in the immediate post-
war years.  Economically and socially, Hong Kong had been devastated by the 
Japanese occupation.  According to the Annual Report on Hong Kong for the 
Year 1946 published by the Hong Kong Government, during the Japanese 
occupation from 1941 to 1945 the colony‘s population dropped significantly.  In 
1941, it was estimated to be 1,600,000, but at the time of the Japanese surrender, 
it was less than three quarters of a million.
120
  There was a shortage of the 
essentials and food, much of which had to be imported from Guangzhou.
121
  Rice 
was imported from Siam and rations provided.
122
  Despite a shortage of personnel 
and the shortage of food and housing faced by the Military Administration,
123
 
which was established in August 1945 and lasted until May 1946, civil 
government was restored in May 1946.  The economy improved quickly.  After 
the end of the Second World War, Hong Kong‘s population increased steadily.  
By the end of 1946, it was approximately 1.6 million.
124
  With the outbreak of the 
Chinese Civil War, the population of Hong Kong increased significantly again as 
there was an influx of refugees from mainland China into the colony, some of 
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whom went to the New Territories.  In early 1950, the colony‘s population was 
estimated to be close to 2.4 million.
125
 
Global Context: Impact of Cold War Politics and Political 
Insecurity 
 Although Hong Kong did not play a major role in the Cold War, it was 
certainly not immune to the Cold War‘s influences, as it was sandwiched between 
two major Cold War blocs,  with its fate directly determined by China, an ally of 
the Soviet Union, and Britain, an ally of the US.  During the Cold War, the US 
sought to contain Communism by setting up bastions around Asia.  With the 
outbreak of the Korean War, Hong Kong was put in an even more precarious 
position.  Since Britain was an ally of the US, Hong Kong became a base to 
support British military operations in Korea.
126
  As I will discuss in detail later in 
this chapter, certain publications promoting anti-Communist sentiments were 
supported by US funding.  A brief case study of Rennie‘s Mill, too, illustrates 
that Hong Kong was certainly not completely shielded from Cold War politics.   
 The political future of Hong Kong depended on not only the New 
Territories lease but Cold War politics as well.
127
  With the victorious anti-
imperialist Communist state just across the border, the colony where a million 
refugees had fled to was an embarrassment to the PRC.
128
  However, British 
Hong Kong as a colony continued to exist for two reasons.  Firstly, Britain was 
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determined to keep Hong Kong because of the economic benefits it provided to 
Britain, whose industrial economy was in decline.  Secondly, China, like Britain, 
was making financial gains from the colony.  I shall discuss Britain‘s economic 
policy towards Hong Kong in more detail in the next chapter in relation to the 
causes of the 1967 riots.  In any case, both Chinese and British governments 
sought to use Hong Kong for their own advantage for economic and strategic 
reasons. 
The China Factor: Impact of the Chinese Civil War on Hong 
Kong 
 The Chinese Civil War between the CCP and the GMD proved to be a 
watershed not only in Chinese history but also in the history of Hong Kong.  As 
noted, the Civil War resulted in an influx of refugees from the mainland into the 
colony.  Moreover, Hong Kong was now, in the words of Steve Tsang, ‗torn 
between two Chinese regimes‘. 129   Hong Kong was caught in the struggle 
between the CCP and the GMD as both sides sought to use the colony as a base 
to promote their opposing political agendas.  We need to understand Hong 
Kong‘s special geo-political position if we are to understand how China-
orientated nationalism turned out to be a historical paradox in the context of 
colonial Hong Kong.  It was a paradox because on the one hand many who fled 
mainland China did not wish to be caught in the turmoil of Chinese politics again.  
On the other hand, the Chinese Civil War had a significant influence on the 
development of nationalist rhetoric, and precipitated a division within the ethnic 
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Chinese community in Hong Kong in terms of political allegiance to the CCP or 
GMD.   
Hong Kong in the late 1940s and early 1950s experienced social 
instability and labour conflicts.  Economic difficulties caused by WWII were one 
of the causes of the workers‘ grievances.130  As the workers were fighting for 
better terms for themselves on both the physical and the ideological level,  a new 
form of China-orientated nationalism began to emerge in the colony, coinciding 
with the founding of the PRC in 1949.  
Migrants and the Politics of China-orientated Nationalism 
Migrants who fled from China to Hong Kong following the Civil War 
generally fell into two categories: those who did not wish to become involved in 
politics while staying in Hong Kong, and those who not only supported the GMD 
but also would use Hong Kong as a base to promote their pro-GMD and/or anti-
Communist agenda.  There were also Chinese in Hong Kong who were pro-CCP.  
Many in the Hong Kong Chinese community still regarded China as their 
home.  In his analysis of whether Hong Kong would become independent like 
other colonies, Governor Grantham stated in his memoirs that local Chinese were 
as ‗transient‘ as the Europeans were, and ‗politically apathetic‘: 
Hong Kong is also different in that the Chinese – and 99% of the population in 
Hong Kong is Chinese – are, generally speaking, politically apathetic.  Provided 
that the government maintains law and order, does not tax them too much and 
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that they can get justice in the courts, they are content to leave the business of 
government to the professionals and the comparatively small number of private 
citizens who, out of civic spirit or the honour and glory they get out of it, are 
willing to serve on government councils and boards.  The majority of Chinese 
in the colony also had little loyalty to Hong Kong.  Like the Europeans, they 
came to Hong Kong to work until they retired home to China, just as the 
Europeans returned home to Europe.  Not inaptly Hong Kong has been likened 
to a railway station, and its inhabitants to the passengers who pass in and out of 
the gates.  The Chinese who have lived all their lives in the colony and intend to 
leave their bones there, are a small minority; as are the Eurasians who have no 
other home.  They are the true citizens of Hong Kong, but their total number is 
insignificant.  The picture is changing since China went Communist, as few 
Chinese in Hong Kong now intend to return to the country of their birth.  They 
are becoming permanent citizens.
131
 
The ‗migrant mentality‘ (移民心態) explains why most Chinese in Hong Kong 
wished to distant themselves from politics,
132
 yet at the same time there existed a 
strong Chinese identity. 
As far as political inclinations were concerned, the Hong Kong Chinese 
community could be divided into several groups.  The majority simply wanted to 
live peacefully in the colony and were afraid that the Communists would disrupt 
their lives.  However, while many Chinese had fled in the late 1940s from the 
Mainland to Hong Kong in fear of the Communist regime, not all of them were 
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specifically anti-Communist.
 133
  Many came to Hong Kong for economic reasons, 
to earn a living for their family.  Among them some were pro-Communist,  some 
favoured the GMD, while others became ‗completely disillusioned‘ with both the 
CCP and the GMD.
134
 
Political/Factional Nationalism: Emergence of Two National 
Identities 
 Hong Kong in the 1950s saw the emergence of two types of nationalism: 
cultural and political nationalism.
135
  As I shall discuss later, the type of 
nationalism based on Confucianism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals who 
fled to Hong Kong could be called cultural nationalism.  In the 1950s, Chinese 
political nationalism revolved around the conflict between the CCP and the GMD, 
as Hong Kong was caught in the struggle between the two.  There was no official 
‗state nationalism‘ in colonial Hong Kong.  This is because the colonial 
government was not a state that officially promoted China-orientated nationalism.  
In fact, in the context of education the colonial government took steps to prevent 
the influence of Chinese politics. 
  It has been argued that ‗both pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist activists 
saw the colony as the last bastion of their unfinished political and ideological 
contentions, giving rise to bitter disputes that challenged and destabilised the 
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British position‘.136  Lam Wai-man has used the term  ‗factional nationalism‘ to 
describe the type of political nationalism manifested in the 1956 riots.  Lam 
defines ‗factional nationalism‘ as follows: 
A central feature of factional nationalism was the intense identification with 
Communist-Nationalist antagonism and the fact that the leftists and rightists 
in the territory were organisationally connected among themselves and to the 
respective party‘s central mechanism.  Because of such sentiments and 
interconnection, factional nationalism also embodied strong identification 
with the rule of the respective states (statism) and a radical drive to eliminate 
the ‗other‘.  In postwar Hong Kong, this type of nationalism was acted out in 
the continual struggle between the traditional left-and right-wing groups, as 
manifested in a continuous stream of propaganda, campaigns to attract 
sympathisers, constant maneuvering for political influence, and measure of 
violence.
137
 
The concept of ‗factional nationalism‘ is relevant to our discussion of the 
kind of political nationalism, which came into existence in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Labour unions as well as other organisations, for example, had long been under 
the influence of the CCP-GMD conflict, and thus had their own political 
agendas.
138
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Post-1949 Debates in the Print Media and the Hong Kong 
Government’s Response 
The influence of  post-Civil War Chinese politics on the discourses of 
nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was obvious in the print media.
139
  Some 
Chinese-language newspapers served as propagandists for the CCP and the GMD. 
For example, Wen Hui Pao (文匯報), Ta Kung Pao (大公報), and New Evening 
Post (新晚報) were backed by the PRC while the Hong Kong Times (香港時報) 
was launched by the Nationalists.
140
  Some other pro-ROC newspapers were not 
under the direct control of the GMD such as Kung Sheung Daily News (工商日報) 
and Wah Kiu Yat Pao (華僑日報).  Even the more neutral sectors of the Chinese-
language press chose to focus on Chinese politics instead of criticising the 
colonial government,  as this was less likely to upset the authorities.
141
 
Leftist newspapers such as the Ta Kung Pao not only promoted pro-CCP 
nationalism but also called the Nationalists jiangfei (蔣匪), meaning ‗bandits of 
Chiang Kai-shek‘.142  The term ‗New China‘ (新中國) was often used in the pro-
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CCP newspapers to refer patriotically to the PRC on the 1 October national day 
celebrations that honoured the Liberation of Beijing.
143
 
Conversely, the Chinese-language newspapers that promoted pro-ROC 
and anti-Communist sentiments
144
 sometimes employed the term Republic of 
China (中華民國) as the official name (國號) for China, and celebrated the 
Double Tenth as China‘s national day.  They refused to accept the PRC‘s status 
as the political state and were clearly anti-Communist.
145
 For example, in an 
editorial of the anti-Communist Gongshang Ribao (工商日報) titled ‗Does the 
CCP really have ―patriots‖?‘ (中共真有愛國主義者嗎?), which appeared on 12 
April 1950, the concept and definition of China-orientated nationalism was 
discussed in detail.  Due to the newspaper‘s anti-Communist stance, it was only 
natural that the editor was sceptical about whether the Chinese Communists were 
truly ‗nationalistic‘, and whether the CCP represented the interests of the people.  
The pro-ROC Chinese-language newspapers constantly painted a very negative 
picture of the CCP.
146
  Moreover, post-1949 pro-Nationalist rhetoric such as 
‗counterattack on the Mainland‘ (反攻大陸) was often used in the pro-ROC 
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newspapers, especially during the Double Tenth celebrations.
147
  Apart from 
political reasons, it is possible that the rightist media promoted anti-Communist 
sentiments and the idea of a ‗counterattack on the Mainland‘ to boost their sales, 
for such ideas were appealing to the large number of refugees from China
148
 
According to the Hong Kong government‘s estimation, there were approximately 
60,000 ‗politically conscious Chinese in Hong Kong‘ who were ‗essentially anti-
Communist and in consequence to some extent pro-GMD‘.149 
 In the 1950s there also emerged a number of anti-Communist Chinese-
language magazines such as the Democratic Review (民主評論), founded by Xu 
Fuguan (徐復觀), and Daxue shenghuo (大學生活),150 and the Chinese Students 
Weekly (中國學生周報).  Some of these anti-Communist publications were a 
product of the Cold War as well as the Chinese Civil War.  The Chinese Students 
Weekly and Daxue shenghuo were backed by US funding and aimed to promote 
an anti-Communist agenda.
151
  Writers in the Chinese Students Weekly, for 
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example, criticised the CCP for the ‗massacre‘ of the Chinese people and 
destruction of Chinese culture as well as of the education system.
152
  The rightist 
publications also served as a platform for Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong 
Kong to promote their cultural and anti-Communist nationalist rhetoric.
153
  
However, in the 12 October 1956 issue of the Chinese Students Weekly, a writer 
began to rethink the relationship between the state and the nation and argued that  
loving the ROC did not mean people ‗could not oppose the Nationalist 
government‘s policy and its officials‘.154  Another writer held a critical view of 
pro-GMD nationalism and questioned the motives of those supporting the 
GMD.
155
  The rhetoric as such had the flavour of the rhetoric of the Third Force 
Movement (第三勢力運動),156 which I shall discuss later. 
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The fact that 1950s nationalism based on pro-PRC and pro-ROC 
sentiments was not anti-colonial in nature did not mean that the Hong Kong 
government would not be concerned about the potentially subversive elements in 
such sentiments.  The Hong Kong colonial government took steps to suppress the 
development and spread of such sentiments in the colony.  One of these steps was 
the banning and censorship of films made in the PRC, and another was the 
revision of the education system.  In 1948, the Hong Kong government made an 
amendment to the Education Ordinance, which gave the Director of Education 
power to ‗refuse or cancel the registration of any teacher, close any school, and 
control the curricula and textbooks of all schools‘.157  Sir Alexander Grantham, 
Governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1957, was against politics in schools.
158
  In 
fact, as noted by Edward Vickers, colonial Hong Kong saw a peculiar 
development of the Chinese history curriculum in schools from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s.  Students in Hong Kong grew up learning that they were Chinese 
and that China was the ‗nation‘ for Hong Kong people; yet at the same time, as 
Vickers puts it, the ‗emphasis of the historical narrative in Chinese history was 
more depoliticised and distant from the present‘. 159   Anthony Sweeting has 
argued that from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, Hong Kong‘s education policy 
was characterised by ‗applied decolonisation‘ and depoliticisation, as a response 
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from a ‗vulnerable and decreasingly ―colonialist‖ government to the forces of 
nationalism and Communism‘.160  
Physical Displays of China-Orientated Nationalism: The Use of 
Symbols 
Each year at the celebrations of the founding of the PRC, and that of the 
ROC on 10 October, the flags of the PRC and the ROC became powerful national 
symbols.  However, quite often the British flag could be seen alongside, for 
example, the PRC flag.  In 1952, for instance, in the celebration of the third 
anniversary of the founding of the PRC by the industrial and commercial sectors, 
the PRC flag was hung alongside the British flag on the stage where major 
figures of these sectors were seated.
161
  This scene was captured in a photograph 
that appeared in the 1 October 1952 issue of the pro-CCP New Evening Post (新
晚報 ).  This photograph calls into question the nature of China-orientated 
nationalism in colonial Hong Kong.  It shows that Chinese in the colony were 
careful in their display of nationalistic sentiments and that they were flexible in 
their loyalty.   
Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, the pro-CCP press 
immediately reported that the majority of the Chinese in Hong Kong, especially 
Chinese workers, the huagong (華工), were eager to embrace the new PRC flag.  
According to an article in the CCP newspaper Huashang Bao (華商報), which 
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was written by the chairman of a labour union and appeared on 9 October 1949, 
Chinese workers were ‗euphoric‘ and there was a ‗rush‘ among the labour unions 
to ‗manufacture and raise the flag‘.162  The same newspaper also claimed that the 
public also embraced the new flag, and that the PRC flag was ‗everywhere on the 
streets of Hong Kong‘.163  These reports were correct to an extent, as according to 
government documents the PRC flag was displayed at premises of pro-CCP 
organisations particularly labour unions on 1 October.
164
 
In contrast, the pro-ROC press reported on the use of the ROC flag.
165
  
The use of symbols shows that it would be difficult for the Chinese community to 
ignore the influence of Chinese politics in the colony and that some reacted 
passionately to the founding of the PRC.  That this symbol carried such powerful 
meanings is shown by the 1956 riots, which I shall discuss later, as it was the use 
of the ROC flag that triggered the riots. 
Celebrations of Two ‘National’ Days: Nationalistic but not Anti-
colonial 
While modern Chinese history shows us that nationalism in China was 
often fuelled by anti-foreign and anti-imperial sentiments, it would be a mistake 
to regard the development of China-orientated nationalism in post-war Hong 
Kong simply as an anti-colonial or anti-British movement.  Local Chinese who 
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displayed their nationalistic feelings on special occasions often did so in an 
orderly manner and took care not to upset the authorities.  Most of these 
celebrations were conducted in a peaceful manner.  We can see this from a 
document sent by the General Officer Commanding Land Forces in Hong Kong, 
to the Under Secretary of State in London, which reports on the celebration held 
on 1 October 1955 for the anniversary of the founding of the PRC.  The section 
on the speeches made during the occasion is particularly relevant to our 
discussion of the nature of pro-CCP political nationalism in Hong Kong: 
The general themes of the speeches made at the various meetings were the 
‗Five Year Plan‘ now in operation in China, and China‘s sincere intention of 
peaceful co-existence with all nations.  The improved Sino-British relations 
were also commented upon by some of the speakers, who claimed that this 
friendship between the two nations contributed much towards the lessening of 
tension and promotion of World peace.  There was a complete lack of 
aggressiveness in the speeches and such subjects as the liberation of Taiwan, 
anti-American imperialism etc were only lightly touched upon at one or two 
of the union celebrations.
166
 
 It appeared that these national celebrations were in no way a threat to the 
colonial authorities and those who held these events were mild in their display of 
pro-CCP nationalistic sentiments. 
Pro-GMD  Activities and the Hong Kong Government’s Response 
In the 1950s, British authorities were concerned about not only 
Communist activities, but the Nationalists‘ spread of pro-GMD agenda among 
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the Chinese population in Hong Kong.  Although some of the pro-Nationalists‘ 
activities might not have been a real threat to internal security, the colonial 
government was to a certain extent paranoid about the spread of Chinese national 
politics and thus often took a heavy-handed approach in dealing with these 
activities. A letter, dated 9 December 1952, from J.B. Sidebotham of the Colonial 
Office to Major A.E. Tracy of the War Office, clearly illustrates this concern of 
the British: 
The dangers to internal security in Hong Kong do not always arise from 
Communist activities as such, but that actions of the anti-Communist 
Chinese element can be fully capable of causing disturbances which, had 
they not been ‗nipped in the bud‘ might well have got beyond the control of 
the Police and required some military assistance to bring them under 
control.
167
 
GMD nationalists were often blamed, by both the press and the Hong 
Kong government, for the disturbances, with China-orientated nationalism as the 
trigger.  Deportation was a usual tactic employed by the government to prevent 
the Nationalists from instigating any sort of major disturbances.  I shall use a few 
examples from this period to illustrate my point: the activities of the Nationalists 
of the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation 
Youth Corps and their subsequent deportation to Taiwan in the early 1950s, and 
the riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan of 1956.  On 26 March 1953 Cheng Ching 
Yuen, the Organisation Officer of the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Anti-
Communist National Salvation Youth Corps, controlled by its parent body in 
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Taiwan, was arrested and found in possession of a plan for the celebration of 
Youth Day to be held on 29 March 1953.  On 20 April 1953 Governor Grantham 
ordered, in accordance with section 18 of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance 
and in the ‗interests of public order‘,168 the deportation of fourteen Chinese who, 
the Hong Kong Government believed, were members of the Youth Corps.  
Previously, on 4 November 1952, 32 members of the Chinese Anti-Communist 
Anti-Russia Youth League, later reorganised into the Chinese Anti-Communist 
National Salvation Youth Corps, had been deported.  The plan seized in the 26 
March 1953 arrest shows the nature of the political activities that pro-GMD 
sympathisers undertook to promote pro-Nationalist sentiments.  Below is an 
extract from the outline of the plan seized by the Hong Kong authorities from 
Cheng: 
March 29th marks a glorious chapter in the history of the People‘s Revolution.  
It is a great day for all youths of our nation who are under the Party‘s 
guidance.  On the occasion of the Youth Anniversary in 1952, this committee 
mobilised its comrades under the most trying conditions and overseas youths 
were urged to hold grand and enthusiastic celebrations separately in Rennie‘s 
Mill, Ma On Shan, Tsun [sic] Wan, and other districts with courage and 
intrepidity.  At the same time (we) launched various cultural and recreational 
campaigns, carried out the ‗FOUR REFORMS‘ suggested by our President, 
and complied wholeheartedly with (his?) very proper instructions of 
encouraging youths to go to the front lines, to factories or to libraries.  Not a 
few glorious achievements have since been witnessed.
169
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The plan is rich in ideological themes, and contains very specific ideas, plans and 
objectives for the upcoming 1953 ‗Double Tenth‘ celebrations.  Page 6 of the 
document contains a list of slogans for the celebration of the Youth Festival such 
as ‗all for anti-Communism, all for National Salvation‘, ‗long live the Chinese 
Guomintang‘, and ‗long live President Chiang‘.170   
Pro-Communists versus Pro-Nationalists: Clashes between Two 
Competing Nationalisms 
The display of political nationalism that emerged in the 1950s was often 
characterised by violent clashes between the Nationalists and Communists. On 7 
July 1952, for example, four supporters of the GMD entered the premises of the 
Hong Kong branch of the Bank of Communications, a Communist organisation, 
‗assaulted a watchman, and destroyed bank documents and records‘.171   The 
flying of flags sometimes triggered these incidents, as revealed by an extract from 
the Weekly Intelligence Report dated 14 October 1952: 
Several minor clashes occurred during the celebration of the Double Tenth, 
most of them as a result of attacks by pro-Nationalist element on left wing 
union premises.  Some of these incidents may have been precipitated by left 
wing organisations‘ decision to fly Communist flags on this occasion, 
nominally in commemoration of the early revolutionary martyrs, but 
demonstrators had in most cases been paid to stir up trouble by Nationalist 
agents and had been assured that provocations were organised by the ‗anti-
Communist anti-Russian Youth Association‘ which has direct links with 
Taiwan.  A number of persons connected with this association have been 
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arrested and will probably be deported.  Incidents were fortunately sporadic 
but might have had serious results but for prompt and effective action on the 
part of the police whose task was made more difficult by the presence of large 
holiday crowds celebrating the traditional autumn festival.
172
 
Once again, the Nationalists were blamed for these incidents.  The Hong Kong 
government, as usual, was quick to respond by deporting those stirring up trouble.  
Apart from the official sources, we can get a glimpse of what happened during 
the 1952 ‗Double Tenth‘ celebrations from reports by the media: 
Angry crowds shouted abuse at the Chinese Communists in the union offices 
of dockyard carpenters.  Plantation workers and sweetmeat and biscuit 
workers where two red flags flew defiantly among hundreds of Chinese 
Nationalist flags hoisted for the ‗Double Tenth‘ celebrations.  At the office of 
the Electrical Workers‘ Union a crowd broke down the doors, overpowered 
Communist officials, damaged office furniture, scattered union documents in 
the street and tore the red flag to shreds…Thousands of people flocked into 
Kowloon‘s crowded streets on hearing the disturbances.
173
 
Another report from Reuters tells a similar story regarding the 1952 ‗Double 
Tenth‘ celebrations: 
Hong Kong police tonight fired teargas into an angry crowd of 1,000 Chinese 
Nationalists demonstrating outside the pro-Nationalist Carpenters Union 
office in Kowloon, the mainland city of Hong Kong.  The union flew red 
flags on the ‗Double Tenth‘ anniversary of the Chinese revolution under Sun 
Yat Sen, celebrated by the Chinese Nationalists here.
174
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A report in the The Times shows vividly how the flags became symbols of 
conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists: 
Members of the Chinese community made a big display of Nationalist flags, 
probably on a scale unequalled since the Nationalist collapse, and some right-
wing trade unionists resented the action of left-wing unions in flying 
Communist flags.  At Shamshuipo Kuomintang and Communist banners 
appeared at separate flats in the same building.  When Communists hoisted 
their flag also on the roof, the rival unionists declared that the ‗Double Tenth‘ 
was their day and tore down the red flag.  A fight developed, but police soon 
had the situation under control.
175
 
Chinese Politics and Union Rivalries in the 1950s 
The CCP-GMD struggle also contributed to labour union rivalries in post-
war years.  Labour unions in the colony were split into two major camps: the pro-
CCP Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) and the pro-GMD Hong 
Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council (TUC).  Political differences between 
these two labour unions had their origins in the Civil War period when 
Communists and Nationalists attempted to mobilise support within Hong Kong 
for their cause as the war was near its end.
176
  As the Communists established 
unions in companies in the major sectors of the economy, the Nationalists set up 
rival unions in the same companies.
177
  These labour unions were ‗guided largely 
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by political considerations‘. 178   There was actually a decline in the labour 
movement in the 1950s due to these union rivalries.
179
  Scholars have attributed 
the decline to the politics of post-Civil War Sino-British relations.
180
  It has been 
noted that British recognition of the  PRC in 1950 and a ‗tacit understanding‘ of 
the status of Hong Kong between China and Britain was a factor contributing to 
the decline.  Moreover, the left-wing unions were unsuccessful in achieving basic 
goals in the strikes of the 1940s and as a result strikers were dissatisfied and the 
FTU lost some of its strength.
181
  Therefore, in the 1950s, the FTU endeavoured 
to rebuild its strength by actively recruiting members.  It has been noted that both 
the FTU and the TUC had the same goals and strategy in the 1950s: 
One goal was political, not in the sense of pursuing power and influence in the 
Hong Kong polity, but rather in terms of expressing and mobilising support for 
the policies of the PRC and Taiwan respectively.  A second goal was to 
expand their influence among workers…After the early 1950s, the FTU 
became less overtly involved in industrial actions against major employers, 
and began to concentrate more on building up worker support through 
expanding educational, cultural and welfare services to members.  The TUC 
adopted a similar strategy.
182
 
Governor Grantham, concerned about the potential danger of the political nature 
of labour unions, made a similar observation in 1955: 
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The welfare and terms of service of their members are of importance only in 
their bearing on the major aims of the Unions which are to secure and to hold 
the political allegiance of their workers.  Matters are made worse by the fact 
that the political issues in question are not related to Hong Kong‘s problems but 
are foreign in conception and origin….A labour dispute in Hong Kong, 
therefore, is unlikely, except superficially, to be a dispute between labour and 
management.  It is more likely to be, in reality, a dispute involving rival 
political factions with the absolute control of labour as the ultimate goal.
183
 
Indeed, TUC publications, for example, promoted anti-Communist sentiments 
and had the same political rhetoric found in pro-GMD/pro-ROC newspapers.  
The TUC as well as unions affiliated with it promoted rhetoric such as 
‗democracy‘, ‗freedom‘, and ‗a counterattack on the mainland‘.184  These labour 
unions were more concerned about Chinese politics and mobilising support for 
their political agendas than the welfare of their members.  The political 
inclinations of the labour unions set the stage for clashes between pro-CCP and 
pro-GMD workers. 
The FTU was the numerically dominant federation.  Sixty per cent of the 
171,623 union members in 1966 belonged to the FTU.
185
  However, neither of the 
two union federations gained much influence among workers in the 
manufacturing industry.  As of 1961, of the 512,000 persons in the manufacturing, 
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which made up 43 per cent of the total working population, only about 10 per 
cent were union members.
186
  Nonetheless, the FTU and the TUC had a more 
substantial presence in other industries such as utilities (40 per cent), and 
transport, storage and communication (78 per cent).
187
  
Rennie’s Mill: A Pro-Nationalist Refugee Camp 
When the Chinese Civil War resulted in a large influx of anti-Communist 
and/or pro-GMD refugees into the colony, some of these refugees initially settled 
at Mount Davis.
188
  Between March and June of 1950, the number of refugees in 
Mount Davis increased from about 1,000 to 5,900.  A settlement at Rennie‘s Mill 
was set up initially ‗as a stopgap measure to house the ex-Nationalist soldiers at 
Mount Davis and their families‘189 and evolved into a permanent pro-Nationalist 
suburban enclave over the next 40 years.
190
 
Symbols of pro-GMD sentiments were a striking feature of Rennie‘s Mill.  
The ROC flag and anthem were often used.  In schools there, pro-GMD and anti-
Communist sentiments were promoted by the teachers.
191
  Despite poor living 
conditions, the refugees‘ loyalty to the ROC remained strong and they sought to 
promote their pro-GMD sentiments in the refugee camp.  However, Rennie‘s Mill 
was only a small enclave and the influence of its pro-GMD sentiments beyond its 
boundaries was limited.  In contrast, the 1956 riots instigated by pro-GMD 
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sympathisers had a larger impact on the Chinese community in Hong Kong, 
albeit in a negative way. 
Pro-GMD  Violent Political Nationalism: The 1956 Riots 
The 1956 riots at Lee Cheng Uk and Tsuen Wan, an example of ardent 
political nationalism, was started by pro-GMD sympathisers.  Flags as symbols of 
political nationalism triggered the 1956 riots, as detailed in the official report 
titled Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, October 10
th
 to 12
th
, 1956.  
Sticking paper flags or other decorations on the walls of the buildings was not 
allowed in the resettlement estates.  It was a decision made at a meeting of the 
Resettlement Policy Committee of the Urban Council held on 3
 
October 1956.  
Residents in most of the resettlement estates were warned about this, and 
representative bodies served as communication channels between the residents 
and the staff of the Resettlement Department.  In Li Cheng Uk, which had only 
one block built, there was no representative body as such.  At 9am on 10 October 
1956, Mok Yiu-kwong, a junior officer of the Resettlement Department in charge 
of Li Cheng Uk Estate found small Nationalist flags and symbols stuck on the 
walls of the block.  Mok and another officer removed some of the flags.  One 
reason Mok removed the flags, according to the official report, was that he knew 
that his superior was going to visit Li Cheng Uk on the morning of 10 October.  
Mok‘s actions upset residents who had stuck the flags on the walls.  A crowd of 
300 to 400 people gathered at 11am, demanding that the flags be replaced.  They 
did not seem hostile at the start.  By 11:45am, the crowd had grown into 
approximately 500 people, most of whom were Nationalist sympathisers.  By 
75 
 
1:15pm, the crowd had increased to 2,000, although most of them were simply 
interested spectators.  Demands were made by spokesmen of the crowd ‗such as 
that 100,000 fire crackers should be provided, to hang from top to bottom of the 
block, that portraits of Sun Yat Sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek should 
be erected on the block with a large Nationalist flag, and that Mr.Mok should 
apologise publicly before the crowd and in Chinese newspapers‘.192  Initially, 
officials and property of the Resettlement Department were the targets.  That was 
the first phase of the riot.  In the second phase, shops with connections to 
Communist sympathisers were looted by Triad gangs, some of them carrying 
Nationalist flags.  In the third phase, more shops were looted.  Triad gangs, as a 
form of extortion, threatened to assault people in cars, and made shopkeepers in 
Kowloon City ‗buy‘ Nationalist flags. 
The incident in Tsuen Wan that took place on 1 October 1956 also started 
with the flag.  On that day, Chinese Communist flags were put up for the 
celebration of National Day, at factory dormitories and other buildings in Tsuen 
Wan, which included left-wing labour buildings.  One of these dormitories was 
that of the Pao Hsing Cotton Mill, which employed 110 left-wing workers.  A 
non-Communist worker living in the same dormitory pulled down one of the 
Communist flags on the early morning of 1 October.  This incident upset the left-
wing workers in the dormitory who had put up the flag.  The person who pulled 
down the flag was later asked to replace it and offer an apology to the left-wing 
workers, which ended the incident.  On 9 October, right-wing workers in the 
same cotton mill dormitory put up Nationalist flags as well as decorations that 
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included, according to the official report on the riots, the slogan ‗Long live the 
Chinese Republic‘ in ‗large characters on the windows of the dormitory‘.193  A 
management staff member inspected the dormitory and demanded that the slogan 
be removed.  Although the right-wing workers complied by removing all flags 
and decorations, the management‘s demand caused resentment among them.  
News of the incident spread among right-wing workers in the area where the 
management had forbidden the employees to celebrate their national day.  It was 
believed that this incident was the cause of agitation among the workers.  In fact, 
before this incident a series of meetings between right-wing workers in the Tsuen 
Wan area had been held to plan celebrations on the National Day.  The Tsuen 
Wan incident eventually turned into a clash between left-wing and right-wing 
workers.  Left-wing workers were beaten by Nationalist sympathisers, and some 
of them died as a result.   
The two riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan resulted in 440 casualties in 
total, of which 59 were fatal and 150 suffered minor injuries.  Contrary to the 
events in Kowloon, which were spontaneous in nature, as reported by Governor 
Grantham,
194
 events in Tsuen Wan were characterised by well-planned and 
organised violence by right-wing workers.  Grantham, in a confidential letter to 
J.B. Johnston of the Colonial Office, remarked that ‗the Tsuen Wan story is a bad 
one; for more than two hours the rioters had it all their own way‘.195   
The 1956 riots show how the CCP-GMD struggle influenced the 
development of nationalist sentiments in Hong Kong, and how such sentiments 
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led to violence.  The initial violence in Lee Cheng Uk was triggered by pro-GMD 
sympathisers‘ dispute with the colonial authorities in relation to the public 
display of the GMD flag.  Similarly, the violence in Tsuen Wan was triggered by 
competing nationalisms as both pro-Communists and pro-Nationalists attempted 
to promote their agenda via the use of the national flag.   
Political Nationalism as Tool of Extortion: The Triads and the 
1956 Riots 
 A noteworthy aspect of the 1956 riots was the role of the Triads and their 
relationship with the GMD, as mentioned in the official report.  In fact, the 
official report noted that some of these Triad Societies had their origins in the 
GMD:  
One of these Triad Societies, known as ‘14K‘, originated in Canton during 
the Nationalist regime and gained influence in Hong Kong comparatively 
recently; it started as a semi-official underground organisation of a political 
character, its members being mostly Nationalist army personnel and minor 
officials.  Membership has lately increased, drawn largely from poor refugees, 
including many youths.
196
 
Zhang Sheng (章盛), in his study of the history of Triads in Hong Kong written 
in Chinese, and W.P. Morgan, a former inspector with the Hong Kong Royal 
Police, claims that the Triads were involved in the 1956 riots.  Morgan states: 
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Those riots, while not inspired by the Triad societies were certainly developed 
by them.  Statements later recorded by policy clearly showed that society 
elements, sometimes on a sub-branch basis, were hastily mobilised and sent out 
to whip up the emotions of the crowd to cover looting activities of the society 
members.
197
 
Zhang also states that agents of the Nationalist secret service ( 軍 統 ) 
masterminded the riots.
198
  Like the official report, both Zhang and Morgan 
remark that some Triad groups were involved in extortion in the riots by coercing 
pedestrians, motorists, and shopkeepers into purchasing their paper flags of a 
political faction, and beating anyone who refused to buy them.
199
  This shows that 
political nationalism was used as a tool by the Triads for extortion and covering 
up their criminal activities.   
 When Chinese newspapers reported the 1956 riots, their reports reflected 
the political divisions within the Chinese-language press.  While the 1956 riots 
occupied the headlines in the major Chinese newspapers, and in general these did 
provide factual information as to what happened, identifying the culprits 
depended on the political stance of the newspapers. For instance, the left-wing 
Wen Hui Bao placed emphasis on the role of ‗GMD agents‘ (國民黨特務) in the 
riots.
200
  The pro-GMD Kung Sheung Daily News, on the contrary, reported that 
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the ROC government claimed that the riots were started by Communist agents 
(中共人員) and emphasised the role played by the triads.201  The pro-GMD Sing 
Tao Daily put on the front page what Jiang Jieshi said on Double Tenth.
202
  It 
mentioned nothing about the relationship between the GMD and the riots, and 
instead simply reported that it was the triads who instigated the riots.
203
  In an 
attempt to add credibility to the report the Sing Tao Daily in its headlines 
attributed the finding as to the role of the triads to the government‘s investigation 
Compared to the Sing Tao Daily and the Wen Hui Bao, reports in the slightly 
rightist Huaqiao Ribao (華僑日報) appeared to have taken a more objective, 
politically-neutral approach.
204
  Possibly due to its political stance, reports in the 
Huaqiao Ribao did not mention specifically who instigated the riots or who was 
responsible for the violence. 
Despite the fact that the Hong Kong government eventually suppressed 
the riots, Grantham foresaw that the risk of a similar riot occurring was always 
there, as the Hong Kong government with limited resources had to deal with the 
influx of refugees.  In the draft despatch attached to the confidential letter to 
Johnston, Grantham gave a clear warning: 
These deplorable events serve once again to draw attention to the very real 
problems presented by the influx of population into the small urban areas of 
Hong Kong and Kowloon, which have produced conditions of unparallelled 
overcrowding and the attendant threat to law and order that arises 
therefrom...Within its limited resources of land, materials and money the 
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Hong Kong Government has done and is doing all it can to ameliorate the 
conditions of these homeless refugees...In the meantime the risks of a similar 
outbreak to that which took place last month will be ever present and require 
increased vigilance.
205
 
Grantham‘s premonition was correct that Hong Kong would continue to be 
plagued by social problems in the 1950s and 60s. 
Pro-Communist Elements: The Hok Yau Chinese and Western 
Dance Study Club and Clandestine Communist Activities 
The Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club (學友中西舞蹈研
究社) was originally formed as a reading club of the Chinese-language magazine 
(學生文叢) shortly before the founding of the PRC.  The club later evolved into a 
study group for students with a focus on extra-curricular activities.
206
  In secret, 
the group was used as a base for the indoctrination of pro-Communist sentiments 
and recruitment of Hong Kong youth for the CCP.
207
  The leftists had to keep a 
low profile, as the Hong Kong government feared the development of pro-CCP 
and pro-GMD sentiments in the colony and took steps to suppress activities 
relating to such developments.  The public, too, feared the leftists.  To keep a low 
profile and a good public image the club followed a ‗two-handed operational 
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principle‘.  The Hok Yau Club had both public and secret leaders, although the 
CCP had control of the group.  Ore in his memoir explains in detail how the 
leadership of the Club was structured and the reason for it: 
Communist Youth League and Party members shared executive positions 
with sympathetic activists who held no Party affiliation.  To outsiders, the 
executive committee controlled the organisation: if anyone asked, the 
committee always made decisions together and voted on issues – a 
democratic system.  However, since all Shadow Core members were also on 
the public executive committee, true power rested within the Shadow Core.
208
 
 There also existed ‗branches‘ of leftists known as ‗lines‘ (線), defined by 
their nature and function within the leftist circle as well as Hong Kong society.  
These branches included the ‗Red Line‘ (紅線), ‗Black Line‘ (黑線), ‗Grey Line‘ 
(灰線), and ‗Pink Line‘ (粉紅線).209  In contrast to pro-GMD sympathisers, pro-
CCP forces kept a low profile throughout the 1950s when promoting their 
political agenda.  To avoid arousing the suspicion of the colonial authorities, the 
leftists sought to promote their agenda via subtle, less aggressive means.  For 
instance, to increase membership and promote the Hok Yau Club, members of 
the club ‗cultivated relationships with the press, businesses, and well-known 
artists in the community‘. 210   Of note is the fact that in 1967, pro-CCP 
Communists acted completely differently and became openly active, and 
eventually confrontational in the 1967 riots.  Through the pro-Communist 
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organisations, these underground leftists promoted pro-CCP sentiments in secret.  
At times, there were tensions among these underground leftists.  Szeto Wah, for 
example, was a leading figure in the club but was removed from it in 1958 
because he had a different opinion on how the club should be run.
211
 
Kenneth Ore Kee-ngai (柯其毅), who became a leader of the Hok Yau 
Club after Szeto Wah‘s departure, noted in his memoir that around 1960 the club 
was instructed by the Party to teach club members to be more patriotic through 
‗thought transformation‘.212  The transformation process was divided into several 
stages.  First, club members were taught not to join gangs, smoke, use drugs or go 
dancing.  Second, they were taught to ‗sympathise with the poor, to love the 
people, and to love China‘. 213   Third, members were recruited into the 
Communist Youth League and transferred outside of the Hok Yau Club.
214
  
However, Ore questioned the methods some Youth League members used in 
teaching club members to be patriotic.  Ore wrote: 
Not everyone in the Youth League practised transformation methods.  Some 
members responded to patriotic directives simply by telling their contacts to 
be more patriotic.  They then reported to their superiors that their contacts 
now knew what to do – that is, to be more patriotic.  Those shortcuts were not 
good enough for me.  How could I change these students‘ lives, their thoughts?  
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I kept asking myself.  How could I make them more patriotic instead of 
simply telling them to love their country?
215
 
What does Ore‘s story tell us about China-orientated nationalism in Hong 
Kong?  People involved in the promotion of political nationalistic sentiments at 
times questioned the methods used and became confused.  Ore‘s story also shows 
how pro-CCP sentiments in the post-1949 period had their origins in the 1950s 
and could only be promoted in secret, due to suppression by colonial authorities.  
In this sense, colonialism served as a limiting factor in the promotion of political 
nationalism.  In order to promote pro-CCP sentiments without arousing the 
suspicion of the colonial government, members of the Hok Yau Club chose to 
keep a low profile and cultivated relationships with different groups such as the 
press and businesses.   
Cold War Politics, ‘Free China’ and the Third Force Movement 
in Hong Kong 
In the 1950s in Hong Kong there existed a group of political activists, 
originally from China and often referred to as the Third Force (第三勢力).216  
The Third Force Movement, which promoted Western liberalism and democracy, 
had its origins in China in the 1940s.
217
  Its aim was the ‗creation of a new China, 
based upon the principles of democratic constitutionalism, which can be brought 
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into consonance with the traditional spirit of Chinese culture‘.218  The nationalist 
rhetoric of the Third Force in Hong Kong focused on the idea of building a 
democratic China free from the totalitarianism of the CCP and the GMD and was 
characterised by its criticisms of both Communist China and Chiang Kai-shek. 
Some of the leading members of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong were 
former GMD members.  Leaders of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong 
included Zhang Fakui (張發奎), a well-known GMD general, Gu Mengyu (顧孟
餘), Zhang Guotao (張國燾), a former CCP member, and Zhang Junmai/Carsun 
Chang (張君勱).  Zhang wrote the book The Third Force in China, which was 
essentially a manifesto of the Third Force Movement.  Zhang founded the China 
Democratic Socialist Party (中國民主社會黨) in 1946 and the Chinese Liberal 
Democracy Fighters Association (中國自由民主戰鬥同盟) in Hong Kong in 
1951, and has been referred to as a ‗Confucian democrat‘.219  Like the Chinese 
intellectuals in Hong Kong who promoted cultural nationalism, Zhang defended 
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Chinese culture in that he believed there existed ideas regarding democracy and 
individual freedom, and human rights in the Chinese tradition.
220
  However, the 
Third Force Movement in Hong Kong was political in nature. 
The Third Force Movement in Hong Kong grew out of the aftermath of 
the CCP-GMD struggle and Cold War politics and was closely associated with 
the US government.  The Hong-Kong-based Third Force received funding from 
the US government,
221
 had an anti-Communist agenda, and was actively engaged 
in political activities such as recruiting members for the Association, publishing 
journals to promote their agenda, and even military operations.
222
  Thus, the 
Third Force Movement can be classified as the third type of political nationalism 
that emerged in Hong Kong in the 1950s.  The Third Force worked with the anti-
Communist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek Free China Movement (自由中國運動) 
headed by Cai Wenzhi (蔡文治).223  As it was illegal to engage in political 
activities in Hong Kong at that time, the Hong Kong Special Branch (政治部) 
kept a close eye on the activities of the Third Force but did not take any drastic 
action against leaders of the Third Force Movement.
224
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While not all of the Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong were 
part of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong,
225
 their relationship with the 
Third Force cannot be ignored.  Zhang Junmai, as one of the leading figures of 
the Third Force Movement, helped draft the Declaration on Behalf of Chinese 
Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World (為中國文化敬告世
界人士宣言), published in 1958 in the Democratic Review.226  I shall discuss this 
document later in the case study of the cultural nationalists. 
The Third Force perceived the ROC and the GMD as different entities.  
For example, in an article in China’s Voice (中國之聲),227 a weekly magazine 
launched by the Third Force in 1951, the Third Force explained clearly that as far 
as their attitude towards the GMD regime in Taiwan was concerned, there were 
three ‗Taiwans‘: the ROC Taiwan, Taiwan as an anti-Communist base, and the 
Taiwan under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek‘s dictatorship.228  Although Zhang 
Fakui in his memoir claimed that the Third Force did not attack Chiang Kai-shek 
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or Taiwan,
229
 in fact it did as it called Chiang Kai-shek‘s regime a ‗cancer of 
China‘ (中國的毒瘤).230 
The concept of a democratic ‗free China‘ (自由中國), as a nationalist 
rhetoric closely related to a critical view of the GMD, was not confined to Third 
Force publications.  It could also be found in rightist publications in Hong Kong  
such as the Chinese Students’ Weekly (中國學生周報), Zuguo zhoukan (祖國周
刊), Daxue shenghuo (大學生活) and Democratic Review (民主評論).231  The 
similarity in rhetoric between these publications is to be expected for the writers 
had the same pro-democracy agenda, and the Third Force as well as most of the 
rightist publications received funding from the US.
232
 
Despite financial support from the US government, the Hong Kong-based 
Third Force Movement was short-lived primarily due to divisions among its 
leaders.
233
  Zhang Junmai openly condemned the Taiwan government and that 
did not gain the approval of GMD members such as Gu Mengyu and Zhang 
Fakui.  In addition, Gu Mengyu suspected that the Chinese Liberal Democracy 
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Fighters Association had been infiltrated by GMD agents.
234
  The Association 
was reorganised in 1954 and then disbanded, and the Third Force Movement 
ended in 1962.   
In the next section, I shall discuss the kind of cultural nationalism 
promoted by these Chinese intellectuals in exile.  The section will not be a 
complete study of the thought of these intellectuals.  It will only be a brief 
examination of the cultural nationalist rhetoric they promoted in Hong Kong in 
the 1950s.  Unlike those involved in the Third Force Movement, the Chinese 
intellectuals I discuss in the next section did not engage themselves actively or 
directly in political activities or military operations in an attempt to retake 
mainland China.  The questions I seek to answer are: what specifically was 
cultural nationalism in the 1950s based on?  What were the Chinese intellectuals‘ 
motives in promoting cultural nationalism in Hong Kong?  Were the cultural 
nationalists pro-GMD?  Did they criticise the GMD?  Did they see the GMD state 
as separate from China as a nation?   
Promoting Cultural Nationalism: Chinese Intellectuals in Exile in 
Hong Kong 
Chinese intellectuals such as Qian Mu (錢穆), Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou 
Zongsan (牟宗三), and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀) fled to Hong Kong in the Civil War 
period and actively promoted traditional Chinese culture in the colony.  Although 
some of these intellectuals spent time in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, their 
writings were often published in Hong Kong in the 1950s in Chinese-language 
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publications such as the Democratic Review (民主評論 ) and the Chinese 
Students’ Weekly (中國學生周報).235  I refer to these intellectuals as Chinese 
intellectuals in exile because despite the CCP‘s victory in the Civil War they still 
regarded the ROC as the legitimate political state of China, although not all of 
them were pro-GMD.  Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan were disciples 
of Xiong Shili (熊十力 ), a well-known scholar of Confucianism in early 
twentieth-century China.  It has been noted that Tang, Mou, and Xu ‗carried on 
his teaching and opened up the second stage of Modern New Confucianism‘.236  
Xu Fuguan, a former GMD official, founded the Democratic Review in 1949.  In 
October 1949 Qian Mu, Tang Junyi and other Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong 
founded the Asia College of Arts and Commerce (亞洲文商學院), which became 
the New Asia College (新亞書院) one year later and then part of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong.  Mou Zongsan taught at the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong from the 1960s onwards until the 1990s, but his writings had been 
published in Hong Kong in the 1950s. 
The New Asia College was founded by Qian Mu and scholars from 
mainland China ‗in search of academic freedom‘. 237   Academic staff of the 
College consisted of intellectuals from mainland China.  Tang Junyi, for example, 
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served as the Head of the Department of Philosophy and Education.
238
  Another 
well-known scholar Zhang Pijie (張丕介) taught economics in the college.  The 
New Asia College had a difficult start as it suffered from a lack of funding, but 
later it received funding from both Taiwan and the US. 
Despite its humble beginnings, New Asia became a base for the 
promotion of cultural nationalism as it was founded on the ideals held by Chinese 
intellectuals such as Qian Mu.
239
  After his arrival in Hong Kong, Qian saw that 
there were many young people without employment and education and thus he 
decided to provide an opportunity for them to receive an education.
240
  From the 
beginning, Qian as the President of the College stressed the importance of 
understanding Chinese culture and the advantage of traditional Chinese education 
in nurturing students with an all-round knowledge.
241
  He also believed that the 
traditional shuyuan (書院) education system of China where students received a 
general education (通識) from private tutors was the best.242   
The purpose in founding the College was ‗to preserve traditional Chinese 
culture and to balance it with western learning that students might at once have a 
thorough knowledge of their cultural heritage and be prepared to cope with the 
modern world‘. 243   Chinese history and culture, particularly Confucianism, 
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became the central motif of cultural nationalism that was promoted by the 
Chinese intellectuals in exile both inside and outside the New Asia College.
244
  It 
has been noted that Tang Junyi, for example, ‗ranked the achievements of 
Chinese Confucianism as the highest‘ of Chinese, Western and Indian cultural 
traditions.
245
  The New Asia scholars strongly believed that only through the 
revival of Chinese traditional culture could the Chinese nation be revived.
246
  
However, cross-cultural understanding was also an important focus in the New 
Asia College and Hong Kong was a suitable place for promoting the type of 
education that the mainland intellectuals envisioned.
247
  
As cultural nationalists, these Chinese intellectuals in exile saw it as their 
mission to preserve and promote Chinese tradition in Hong Kong.
248
  They made 
their agenda clear in a well-known document titled A Declaration on Behalf of 
Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World.  In that 
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document the authors vigorously defended Chinese culture, particularly 
Confucianism, and discussed the future of Chinese culture in terms of its 
relationship with the development of a democratic Chinese nation.
249
  The 
authors argue that Confucianism contains ideas relating to democracy and 
equality.
250
 
Chinese traditional culture was not the only matter these cultural 
nationalists discussed in their writings, for they also pondered the state of the 
Chinese nation.  Mou Zongsan, for example, placed emphasis on the ideological 
aspect of both the nation and the state as one based on Chinese tradition and 
culture, and one that should be ‗internalised‘ as part of ‗life‘, or shengming (生
命).251  Mou believed that a nation cannot be fully realised without a state,252 and 
that the state represents the nation.
253
  Mou‘s concept of the relationship between 
nation and state is an example of Ernest Gellner‘s observation that nationalism 
maintains that nations and states ‗were destined for each other; that either without 
the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy‘.254  In the view of Mou and Xu 
Fuguan, the transformation of the state and the preservation of the Chinese nation 
and culture cannot be separated.  It is precisely for the sake of preserving Chinese 
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culture that the state needs to be transformed.
255
  Similarly, Tang Junyi placed 
emphasis on both the nation and the state.  He criticised those that put too much 
emphasis on the nation, the party or the government, and groups that simply 
attacked the CCP and the GMD.
256
 
The work of the Chinese scholars in Hong Kong in the 1950s is an 
example of John Hutchinson‘s theory that cultural nationalists are ‗moral 
innovators who seek by ―reviving‖ an ethnic historicist vision of the nation to 
redirect traditionalists and modernists away from conflict and instead to unite 
them in the task of constructing an integrated distinctive and autonomous 
community, capable of competing in the modern world‘.257  The work of these 
Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong is an example of how cultural nationalists 
seek to bring together ideas of tradition and modernity, with a vision of an 
autonomous community based on a nation‘s distinctive cultural, ethnic and 
historical roots.   
Yet there was a political dimension to the promotion of cultural 
nationalism by these intellectuals.  New Asia College was a product of Cold War 
politics as well as post-Civil War Chinese politics.  The College was in part 
supported by US non-governmental organisations, which believed that preserving 
a symbol of Chinese culture such as New Asia would help combat 
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Communism.
258
  Qian Mu had personal connections with Chiang Kai-shek and 
the New Asia College received funding from the Nationalist government in 
Taiwan.
259
  Most importantly, what prompted these intellectuals to revive 
Chinese culture was the post-1949 political situation in China, as they believed 
that Chinese culture was slowly being destroyed by the Communist regime there.  
For Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan in particular, the 1949 regime change in China 
was the definitive turning point in their academic career as it sparked their 
determination to promote Confucianism.
260
   All the Chinese intellectuals in exile 
were anti-Communist.  Tang Junyi often criticised the CCP after he went to Hong 
Kong.
261
  Mou‘s nationalist ideology consists of three ideas: combating 
Communism with Chinese culture (文化反共); promotion of Confucianism; and 
supporting the ROC.  As a result, Mou did not openly criticise the GMD.
262
 
Compared to the work of the New Asia scholars, Xu Fuguan‘s work in 
Hong Kong in the 1950s was more political, particularly in the early days of the 
Democratic Review.  Xu founded the Democratic Review not only to call upon 
Chinese intellectuals to ponder their role in post-1949 ‗China‘ but to push for 
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changes in the GMD through open discussions.
263
  It has been argued that the 
Democratic Review reflected a change of thought in Xu Fuguan, as he became 
disillusioned with the GMD and turned his focus to Chinese culture as the way to 
save China.
264
  Indeed, in the final issue of the Democratic Review, Xu admitted 
that the focus of the publication moved from politics to Chinese culture.  
However, at the same time, Xu stated that the ‗great project of revival‘ (中興大
業) of China was ultimately inseparable from the GMD.265  He also argued that 
despite the fact that the publication was supported by the GMD at various times, 
he was being critical of the GMD out of good will.
266
  Thus, it can be said that 
although Xu Fuguan was critical of the GMD, he still supported the GMD and 
respected Chiang Kai-shek.  In any case, the attitudes of the cultural nationalists 
in exile towards the GMD appeared to be mixed and we cannot simply label them 
as either anti-GMD or pro-GMD.   
Pro-ROC versus Pro-GMD: The ROC Flag as Symbol of Chinese 
Culture 
The fact that New Asia scholars were anti-Communist did not necessarily 
mean that they should be labelled pro-GMD.  While Tang at times spoke 
positively about the GMD government in Taiwan,
267
 and Qian Mu had a personal 
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connection with the Chiang regime in Taiwan, Qian and Tang conceptually 
separated the GMD from the ROC, and politics from culture.
268
  Tang Duanzheng 
(唐端正), a student of Tang Junyi, has noted that although Tang Junyi recognised 
the Nationalist government (國民政府) as the state representing China, he never 
praised the GMD or celebrated Chiang Kai-shek‘s birthday.269   Indeed, Tang 
Junyi‘s writings published in the 1950s show that he perceived the ROC as the 
Chinese nation, the GMD as a political party, and the Nationalist government as 
the political state.
270
 
From Qian Mu‘s writings, it appears that although he came into contact 
with politically active people such as Zhang Junmai in Hong Kong,
271
 the focus 
of Qian‘s nationalist rhetoric was not on Chinese national politics or pro-GMD 
political sentiments, but on traditional Chinese culture.  In addition, Qian at times 
did criticise the GMD.  Like Xu Fuguan, Qian believed changes in the GMD 
were needed.
272
  That Qian was not pro-GMD is also evidenced by the fact that 
he refused to establish a college in Taiwan when asked to do so.  Thus, New Asia 
apparently wished to ‗operate outside the sphere of Chiang‘s control‘.273  As far 
as Qian Mu‘s view on the future of China was concerned, he wrote that he was 
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positive about it because China had a ‗traditionally superior culture‘,274 and that 
he hoped that Chinese people would draw lessons from Chinese history and 
traditional Chinese culture.
275
   
Although both Qian and Xu discussed the state of China and the GMD in 
their writings, it appears that Qian‘s promotion of cultural nationalism originated 
from his desire to preserve Chinese culture, while in Xu Fuguan‘s case the 
impetus was Chinese politics, or more specifically GMD politics.
276
  This 
difference in motive is to be expected because Xu was a former GMD official 
hoping to push for changes in the GMD, while Qian was a teacher and historian 
before he fled China.   
That New Asia scholars Qian Mu and Tang Junyi saw the ROC and the 
GMD as different entities is evidenced by their perception of the ROC flag.  The 
ROC flag was used in the New Asia College not because the staff supported the 
GMD, but because they regarded the flag as a symbol of Chinese culture.  The 
use of the ROC flag became a political issue when New Asia was to be 
incorporated into a new public university set up by the government, which was 
determined to make public universities politically neutral and thus demanded that 
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New Asia stop flying the ROC flag.  In the end, leaders of New Asia, concerned 
about New Asia‘s future, bowed to government pressure.277 
The case of Chinese intellectuals who settled in Hong Kong after 1949 
shows that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was not a 
purely political phenomenon.  Chinese culture was the central motif in the 
cultural nationalist rhetoric they promoted.  They believed in the idea of ‗saving 
China with Chinese culture‘ (文化救國). In reaction to the political nationalism 
revolving around the CCP-GMD struggle, they placed emphasis on the 
importance of both the nation and the state.  Further, the issue of representation 
of the nation emerged when questions were asked about what a national symbol 
represented. 
The flag-flying issue in the New Asia College also illustrates the fact that 
clashes between nationalism and colonialism were unavoidable.  In fact, this was 
not the only time when a state flag was used as a national symbol to represent the 
Chinese nation in a broader sense.  In the 1996 Baodiao campaign, which I will 
examine in detail in Chapter Seven, the PRC flag was used by activists to 
represent the entire Chinese community.   
Cultural Nationalism versus the Third Force Movement in Hong 
Kong: A Comparison 
A major difference between the cultural nationalists and the Third Force 
in Hong Kong is that while cultural nationalists Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, Mou 
                                                     
277
Grace Ai-ling Chou, Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong’s 
New Asia College, 1949-1976 (PhD thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), p.249. 
99 
 
Zongsan and Xu Fuguan were promoting their agenda with a focus on the revival 
of Chinese culture outside the realm of politics and respected Chiang Kai-shek, 
the Third Force Movement was marked by its condemnation of Chiang Kai-shek, 
and by Third Force activists‘ involvement in political as well as military activities.   
There were also similarities between the rhetoric of the cultural 
nationalists and that of the Third Force.  Both the cultural nationalists and the 
Third Force defended Chinese culture.  The concept of ‗democratic free China‘ 
could be found in the nationalist rhetoric of both the cultural nationalists and the 
Third Force.
278
  Those involved in the Third Force Movement had some 
connection with the cultural nationalists in the New Asia College as well as with 
other Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong.  In addition, both the cultural 
nationalists and the Third Force were anti-Communist.   
To some extent cultural nationalism persisted in the wen she (文社 ) 
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw a proliferation of Chinese-
language literary publications, some of which carried a nationalistic tone and 
discussed Chinese culture and matters relating to China.
279
  For example, the 
magazine Pangu 盤古, first published in 1967, contained many discussions about 
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China as well as a well-known article written by one of the editors as a response 
to Tang Junyi‘s discussions about overseas Chinese and the state of the Chinese 
nation.
280
  However, it remains unclear how much influence the kind of cultural 
nationalism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals in exile in the 1950s had on 
magazines such as Pangu, or Hong Kong young people in the 1960s and 1970s.  
One scholar has argued that some of the young people who participated in the 
first phase of the Campaign to Make Chinese an official language (爭取中文成
爲法定語文運動/中文運動) and the 1971 Defend Diaoyu Islands campaign 
were inspired by the ‗older form of cultural nationalism‘ of the 1950s.281  It can 
be said that cultural nationalism took on a new form in the 1970s student 
movement dominated by pro-China/pro-PRC Hong Kong students, who often 
claimed that they were promoting the spirit of the May Fourth Movement.
282
 
However, the kind of nationalism that emerged in the 1970s had more to do with 
increased political activism and the rise of pro-PRC sentiments among Hong 
Kong youth, which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter Five. 
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Conclusion: Post-1949 Chinese Politics and China-orientated 
Nationalism in the 1950s 
 After the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Hong Kong became a 
new battleground for the CCP-GMD struggle.  With the existence of both pro-
CCP and pro-GMD forces in a small colony, clashes between the two political 
camps were unavoidable.  This emerged in different contexts.   The influx of  
political refugees from China directly contributed to the emergence and 
promotion of pro-GMD sentiments in the colony.  The case of Rennie‘s Mill 
demonstrates that refugees promoted their pro-GMD sentiments in the small 
enclave despite economic hardships and poor living conditions. We have also 
observed how labour unions were divided into pro-CCP and pro-GMD camps. 
Along with political nationalism based on pro-CCP and pro-ROC 
elements, there existed cultural nationalism based on Confucianism as well as the 
Third Force rhetoric that was neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD.  Chinese 
intellectuals in the New Asia College looked to Chinese culture, specifically 
Confucianism, as the answer to building a better China and saw it as their mission 
to use Hong Kong as a base to protect Chinese culture from destruction by the 
CCP.  There were also Chinese intellectuals who became frustrated with both the 
CCP and GMD, and promoted the idea of a new democratic China, free from the 
political influence of the CCP and the GMD.  Although these Chinese writers 
vigorously promoted their agenda, their influence on the Chinese community in 
Hong Kong was limited.  The Third Force Movement was short-lived due to 
divisions among its leaders, a matter not uncommon in nationalist movements in 
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post-1949 Hong Kong.  In the expressions of nationalism, there emerged different 
meanings for ‗China‘: the ROC (中華民國) as the embodiment of the Chinese 
nation and cultural China; the GMD (國民黨) as a political party; the Nationalist 
government (國民政府) in Taiwan as the legitimate political state of China; and 
New/Communist China (新中國/中共). 
 In the 1950s, compared to the pro-GMD sympathisers, the pro-CCP 
forces kept a relatively low profile.  The 1950s witnessed the pro-Nationalists‘ 
open and active promotion of their agenda, to the dismay of the colonial 
government. The 1956 riots show how pro-ROC sentiments led to violence.  
History would repeat itself in the 1967 riots when leftists carried out their own 
‗nationalist‘ anti-British struggle, which, like the 1956 riots, disrupted the lives of 
Hong Kong citizens. 
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Chapter Four: The China Factor and Violent Political 
Nationalism: Construction and Failure of an Anti-
Colonial Rhetoric in the Maoist-led 1967 Riots 
 In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the post-1949 CCP-
GMD struggle influenced the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in colonial 
Hong Kong in the 1950s and was a major trigger of the 1956 riots.  It also 
showed that how the violent political nationalism manifested in the 1956 riots 
failed to gain public support.  To a certain extent, history repeated itself in the 
1967 riots, in that both riots failed to gain public support and both were 
influenced by the post-1949 political contexts.  However, the 1956 and the 1967 
riots occurred in different contexts.  While the 1956 riots saw a conflict between 
CCP and GMD sympathisers, the 1967 riots were led by pro-CCP workers, with 
the involvement of Chinese officials in Hong Kong.  As a result of the Cultural 
Revolution in China and Hong Kong‘s socio-economic problems at the time, 
what began as a labour dispute in 1967 turned into a highly politicised anti-
British series of riots.  The 1967 riots are significant in my analysis of China-
orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong because the riots are another 
example of violent political nationalism that the colonial government as well as 
the Hong Kong Chinese community had to deal with; and the riots had a negative 
impact on the lives of Hong Kong people.  Nationalism in this case created a 
division between those who supported the riots and those who did not.  It brought 
the coloniser and the non-leftist Chinese closer as both sides desired security.  It 
also prompted discussions by some Hong Kong Chinese about what China meant 
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for them.  The violent expressions of nationalism in the 1956 and 1967 riots 
contributed to the disappearance of national politics from nationalist movements. 
The 1967 disturbances are a controversial topic and few scholars have 
examined the riots in detail.
283
  Due to the space limitations, this chapter is unable 
to provide a complete history of the riots, but instead focuses on the leftists‘ 
construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric and its failure and debates about 
nationalism.  The chapter begins with an examination of how the social contexts 
and the China factor contributed to political instability in the colony and how 
they ultimately led to the riots.  It then examines the leftists‘ construction of an 
anti-colonial rhetoric by looking at leftist newspapers, and focuses on how and 
why the rhetoric failed.  The chapter examines their tactics and how at times they 
disagreed among themselves as to the use of tactics.  It then examines the Hong 
Kong community‘s reaction to the riots, focusing on the debates in the non-leftist 
Chinese-language press.  Lastly, the chapter discusses why the leftist struggle 
failed, the impact of that failure on the leftists, and the significance of the 1956 
and 1967 riots in relation to the development of China-orientated nationalism in 
Hong Kong. 
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Socio-Economic Contexts: The Economy, Living Conditions and 
Colonialism 
  To understand why the 1967 riots happened we must first look at the 
social and economic contexts in which they developed.  The population in the 
colony was close to four million.  Hong Kong was one of the most densely 
populated cities in the world.
284
  As of 1967, there were approximately 1.5 
million people working in Hong Kong, with 576,440 in the manufacturing 
industries.
285
  However, the economic takeoff did not necessarily result in the 
improvement of the living conditions of the population.  Why was there industrial 
growth in the colony?  Why was the Hong Kong government reluctant to invest 
resources in improving the infrastructure and living conditions in the colony?  
One needs to take into account two factors: the economic policy of the Hong 
Kong government and that of the British government; and the decline of the 
British industrial economy in the post-war period.  As mentioned in the last 
chapter, Britain was determined to keep Hong Kong as a colony in the post-war 
period to support its own ailing industrial economy.  This meant that the 
economic gains Britain made from the colony would not be re-invested in the 
colony itself.  Taking Britain‘s economic policy into account, one can understand 
how the government‘s practice of a tight fiscal policy was not merely an 
‗ideological commitment of the Financial Secretary to fiscal conservatism‘.286  It 
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was also because it served to support Britain financially that the colonial 
government implemented policies that facilitated industrial growth in Hong Kong, 
and exploited the abundant refugee labour.  These economic and political 
contexts explain why the colonial government up until the 1967 disturbances was 
reluctant to make improvements to the living conditions of the citizens in the 
colony. 
 A major problem was related to housing.  Although by 1967 the 
government had resettled over one million people, and about a third of the total 
population in low cost government housing, about three quarters of million 
people still lived in entirely inadequate housing.
287
  In its report on the 1966 riots, 
the colonial government admitted that despite the costs in time and resources, 
housing needed improvement.
288
  The colonial administration was also faced with 
the problem of youth discontent, which the 1966 riots clearly reflected. 
Youth Discontent and the 1966 Kowloon Disturbances: A Prelude  
 In 1966, disturbances broke out over fare increase by the Star Ferry 
Company.  Due to the disturbances, the government became concerned with 
problems relating to youth, since the disturbances marked the beginning of 
political participation by Hong Kong youth born after WWII.  Although the 
disturbances had nothing to do with nationalism or politics in China, criticisms of 
the colony‘s social and economic problems these had been raised against the 
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Hong Kong government.  Many who participated in the disturbances were 
between the ages of fifteen to 25.
289
  It has been noted that at the time more than 
50 per cent of Hong Kong‘s population was below the age of 21.290   
There had been reports of growing unemployment in the newspapers but 
in fact, the government claimed, there had been a large increase in employment in 
the early 1960s.
291
  However, the government also noted that many of the 
demonstrators in the riots had received little or no education beyond the primary 
school stage, and while the government concluded that the lack of education was 
not the reason why the riots occurred, it believed that the participating youth‘s 
lack of education might have contributed to a general attitude of discontent.
292
  
Thirdly, there was a widespread sense of worry about Hong Kong‘s economic 
future and fears of inflation.
293
  Under these circumstances, it was not unusual for 
young people to blame the colonial government for the social problems that 
existed in the colony.  The Hong Kong government received a report from social 
scientists who blamed the participation of youth in the riots on their sense of 
frustration at ‗their limited chances in life and the apparently wide gap between 
their aspirations and their achievements‘. 294   Although the government was 
uncertain as to the validity of these observations, in its report of the 1966 riots, it 
noted that young people had a ‗lower threshold of control over their 
dissatisfactions‘, and that the participation of youth was more likely due to their 
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‗feelings of boredom‘ and ‗a desire to draw attention by demonstrating false 
bravado‘.295   
China Factor I: CCP-GMD Struggle and Communist Influence in 
the Colony 
 The efforts of both Communists and Nationalists to promote their agenda, 
a result of the CCP-GMD struggle in Chinese politics, contributed to political 
instability of the colony.  Both Communists and Nationalists used Hong Kong as 
a base to their advantage for political reasons.  In the previous chapter, I 
examined several incidents in which Nationalists attempted to promote their 
agenda in the colony.  The Communists, too, had been doing much work on 
expanding their influence in the colony through the control of organisations such 
as the Hok Yau Club,
296
 which I discussed in the previous chapter, and through 
indoctrination of Communist ideas and promotion of pro-CCP sentiments in these 
groups.  In 1967, there were 32 leftist schools in Hong Kong with over 20,000 
students enrolled in them.
297
  It is clear that leftist forces in Hong Kong had been 
expanding their influence.  The leftist schools and organisations had previously 
kept a very low profile in their activities due to the political environment of that 
period and the Hong Kong government‘s fear of the spread of Communist 
influence in the colony.  Further, the influence of the Hong Kong-Macao 
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Working Committee over leftist schools was weak.
298
  It was in the context of 
labour movement that leftists had a more significant influence.  As the 1967 riots 
began with labour disputes and leftist labour unions played a major role in the 
riots, it is necessary to examine the situation regarding leftist unions in Hong 
Kong  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CCP-GMD rivalry extended to 
the labour movement, for there existed pro-CCP and pro-GMD trade unions 
whose interests were tied to Chinese politics.  Trade unions in Hong Kong had 
two functions: one was to rally support for political purposes and the other was to 
provide social and economic services to their members.
299
  It has been argued that 
while unions were forbidden by law from financing political activity, joining a 
trade union was a political gesture and commitment.
300
  In the 1960s and 1970s 
most trade unions were affiliated with the pro-CCP FTU.
301
  Although the FTU 
lost members after the 1967 disturbances, at the end of 1967 Communist union 
membership was still over 95,000.
302
  The FTU was the labour section of the 
New China News Agency (新華社 NCNA) and responsible for implementing the 
policies of the NCNA.
303
  Many who were involved in the 1967 disturbances and 
the labour disputes leading up to the riots were members of leftist trade unions.  
 
                                                     
298
 John P. Burns, ‗The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong‘, Asian Survey, 30, 
8, 1990, pp.748-765. 
299
 Joe England and John Rear, Chinese Labour under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour 
Relations and Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.95. 
300
 Ibid., p.94. 
301
 Ibid., pp.90-91. 
302
 Ibid., p.91. 
303
 Wong Cheuk-yin, The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors 
Approach (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000), pp.30-31. 
110 
 
China Factor II: The Cultural Revolution in China 
Scholarly work done in relation to the riots has suggested that the 
economic and labour contexts were not the most significant factor resulting in the 
disturbances.
304
  There had been labour strikes in the 1950s and early 1960s but 
most of them were of short duration and did not escalate into full-scale riots.
305
  
Moreover, there had been a decline in the labour movement and a drop in union 
membership in the 1950s.
306
  In addition, the fact that there had been a period of 
industrial peace in the 1950s was a result of the non-militant policies of the FTU 
and TUC.
307
  In the 1950s the FTU was in fact less openly involved in industrial 
actions against major employers, and its focus in that period was building up its 
strength through the expansion of educational and welfare services to its 
members.
308
  Furthermore, economic difficulties faced by the working population 
such as rising inflation alone ‗were not of a magnitude that could generate and 
sustain widespread and prolonged confrontations with the management and their 
alleged protectors the colonial government‘.309 
Therefore, the answer as to why the 1967 disturbances occurred and why 
it became so highly politicised and turned into a full-scale riot, lies elsewhere.  It 
will be useful to begin the investigation by first examining the PRC‘s policy 
towards Hong Kong up until 1967.  Before 1967, Hong Kong and China had 
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shared a harmonious relationship.  The guiding principle of the PRC‘s policy 
towards Hong Kong was taking a long-term view and making full use of Hong 
Kong‘ (chongfen dasuan changqi liyong 充分打算，長期利用).310  The origins 
of this policy could be traced back to 1948 when the Chinese Civil War was 
coming to an end.  The head of the NCNA at that time, Qiao Guanhua (喬冠華), 
told the British that the CCP had no intention of taking over Hong Kong, because 
of Hong Kong‘s economic value to China.311  By maintaining the status quo the 
Chinese government was using Hong Kong to its advantage politically and 
economically.
312
  In 1966, for example, the PRC made more than 250 million 
pounds in foreign exchange out of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong bought 2,769 
million Hong Kong dollars of low-cost goods from China.
313
  By 1967 the PRC 
had made over 600 million U.S. dollars in foreign exchange out of Hong Kong.
314
  
It was therefore unlikely that the PRC would want to take back Hong Kong.  
However, with the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 there would be 
political developments in China that would affect the PRC‘s policy towards Hong 
Kong, and create an impression in the eyes of leftists in Hong Kong that a there 
would be a change in China‘s policy towards Hong Kong.  Under the influence of 
the Cultural Revolution the leftists in Hong Kong attempted to start their own 
cultural revolution in the colony, which entailed going against Beijing‘s official 
policy towards Hong Kong.  To understand why the Hong Kong leftists and the 
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NCNA officials made such attempts it is necessary to look at the politics within 
the PRC, particularly within China‘s Foreign Ministry. 
Chinese Politics and the Struggle in Hong Kong 
There were two factions within the Foreign Ministry, the offices under the 
leadership of the rebels and those under the control of the moderates.  As a result, 
there existed two groups responsible for coordinating the work of Chinese in 
Hong Kong at the same time: the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee (港澳
工作委員會 HKMWC), working under the name of the NCNA in Hong Kong 
and under the influence of the Cultural Revolution;
315
 and the Hong Kong-Macao 
Office (港澳辦公室 HKMO), formed under the order of Zhou Enlai and headed 
by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Guibo (羅貴波).316  As rebels in the 
Foreign Ministry attempted to seize power from the ‗moderates‘, the Hong Kong 
and Macao Working Committee and the NCNA, HKMWC‘s office in Hong 
Kong, instructed the leftists in Hong Kong to carry out the anti-British struggle.  
At that time the NCNA was already under the influence of the Central 
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Revolutionary Group (中央文革組),317 and decided that a large scale struggle 
must be carried out.  Moderates such as Liao Chengzhi (廖承志) and Luo Guibo 
had doubts about carrying out a large scale struggle in Hong Kong.  However, in 
the political climate of the Cultural Revolution at that time, they were reluctant to 
say anything.
318
 
Premier Zhou Enlai himself, though not directly or openly supporting the 
struggle, had a direct involvement in the policy-making processes in relation to 
the struggle in the colony.  Although the rebels attempted to seize power from the 
moderates in the Foreign Ministry, Zhou and his subordinates did not really lose 
control of everything.  For in the end the Gang of Four and the rebels failed in 
their attempt to seize power in the Foreign Ministry after the burning of the office 
of the British Charge d‘Affaires in Beijing, which was severely criticised by both 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.
319
  Eventually Zhou and the moderates, through the 
HKMO, with the approval of Mao Zedong, put an end to the struggle.
320
  
There have been different opinions in literature dealing with the Cultural 
Revolution, on whether Zhou Enlai lost control of the Foreign Ministry during 
the Cultural Revolution and whether the Hong Kong disturbances were a result of 
Zhou‘s loss of control.  Officially, the Chinese government put the blame on the 
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Gang of Four and their attempt to change China‘s policy towards Hong Kong.321  
It has been suggested that the Foreign Ministry was going through a process of 
‗disintegration‘ and radicalisation and that had there not been the radicalisation 
the Hong Kong riots probably would not have occurred.
322
  Jin Yaoru, who 
worked for the Wen Hui Pao during the 1967 disturbances, has stated that the 
Central Revolution Group under the leadership of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing had a 
direct hand in the work of the Foreign Ministry relating to affairs of Hong Kong 
and Macao.  Jin has also stated that the State Council‘s Foreign Affairs Staff 
Office (國務院外事辦公室) under the leadership of Zhou Enlai was in practice 
removed  by the Gang of Four.
323
  However, recent literature presents a different 
story.  Ma Jisen, for example, in her recent work argues that although the Central 
Revolution Group, through its propaganda had a significant influence on the anti-
British struggle in Hong Kong, it was not directly involved in the decision-
making process in relation to the struggle.  Ma also argues that the Foreign 
Ministry was very much intact and still under the leadership of Zhou Enlai.   
Before the radicalisation and the radicals‘ attempt to seize power, work 
relating to Hong Kong and Macao were under the leadership of Liao Chengzhi 
who was the leader of the Hong Kong and Macao group of the State Council‘s 
Foreign Affairs Staff Office (the office was headed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi) 
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and First Deputy Head of the office.
324
  However, some of its conservative 
officials were now facing the prospect of being criticised by the rebels or had 
already become targets of criticism.  These included Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
(陳毅 ) and Liao Chengzhi.  For the sake of self-preservation, conservative 
officials such as Liao Chengzhi and Luo Guibo dealing with Hong Kong and 
Macao affairs were afraid to speak up against the extremist direction the 
HKMWC was taking.
325
  Even Zhou Enlai himself gave tacit approval to the 
work of the Red Guards and openly supported the seizure of power by the rebels, 
although this move by Zhou in practice protected the Foreign Ministry from 
being thrown into disarray.
326
  It cannot be denied that there was a strong 
impression of a change in policy regarding Hong Kong, particularly in the eyes of 
those in the leftist circle and Chinese officials working in the colony.  For these 
reasons, it is not at all surprising that the NCNA/HKMWC in Hong Kong took 
steps to carry out and prolong the anti-British struggle. 
 Although the radicals of the Central Revolution Group might not have had 
a direct hand in changing the PRC‘s policy towards Hong Kong at this time, there 
did appear to be a change of policy in May 1967 when Vice Foreign Minister Luo 
Guibo issued a statement protesting the way in which the Hong Kong 
government dealt with the labour disputes at the San Po Kong Plastic Flower 
Works.
327
  Scholars have given some explanations as to the factors that 
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contributed to this change in policy.  Firstly, the ideology and political 
atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution would not tolerate the existence of 
colonial and capitalistic Hong Kong.  Secondly, despite Hong Kong‘s economic 
value to the PRC, under the influence of the Cultural Revolution Chinese 
Communists would make national pride their priority over all else.
328
  The Sino-
Soviet border conflict in the 1960s illustrated that to some extent.
329
  Under the 
extreme political climate, officials in China and Chinese government personnel in 
Hong Kong could not afford to appear any less revolutionary than what was 
required by the Cultural Revolution, in order to avoid personal political troubles.  
Naturally, in 1967 the staff in the NCNA were under much pressure to create an 
image for themselves that they were ‗revolutionary‘.  Adding insult to injury, 
there appeared to be a lack of communication between Beijing and the NCNA 
regarding the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong.  Although rebels in Beijing 
initially created the impression that the struggle must continue, staff in the NCNA 
appeared to be confused by the political developments in China. 
 Although the power struggle within the Foreign Ministry ended in August 
1967, the NCNA /HKMWC in Hong Kong were not ordered to end the struggle 
until late 1967.  Between August and the end of 1967, it was up to the leftists in 
Hong Kong to continue with the struggle.  For Zhou Enlai did not become 
involved in the Hong Kong struggle for a while even after the Sha Tau Kok 
incident, a border incident that saw a clash between  Hong Kong police and 
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Chinese troops as the two sides exchanged fire.
330
  It is unclear whether the heads 
of the NCNA were aware of the end of the internal Foreign Ministry power 
struggle following Mao‘s criticism of the rebels‘ actions.  By August Mao 
realised the Foreign Ministry rebels were a threat, and took steps to crack down 
on the rebels.
331
  Many cadres working in Hong Kong were unaware of the end of 
the power struggle.
332
  The evidence suggests that there was confusion within the 
Hong Kong NCNA because of the NCNA officials‘ lack of knowledge of the 
political developments within the Chinese government.  This confusion further 
contributed to the leftists‘ attempt to prolong a failing struggle.  In short, it was 
both the confusion and sense of self-preservation, a result of the Cultural 
Revolution, among Chinese cadres responsible for PRC‘s work in Hong Kong, 
which ultimately resulted in the extreme left approach taken by Hong Kong 
leftists in the 1967 riots.  While the politicisation and escalation of the anti-
British struggle in Hong Kong was a result of the influence of the Cultural 
Revolution, it was the labour disputes  in the colony that triggered the riots. 
Labour Disputes in Early 1967 
The immediate trigger to the 1967 riots was the labour dispute at the 
Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong in Kowloon in April 1967.  
However, it should be noted that from February to May 1967 there were other 
labour disputes as well.  There were reports of fighting among workers and 
                                                     
330
 For details, see Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, pp.185-
186. 
331
 For example, Wang Li (王力), a leading rebel who caused major changes in the Foreign 
Ministry in 1967, was arrested on 26 August 1967 and suspended from his job.  See Ma Jisen, The 
Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, pp.219-220. 
332
 Jin, Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang, p.168. 
118 
 
beating of workers by the senior staff.
333
  The leftist media seized every 
opportunity to politicise these labour disputes by putting the blame on the 
colonial government as well as GMD agents.  On 29 April a labour dispute broke 
out at the Hung Hom works of the Green Island Cement Company (青洲英坭公
司) when it was alleged that Chinese workers were beaten by two Australian 
engineers.
334
  The workers protested and made a six-point demand to the 
management.  The management quickly closed down the factory suspending the 
works and preventing about 200 workers from getting into work. 
335
  As the 
workers protested outside the factory, eight people wearing Mao badges and 
holding Quotations of Chairman Mao (毛主席語錄), also known as the ‗Little 
Red Book‘, and recited the quotations.336   Leftists‘ involvement and their use of 
Chinese Communist symbols marked the beginning of the politicisation of labour 
disputes. 
The Labour Dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works 
as Immediate Trigger 
Although the labour dispute at the Green Island Cement Company 
attracted more public attention,   it was the labour dispute at the San Po Kong 
Artificial Flower Works in Kowloon that served as the immediate trigger to the 
1967 disturbances, due to violent intervention by Hong Kong police.
337
  Two 
serious clashes between the police and the workers involved in the dispute 
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occurred on 6 May and 11 May.  On 6 May, for the first time the dispute turned 
into a riot resulting in confrontation between the police and workers,
338
 as about 
100 workers involved in the labour strike attempted to stop the moving of goods 
from the factory and police were called in to help.
339
  Some people involved were 
beaten by the police and eighteen were arrested.  The second, more violent 
confrontation took place  on 11 May when leftist students and workers visited the 
workers of the flower works to offer their support.  About 620 riot police arrived 
at the scene at 3pm,
340
 and started beating the leftist students and workers.  In 
total 53 tear gas bombs and 70 wooden bullets were fired by the police and 127 
people were arrested.
341
  Following the events at San Po Kong of 11 May, riots 
broke out in other parts of Kowloon.
342
  Why was there continued politicisation 
and escalation of the riots in the months following the initial riots?  To answer 
that question we need to examine in detail Beijing‘s response, which served as a 
source of encouragement for the local leftists. 
Politicisation and Escalation of the Anti-British Struggle 
Along with the Cultural Revolution in China, the colonial government‘s 
handling of the labour disputes as well as Beijing‘s response encouraged the 
leftists to escalate the struggle.  Following the clashes between police and 
workers at San Po Kong in May 1967 struggle committees were formed.  After 
the Foreign Ministry of China released statements expressing support for the 
                                                     
338
 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p.183. 
339
 Zhou Yi 周奕, Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi 香港左派鬥爭史 (A History of Leftist 
Struggles in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Liwen chubanshe, Third edition, 2002), pp.225-226. 
340
 Zhang, Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing, p.37. 
341
 Zhou, Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi, p.229. 
342
 Ibid. 
120 
 
struggle in Hong Kong,  the number of struggle committees surged.  On 15 May 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its first statement expressing support for the 
‗Hong Kong compatriots‘ and condemning the use of violence by the Hong Kong 
government in the events at San Po Kong.
343
  Material published in the People‘s 
Daily, too, served as an inspiration to the leftists in Hong Kong as they believed it 
was proof that the Chinese government was officially supporting the anti-British 
struggle.  On 3 June the People’s Daily, which was under the influence of the 
rebels, published an editorial titled ‗Resolutely Repel British Provocations‘ (堅決
反擊英帝國主義的挑釁),344 which called upon the populace of Hong Kong to 
take action against the Hong Kong government.  On 5 July the People’s Daily 
once again called for an escalation of the Hong Kong struggle.
345
  The  small 
victory of the leftists in the Macao riots also served as an inspiration to Hong 
Kong leftists.  The arrests of the staff of three leftist newspapers in August 
provoked the leftists even further.  The arrests eventually led to the Chinese 
government‘s issuing an ultimatum to the British government demanding that the 
Hong Kong government lift the ban on the three newspapers and release the 19 
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detained reporters within 48 hours.
346
  Rallies were held in China to support the 
Hong Kong struggle.   
All these events showed that the factors contributing to the escalation of 
the struggle included Chinese politics and Beijing‘s response to the events in 
Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong government‘s actions.  More importantly, 
Beijing‘s actions created an impression, in the eyes of the local leftists and 
particularly the Hong Kong branch of NCNA, that the PRC was supporting them.  
Leftists in Hong Kong were not the only ones who started the promotion of an 
anti-colonial rhetoric.  Beijing played an equally important role in the 
construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric and by doing so, it encouraged local 
leftists to escalate the struggle.  Chinese officials particularly top cadres of the 
NCNA, who dealt with Hong Kong affairs were so encouraged by Beijing‘s 
actions that they even believed that eventually the PRC would officially intervene 
in the Hong Kong struggle.  However, these Chinese officials miscalculated, as 
they failed to keep in mind the PRC‘s official long-standing policy towards Hong 
Kong, and that is to maintain the status quo.
347
  From the time Beijing made an 
official response to the events in Hong Kong, leftists in Hong Kong followed 
Beijing‘s political tone very closely in their construction of an anti-colonial 
rhetoric, only to realise in the end that neither Beijing nor the public would 
support their anti-British struggle. 
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Construction of Maoist Anti-Colonial Rhetoric 
 The NCNA was pulling the strings as it controlled the major leftist 
newspapers in the colony such as the Ta Kung Pao (大公報) and Wen Hui Pao 
(文匯報).  Throughout the disturbances, the two leftist newspapers constantly 
published articles on the anti-British struggle and the Cultural Revolution in 
China.  Quotations from Mao‘s works were often printed in prominent spaces in 
leftist newspapers published during the disturbances.  During the indiscriminate 
bombing in Hong Kong, the two newspapers published reports on the bombing, 
claiming how British police officers were shaken by the bombing or were killed 
by the bombs.
348
  The leftists called colonial officials ‗white-skinned pigs‘ (白皮
豬 ) and Chinese police officers ‗yellow-skinned dogs‘ (黃皮狗 ). 349   Leftist 
newspapers also published small newsletters to promote their anti-British 
struggle.
350
  Some of the ‗letters of support‘ from readers that were published in 
the leftist newspapers were not genuine as they were in fact written by the editors 
themselves.
351
 
Some observations can be made concerning the leftists‘ construction of 
rhetoric.  Firstly, the leftists used the print media extensively to promote their 
agenda and for their construction of political nationalism with an anti-colonial 
rhetoric.  Secondly, from what was published in the leftist media one can clearly 
see that the leftists almost completely ignored the inconveniniences the 
indiscriminate bombing caused to the lives of the citizens in the colony.  The 
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construction of rhetoric had nothing to do with an attempt to address labour 
grievances or labour disputes.  It was unlikely that Hong Kong citizens would be 
able to relate personally to the anti-colonial rhetoric or the leftist nationalist 
rhetoric when it was obvious that all the leftists were trying to do was to stir up 
trouble in the colony.   One needs to keep in mind that many who fled mainland 
China during the Civil War period did so to avoid the political turmoil.  Moreover, 
given that information about the situation in China was not readily available to 
the public, most Hong Kong citizens probably would have no idea what was 
happening in China as far as the Cultural Revolution was concerned. 
The leftists‘ lack of realistic objectives and use of a rhetoric that had little 
to do with addressing labour grievances meant that the struggle was destined to 
fail.  Indeed, from the beginning the leftists achieved very limited success with 
the strikes.  A joint strike was launched on 10 June to disrupt local administration 
and food supplies to the colony.  An announcement was made in the leftist 
newspapers that in response to the call to strike by four left-wing government 
workers‘ unions, workers in government departments would go on strike as 
protest against government persecution.
352
  However, almost all government 
workers reported for duty.  Food strikes launched to disrupt food supplies to 
Hong Kong did not make much of an impact either, for although food supplies 
from mainland China was disrupted, not many responded to the call to strike and 
there were local supplies of food.
353
  In the latter half of the year, the leftists 
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launched yet another food-related campaign in an attempt to discredit the colonial 
government, following their failure with the food strikes. 
Launch of the ‘Love the Motherland, Buy National Goods’ 
Campaign 
In the latter half of 1967, there was a shortage of food caused by the local 
strikes initiated by leftists,
354
 a reduction of food imports from mainland China 
due to the Cultural Revolution,
355
 and bad weather in the summer of 1967.
356
  
Leftists called upon the hawkers and merchants selling food products to go on 
strike, but the call received little response and had very little effect.
357
  Perhaps 
sensing that their anti-British struggle was failing and desperate to gain public 
support, local leftists‘ propaganda blamed the colonial government for the 
shortage of food, claiming it resulted from the colonial government‘s closure of 
the border.  In October, the leftists launched a campaign to promote Chinese food 
products and to create an impression that China had an ample supply of food and 
was on the side of Hong Kong compatriots and would keep supplying them with 
food.
358
  The slogan of the campaign was ‗love the motherland, buy national 
goods‘ (愛祖國，用國貨).359   The campaign was officially launched on 29 
October and ended on 10 November, and major leftist newspapers Wen Hui Pao 
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and Ta Kung Pao were mobilised to promote the food campaign.
360
  In contrast, 
Ming Pao Daily News criticised the food campaign and called for an end to the 
violent struggle.
361
  If the leftists were to show that they cared about the well-
being of Hong Kong citizens, why did they not simply end the indiscriminate 
bombing and strikes so that order could be restored and people‘s lives could 
return to normal?  The launch of the ‗buy national goods‘ campaign was marked 
by inauspicious timing, and represented a lack of strategy on the part of the 
leftists. 
Months before the launch of the October/November ‗buy national goods‘ 
campaign the power struggle within the Chinese Foreign Ministry had ended.  
The campaign appeared nothing more than a final attempt by the leftists to 
prolong the struggle.   Leftists once again attempted to construct a campaign with 
a nationalistic tone.  Unlike the previous food strikes, the ‗buy national goods‘ 
campaign did not carry an anti-colonial rhetoric.  It is possible that the leftists had 
learned that actions that carried an overtly anti-colonial tone, and caused 
disruption to the lives of citizens would only antagonise the public.  Therefore, 
the leftists emphasised the nationalist rhetoric in the ‗buy national goods‘ 
campaign towards the end of the year, when it became apparent that their struggle 
was failing as it lost public support.  As far as nationalist campaigns are 
concerned, this change of tactics by the leftists in 1967 illustrates how activists in 
nationalist campaigns had to change tactics if the situation called for it.  A 
nationalist campaign cannot succeed without the support of the masses.  A 
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change in tactics may be needed, particularly if the campaign has failed to gain 
public support. 
The ‗buy national goods‘ campaign by the leftists was a failed attempt to 
rally public support simply by using a nationalistic rhetoric.  The leftists failed to 
consider the fact that leftist labour strikes and bombing had already caused 
inconveniences to many citizens in the colony.  Food supply in the colony 
seemed to have stabilised by the end of the year.  The launch of the ‗buy national 
goods‘ represented a lack of direction within the local leftist circle as to how the 
anti-British struggle should be continued in wake of a series of failures in rallying 
public support.  The indiscriminate bombing had already tarnished the leftists‘ 
reputation and the food strikes only appeared to be causing inconveniences to the 
citizens of Hong Kong.   Launching another campaign with an empty nationalist 
tone certainly would not help in improving the leftists‘ public image.  Launching 
strikes and campaigns with a nationalist motif was not the only action the leftists 
took in the riots to promote their agenda.  The leftists also constructed heroes by 
publishing stories of individuals who were arrested in their newspapers and 
labelled them as ‗patriots‘. 
Stories of Tsang Tak-sing and Individual Leftists as Propaganda 
Material: Construction of Heroes 
 The case of Tsang Tak-sing (曾德成),362 who was hailed by leftist media 
as a hero after his arrest, is particularly interesting.  Tsang was an eighteen-year-
old Form 6 student at St. Paul‘s College who was arrested by the police for 
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distributing leaflets criticising the colonial education system.  After the labour 
disputes in May Tsang sympathised with the leftists and began distributing the 
leaflets outside his school during the summer holiday.  On 28 September, when 
Tsang was a Form 7 student, he and several students distributed the same leaflets 
in the classrooms.  Police were called in by the school.  Tsang was the only 
person arrested.  He was beaten by the police and eventually sentenced to two 
years‘ imprisonment.363  After the incident, Tsang was hailed by the leftist media 
as a hero, particularly because he was not a member of the leftist circle and was 
studying in an English secondary school perceived to be a nursery for the local 
elites under colonial rule.  Although Tsang‘s father was working for the pro-CCP 
Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (香港中華總商會), his 
family was not a ‗traditionally leftist‘ family.  Tsang‘s story was published 
simultaneously in the 27 October editions of Wen Hui Pao and Ta Kung Pao.  
The leftist media reported that Tsang had been ‗poisoned by enslavement 
education‘ (飽受奴化教育毒害 ), 364  that Tsang displayed courage on the 
frontline of the struggle and that he was ‗armed with Mao Zedong Thought‘.365  
The leftist media also emphasised how he sacrificed himself and his future as a 
patriot.
366
  However, a later study asserted that Tsang had distributed the leaflets 
out of sympathy for the leftists following the use of violence by the police in the 
labour disputes, not because of ‗Mao Zedong Thought‘.367   
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Tsang‘s story is one example of how leftist media would seize every 
opportunity to promote their agenda, even when what was said in their reports 
was far from the truth.  Political nationalism in this case was about constructing 
heroes as models for citizens to follow.  Tsang was not the only one constructed 
by leftist media as a hero; the stories of those working for leftist newspapers who 
were arrested by the Hong Kong government were used as propaganda material 
as well.  By publishing Tsang‘s story, the leftists probably hoped to show that 
even someone educated in a colonial education system would ‗rise up‘ against the 
colonial government.  However, given the violence committed by the leftists in 
the form of indiscriminate bombing, the construction of heroes through 
newspaper reports would have little effect in helping leftists gain public support 
for their anti-British campaign.  These stories of arrested leftists, and of  those 
who sympathised with the leftists, would only serve to remind citizens of Hong 
Kong that taking any action to support or show sympathy for the leftists would be 
dangerous.  Another major flaw with these personal stories was that they ignored 
what the majority of the Chinese population was thinking at that time.   The 
majority of Hong Kong citizens supported the government, as they put their faith 
in the colonial administration in restoring order.  Having failed to gain public 
support by trying to promote a Maoist anti-colonial rhetoric through propaganda 
and strikes, local leftists resorted to the use of terror bombing, which was the 
major factor contributing to the failure of their struggle. 
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Use of Violence and Bomb Tactics: Struggle out of Control and 
Divisions within Leftist Circles 
As part of the escalation of the anti-British struggle, local Communists 
devised the tactic of indiscriminate bombing.  Bomb attacks began around July 
1967,
368
 occurred almost daily, and lasted several months until the end of 
December.
369
  The first bomb attack occurred on 8 July as demonstrators attacked 
a police station in Kwun Tong.
370
  The Chinese government did not sanction the 
use of bombs.  It was a tactic devised by local leftists alone.
371
  Even the British 
government believed that the disturbances ‗were almost certainly not 
premeditated by the Chinese government‘.372  Despite the fact that the bombing 
caused injuries and great convenience to innocent Hong Kong citizens, leftist 
newspapers promoted the use of bombs in the struggle.  However, some of the 
leftists raised doubts about the bomb tactic.  The principal of the leftist Hon Wah 
Middle School (漢華中學) Huang Jianli (黃建立), for instance, had doubts about 
the bomb tactic.
373
  Huang was a core member of the struggle committee of the 
education sector.  According to Huang‘s account, leftists in the education sector 
did not support the use of violence and only carried out non-violent protests.
374
  
As other examples, Jin Yaoru of Wen Hui Pao and Liao Yiyuan (廖一原), a 
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committee member of the All Circles Struggle Committee (各界鬥委會 ), 
similarly did not support the use of bombs.
375
  In any case, these less radical 
leftists did not express their doubts about the bombing, as they did not wish to 
upset their fellow leftists at a time when the nationalist fever within the leftist 
circle was at its peak.
376
 
 The fact that some leftists had doubts about the use of bombs in the 1967 
riots shows that as far as nationalist movements in Hong Kong were concerned, 
differences in opinion were unavoidable.  In the case of the 1967 riots, certainly 
the use of violence would not gain approval from some of the less militant leftists.  
Even in cases of peaceful expressions of China-orientated nationalism in Hong 
Kong in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, activists would differ as far as the use of 
tactics was concerned.  It is impossible to get activists to agree on tactics 
unanimously.  When it comes to the use of violence, any activist with common 
sense would have doubts about it.  Under the extreme political circumstances in 
both China and Hong Kong at the time the riots occurred, however, it was 
difficult for the less radical leftists to oppose the use of violence or any other 
extreme measures.  In this sense, the nationalist fever displayed in the 1967 riots 
became a form of censorship for local leftists as well as Chinese cadres working 
in Hong Kong.  Further, it could be said that it was both action and inaction of 
the leftists that contributed in part to the occurrence of the riots.  Conversely, 
Hong Kong citizens were willing to speak up by supporting the government.  The 
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use of violence meant that leftists in 1967 would lose public support for their 
anti-British campaign as it was widely condemned by the local community.   
Community Reaction to the Riots 
Major non-leftist newspapers all condemned the leftist-instigated violence, 
particularly the killing of two siblings in North Point on 20 August by a bomb,
377
 
and that of well-known radio broadcaster Lam Bun (林彬) in the same month.378  
On the killing of the two siblings, the South China Morning Post commented: 
No single incident since the disturbances began has created such universal 
horror and disgust as the murder of two little Chinese children in Ching 
Wah Street on Sunday.  The planting of other bombs near children‘s 
playgrounds indicates a definite intention to kill or wound the youngest 
members of the community – those who are as innocent of political 
entanglement as they are vulnerable through childish curiosity.  That such a 
campaign should have been knowingly embarked on speaks volumes for the 
animal savagery of the agitators, whether they are those who construct the 
bombs or the (probably) paid thugs who distribute them.
379
 
The killing of Lam Bun attracted just as much publicity.  Lam Bun was a 
well-known radio host at Hong Kong Commercial Radio, who had been 
criticising the leftists on a daily basis on his show during the disturbances.  The 
killing of Lam attracted much criticism from the non-left media such as Ming 
Pao.
380
  The incident certainly boosted leftists‘ reputation but in a very negative 
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way.  It only shows that no one in the community, whether it be a child on the 
street or a well-known media personality, was safe from the violent display of 
political nationalism.  The indiscriminate bombing was one of the main reasons 
the leftists lost public support.  Contrary to the leftists‘ expectations, the public 
supported the colonial government‘s actions.  Numerous individuals and groups 
such as companies and community groups sent letters of support to the 
government and expressed support for the government through advertisements in 
the newspapers.
381
  It was one of the major tactical mistakes the leftists made in 
their attempt to force the colonial government to give in to their demands.  As 
Stephen Waldron has argued: 
These bomb incidents, which caused increasing anxiety among ever-larger 
numbers of residents from all walks of life, constituted one of the weakest 
elements in the struggle campaign, since they did not mobilise and consolidate 
anti-government sentiment; instead they had the opposite effect of causing 
large numbers of persons to turn in desperation away from the leftist cause and 
to the government, which they came to view as a better guarantor of safety and 
welfare.
382
 
1967 Disturbances Sparking Debates of Nationalism  
 As the leftists‘ violent anti-British struggle escalated, it sparked 
discussions about nationalism in the media and among university students.  For 
example, in the summer of 1967 there were discussions about the disturbances in 
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the Hong Kong University Student Union‘s official publication Undergrad.383  Of 
note is how many of the students writing in the magazine criticised not only the 
extremist actions by the leftists, but the CCP as well.  In their criticisms of the 
leftists students also asked questions about the meaning of patriotism and more 
specifically whether the CCP actually represented the Chinese nation.
384
  In these 
articles, the student implicitly perceived  a separation between the state and the 
nation. 
 Outside the university setting, Chinese newspapers were divided in their 
interpretation of nationalism.  On the one hand were the leftist newspapers, under 
the influence of the Cultural Revolution, embarking on their incessant 
propaganda campaign for the struggle.  On the other hand, writers in non-leftist 
newspapers such as Ming Pao Daily News put forward their own interpretation of 
nationalism as they condemned  the leftists‘ actions.385  The founder of Ming Pao 
Daily News, Louis Cha (查良鏞), and his staff openly criticised the leftists in the 
newspaper‘s editorial, particularly after the local leftists‘ attempted to sabotage 
the newspaper by secretly replacing a photograph with a statement allegedly 
issued by the bogus ‗Ming Pao Workers‘ Struggle Committee‘ before the 23 June 
edition of the newspaper went into print.
386
  Louis Cha was not the only writer in 
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Ming Pao Daily News who criticised the leftists, numerous articles in the 
newspaper written by others also denounced the leftists‘ actions.387 
 The debate in the media shows that nationalism is always open to debate 
and interpretations.  Violent expressions of political nationalism in particular 
were prone to criticism.  In their discussions of the meaning of patriotism, tertiary 
students in particular offered their own interpretation.  The discussions might 
have been very different had the leftists dropped the anti-colonial rhetoric and 
protested via peaceful means, without attempting to transplant the Cultural 
Revolution to the colony.  Amidst the discussions and criticism of the leftists‘ use 
of violent tactics, there emerged a perceived separation between the nation and 
the state.  Although the issue of political allegiance had no doubt surfaced after 
the Civil War as Chinese in Hong Kong celebrated two ‗national‘ days, the 
violence of the 1967 riots once more prompted those who discussed the meaning 
of being a patriot rethink about the question of whether the Chinese Communist 
state represented all of Chinese people.  
Rhetoric without Substance: Failure of a Highly Politicised 
Campaign 
 There are several reasons the leftists‘ anti-British struggle ended in failure.  
Firstly, the leftists‘ campaign to discredit the colonial government started to lose 
support as the struggle became increasingly politicised, which meant that the 
struggle began to ignore the real problems facing the workers.  Therefore, the 
struggle gradually alienated itself from the workers as well as the  people of 
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Hong Kong.  Had the Leftists' focused on the original labour grievances in their 
rhetoric it might have been possible for them to retain support.  Ultimately, the 
leftists‘ use of violent tactics in the form of indiscriminate bombing resulted in 
the complete loss of public support and sympathy.
388
 
  As mentioned previously, Chinese internal politics was a major factor 
that contributed to the end of the struggle.  Although the power struggle within 
the Foreign Ministry of the PRC ended in August 1967, it was not until the spring 
of 1968 that the NCNA in Hong Kong received instructions from Premier Zhou 
Enlai to put an end to the struggle and to negotiate with the colonial 
government.
389
  Late in 1967 Zhou also held meetings with members of the Hong 
Kong-Macao Office and the Hong Kong and Macao Working Committee and, 
with the approval of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao (林彪), ordered them to put an 
end to the strikes and bombing.  With the leaders of the struggle held in Beijing 
for two months, the Hong Kong struggle ended.  It was obvious that the struggle 
was already failing in the latter half of 1967, and the instructions from Beijing 
officially put an end to the struggle.
390
 
The ‗nationalist‘ anti-British struggle was marked by inauspicious timing 
as it occurred at a time when it was obvious, taking into account the political and 
social circumstances at the time, that neither Beijing nor citizens of Hong Kong 
would support an armed display of political nationalism.  Further, the anti-British 
struggle lacked direction and realistic objectives.  The leftists in Hong Kong 
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committed a major flaw in terms of the use of tactics, and showed a lapse of 
judgment on their part as they hoped that Beijing would intervene.  Not 
surprisingly, the struggle died slowly and silently.   
Through the 1967 riots, the leftists learned that violent political 
nationalism would never be successful.  Though maintaining that the anti-British 
struggle was the right thing to do, the leftists admitted that the extremist tactic 
was a mistake.  Following the disturbances the deputy director of the NCNA Qi 
Feng (祁峰) on one occasion said that ‗1967 was a mistake‘.391  The 1967 riots 
were damaging to not only to the leftist circle as a whole, but to individual leftists 
as well. 
Negative Impact of the 1967 Disturbances on the Leftist Circle 
On a macro-level, the FTU lost a significant number of members and 
labour activists.
392
  It has been estimated that the FTU lost over a thousand 
members,
393
 and according to one report, hundreds of left-wing workers left their 
unions to form or join right-wing unions.
394
  Due to the 1967 riots the leftists the 
public came to have a very negative opinion of anyone who belonged to the 
leftist circle.  This made it difficult for leftists to be accepted by employers or the 
society at large.  In October, it was reported that close to 1,000 left-wing workers 
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were unemployed and did not receive living allowance payment.
395
  It was 
reported that unemployed left-wing workers were told by Communist leaders to 
find work,
396
 and when left-wing strikers failed in seeking reinstatement, the 
leftist media once again put the blame on the colonial government and called the 
workers‘ attempt to find work a ‗return-to-work struggle‘ (復工鬥爭).397 
Left-wing workers were not the only ones who suffered due to their 
participation in the anti-British struggle.  Others in the leftist circles, who quit 
their jobs or took steps to join the left-wing workers, were also affected.  As 
noted by Kenneth Ore who worked at the left-wing Hok Yau Club: 
Between 1967 and 1969, the high point of the Cultural Revolution, many of 
our Hok Yau contacts had left high-paying jobs and prestigious schools to 
show solidarity with their working-class comrades.  In the aftermath of the 
riot years, however, these activists found themselves in serious debt and 
under pressure from their families.  They could not return to their jobs or 
schools…The extreme-leftist faction of the Party sharply disapproved of 
anyone attempting to rebuild their lives after the May Riot.
398
 
The plight of the workers shows that those who sacrificed themselves for 
the promotion of political nationalism ended up causing themselves great 
difficulty socially and financially.  Violent expressions of political nationalism 
would only create a negative image of oneself in the eyes of the public.  The 1967 
riots was a painful lesson for the leftists as a group and as individuals.  Leftist 
organisations and individuals suffered economic losses.  Their public image was 
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severely tarnished by the riots.  For years to come the public would harbour a 
sense of fear for anything leftist.  In contrast to the leftist workers, it seemed that 
pro-GMD sympathisers had learned their lesson from the 1956 riots.  During the 
1967 riots, pro-GMD sympathisers kept a very low profile, but took the 
opportunity to improve their image yet at the same time promoted their agenda 
peacefully.  
Pro-GMD Forces during the 1967 Riots 
 Pro-Nationalist people in the colony carried out their Double Tenth 
celebrations as usual in Wan Chai and Rennie‘s Mill. 399   Radical leftists 
attempted to disrupt the celebrations, by planting hoax bombs in places where the 
Nationalists planned to gather.
400
  In Wan Chai members of the TUC and 
representatives of 110 affiliated right-wing unions met.  The chairman of the 
TUC stated there that the ‗freedom-loving peoples had just won the ―first round 
of battle‖.‘401  During the disturbances, Nationalist workers were asked to counter 
what the leftist workers did.  According to a transport worker who was a GMD 
member and had been the chairman of the Hong Kong Motor Transport Workers 
General Unions (汽車總工會), during the disturbances the GMD‘s Hong Kong 
branch and pro-GMD workers were given specific instructions by the GMD to 
make sure all the workers went to work.
402
  A loyal workers‘ fund, the initial 
amount of which came from public donations and was given to the pro-GMD 
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TUC, was established as a reward for workers who remained at their posts during 
the riots. 
 It is possible that pro-GMD sympathisers had already learned from the 
1956 riots that violent political nationalism would only end in failure.  They did 
not choose to confront the leftists directly as they did in the 1956 riots.  Instead, 
pro-GMD sympathisers chose to celebrate Double Tenth peacefully, and, perhaps 
as a silent protest against the leftists‘ actions, followed GMD‘s orders to go to 
work.  The actions of GMD sympathisers as such show that political nationalism 
need not be promoted through violence against the other faction, despite the 
intense hostility between pro-CCP sympathisers and pro-GMD sympathisers 
expressed in the past.  It would appear that during the 1967 riots GMD 
sympathisers seized the opportunity to improve their image by taking actions 
much more acceptable to the public, compared to the violence and strikes started 
by the leftists, which only caused  inconveniences to the public. 
Conclusion: Significance of the 1956 and 1967 Riots 
 The 1967 riots are significant in my analysis of China-orientated 
nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong because the kind of violent political 
nationalism expressed in the riots became a serious problem for both the colonial 
government as well as the people of Hong Kong.
403
  Although the immediate 
trigger of the 1967 disturbances was labour disputes, this chapter has noted that a 
power struggle in China‘s Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution 
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contributed to the politicisation of the riots in Hong Kong and prolonged the 
leftists‘ anti-colonial campaign.  It has been pointed out that the 1967 
disturbances show the ‗susceptibility of the labour movement, and indeed of the 
Hong Kong Chinese community, to the influence of political events in Mainland 
China‘. 404   Of course, Hong Kong‘s social and economic conditions also 
contributed to the discontent among the working class, which local leftists 
exploited to carry out the struggle.  Writers of Hong Kong history have often 
focused on how the 1967 disturbances were a watershed in the history of Hong 
Kong as they led to the development of a Hong Kong identity,
405
 government 
policy changes that improved industrial relations, increased public spending by 
the colonial government,
406
 and increased public support for the colonial 
government.
407
  What was the significance of the 1956 riots and 1967 
disturbances in relation to the history of China-orientated nationalism in Hong 
Kong?  Both disturbances were characterised by expressions of pro-CCP/pro-
GMD political nationalism through violence.  Both were related to Chinese 
politics, a legacy of the CCP-GMD struggle.  Colonialism served as a trigger and, 
particularly in the case of the 1967 riots, a source of escalation of the 
disturbances.  In both disturbances, the public became the victim and the colonial 
government took firm action against the troublemakers. 
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However, there are several key differences between the two periods of 
riots.  In the 1956 riots, the main actors were pro-Nationalist sympathisers.  In the 
1967 disturbances, the main actors were the leftists.  The circumstances and 
triggers that sparked the riots were also very different.  The 1956 riots began with 
a small incident when pro-GMD sympathisers were told by authorities to remove 
GMD flags from buildings, followed by a violent conflict between  pro-CCP and 
pro-GMD sympathisers.  The 1967 disturbances were triggered by an industrial 
dispute at a factory and were quickly transformed into a political struggle against 
the colonial authorities, but did not involve any direct clashes with the GMD 
camp.  The disturbances instead took the guise of an anti-colonial struggle. 
Although the 1967 Communist-inspired anti-colonial campaign was a 
failure, its significance in terms of the history of nationalism in Hong Kong 
cannot be ignored.  Firstly, the failure of the 1967 riots marked the end of violent 
political nationalism in the history of colonial Hong Kong.  The 1956 and 1967 
riots saw the last open, violent expressions of China-orientated nationalism based 
on pro-GMD and pro-CCP sentiments.  After the 1967 riots, there was no more 
violent conflict between CCP and GMD sympathisers.  Neither the CCP nor the 
GMD sympathisers again employed violent militant tactics to promote their 
agendas. 
The CCP-GMD struggle as a legacy of Chinese national politics 
completely disappeared from the rhetoric of nationalism in mass movements in 
later years.  The reason this is the case is that through the 1956 and 1967 riots, the 
pro-CCP and pro-GMD forces learned that violent expression of political 
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nationalism would only antagonise the public.  The public image of both the pro-
Communists and pro-Nationalists was damaged by the two riots.  The pro-
Nationalists showed that they had learned their lesson, for they kept a low profile 
during the 1967 riots.
408
  The leftists, too, learned that the 1967 riots were a 
mistake.  As far as the disappearance of national politics in political movements 
is concerned, Lee Ming-kwan argues: 
The pro-Communists, on the heel of the pro-Nationalists, had 
lost their battles and sympathisers in their bid to challenge the 
authority of the colonial administration.  As a result, national 
politics had also lost its battlefield and protagonists.  The 
stage was set for the Government of Hong Kong and its 
people to enact their own drama.
409
 
Further, anti-colonialism as a theme was no longer explicitly used in 
subsequent mass movements relating to the expression of nationalism.  Nor was 
such a theme able to stir up as much trouble as in the 1967 disturbances.  For 
these reasons, the 1967 disturbances were a watershed not only in Hong Kong 
history, but in the development and evolution of China-orientated nationalism in 
the colony. 
The two sets of riots demonstrate that violent public displays of political 
nationalism did not gain public support.  Nevertheless, the 1967 riots, along with 
the 1966 riots, raised Hong Kong youths‘ political awareness, and awareness of 
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the injustices of colonialism.  It could be said that the two riots indirectly led to 
the student and social movements that would emerge in the next decade.  It has 
been argued that ‗through these bloodstained experiences, society was growing 
more articulate‘.410  Eventually, Hong Kong youth did become articulate in the 
1970s.  The small group of university students who sympathised with the leftists 
during the 1967 disturbances evolved into the pro-China faction in the student 
movement of the early 1970s.
411
  I shall discuss in the next chapter how Hong 
Kong youths played an important role in the nationalist Baodiao campaign in 
1971 as well as the promotion of China-orientated nationalism in universities 
around the mid-1970s. 
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Chapter Five: Hong Kong Youth and the Politics of 
Nationalism in the 1970s: Baodiao, New Left, China 
Complex 
 This chapter begins the third part of this thesis, in which I examine three 
case studies of popular nationalism in Hong Kong: the 1971 Baodiao campaign 
and the surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth in the 1970s, 
Hong Kong‘s response to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, and the 1996 
Baodiao campaign.  
 In Chapters Three and Four, I discussed how the expression of China-
orientated nationalism was based on allegiances to the PRC and the ROC.  The 
1956 and 1967 riots saw the outbreak of a series of disturbances by pro-CCP and 
pro-GMD sympathisers in the colony.  The Hong Kong government‘s crackdown 
on Communist activities during the 1967 riots dealt a serious blow to the left-
wing forces (左派) in Hong Kong.  As the influence of the traditional left-wing 
faded, a new breed of activists took the lead in political activities over the next 
decade.  The 1970s saw the emergence of student and youth activists, different 
from the traditional leftists and pro-GMD activists, as a new yet significant force 
in the promotion of China-orientated nationalism.  The kind of nationalism 
expressed from the 1970s onwards had little relationship with the politics of the 
CCP-GMD struggle.  I refer to this kind of nationalism as popular nationalism.   
Two waves of the Defend Diaoyu Islands Movement (Baodiao yundong 保
釣運動) occurred in the 1970s, the first in 1971-72 and the other in 1978.  The 
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1970s also saw the surge of nationalistic sentiments among university students 
and, after 1971, the dominance of pro-China student activists in universities.  In 
this chapter, I continue to focus on the significance of local politics in the 
expression of nationalism, and the politics of nationalism.  The chapter first 
examines the ‗defend Diaoyutai‘, Baodiao (保釣 ), phenomenon of 1971 to 
demonstrate how the expression of China-orientated nationalism was influenced 
by local politics due to differences in political ideology of the participating 
groups.  There were differences in opinion between not only the pro-China group 
and radicals known as the New Left,
412
 but within each of these two groups as 
well.  Although the Baodiao campaign appeared to be a nationalist campaign, the 
New Leftists intended to use it to encourage the public to think about colonialism.  
To some extent, the New Left succeeded in its goals because the government was 
criticised for its handling of the 7 July demonstration, and after the 1971 
campaign young people participated in movements aimed at addressing social 
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injustice in the colony.  The significance of China-orientated nationalism in the 
1970s is that, first, it was used as a tactic for political purposes by groups of 
politically active young people.  Second, it created divisions among them before 
and after the Baodiao campaign.  Third, nationalism provided Hong Kong young 
people a means to reflect on their Chinese identity and express their concern for 
China as well as Hong Kong. 
 The first section of this chapter consists of a brief analysis of the context 
of the 1970s.  Subsequent sections examine the development of the Baodiao 
campaign of the 1970s; the different factions involved in promoting China-
orientated nationalism; and the emergence of young people and students as 
leaders of the campaign.  I argue that in the 1971 Baodiao campaign, China-
orientated nationalism was a mere rhetorical expression of the New Left, the true 
political agenda of which was anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism, and that was 
influenced by local politics and the group‘s own political ideologies.  Therefore, 
the 1971 Baodiao campaign reflected the complexity of not only China-
orientated nationalism in Hong Kong, but the politics of it.  In the final section, I 
examine the rise and decline of pro-China sentiments among university students 
in the 1970s. 
Hong Kong in the 1970s: Young People and Student Activism 
 From the 1950s to the 1970s, Hong Kong experienced significant social 
and economic changes.  As far as the economy was concerned, the national 
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income and government expenditure increased twelve times in those 20 years.
413
  
The city‘s physical environment underwent significant changes as high-rise 
buildings were built and infrastructure such as roads and highways expanded.  
Hong Kong‘s population at the end of 1972 was 4,103,500.414  About 55 per cent 
of the urban population was born in Hong Kong.  The fact that Hong Kong had a 
young population, with nearly half under the age of nineteen, put much stress on 
the education system, but Hong Kong‘s education services expanded steadily, 
and by 1971, 1,284,000 students were enrolled in 2,895 schools, colleges and 
adult education centres.
415
  In higher education, in 1969-1970 the government 
introduced a scheme of student financing that provided grants and loans to 
students at the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong (CUHK).  There were approximately 3,000 undergraduate places at 
the HKU and the total undergraduate enrolment at the CUHK was about 2,500.  
Although the number of tertiary students remained small, it is clear that Hong 
Kong in the 1970s had a young population and that more young people were 
being educated.  This is not to say that there was no student movement before the 
1970s.  It has been argued that the first wave of the Hong Kong student 
movement appeared in the early 1960s as those born in Hong Kong after WWII 
came of age.
416
  It has also been argued that the first generation of young people 
born in the colony did not possess the ‗refugee mentality‘ of their parents and 
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were therefore ‗willing to think seriously about injustices in their society‘ and to 
‗think about their roots‘.417  In short, the social context of Hong Kong and the 
historical background in relation to Hong Kong youth contributed to the 
appearance of the Hong Kong student movement in the 1960s and 1970s.  The 
social contexts as such help us understand why young people in Hong Kong 
became the protagonists in the expression of nationalism, and why such 
expressions were essentially a product of not only the China factor but the ‗Hong 
Kong factor‘ as well. 
 The 1970s also saw the rise of local popular culture based on the 
Cantonese language.  Yet this local popular culture was also mixed with elements 
of Western popular culture.  The local Hong Kong Chinese became more 
conscious of their Hong Kong identity as increased wealth enabled them to travel 
overseas and to China, giving them a perspective to reflect on their own identity, 
and as Hong Kong was faced with the problem of illegal immigrants from 
mainland China who had difficulty in terms of assimilation into the Hong Kong 
way of life.
418
  At the same time, and partly as a consequence, an obsession with 
understanding China, sometimes referred to as the ‗China complex‘, emerged 
among young people and fuelled the student-led nationalist movements in the 
1970s. 
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University Students and the ‘China complex’: Reflecting on 
Nationalism and Colonialism 
 Although the political awareness of Hong Kong youth was growing as 
they reflected on their Hong Kong identity, the 1971 Baodiao campaign sparked 
some of the Hong Kong youth‘s interest in learning about China.  Internally, as a 
result of the 1971 Baodiao campaign there was a split among university students 
as some placed China first while others were more concerned about Hong Kong 
society.
419
  Conversely, the Cultural Revolution served as an external factor 
contributing to a surge of nationalist sentiments among university students.  
However, university students‘ understanding of what was happening in China 
was quite limited.  In fact, some of the interviewees said that young people, who 
grew up in the post-war years, were ‗confused‘420 and did not really understand 
what was happening in China.
421
  Various essays in the student magazines reveal 
that students were still attempting to learn about China.  In fact, discussions of 
China-orientated nationalism among university students did not begin with the 
Baodiao phenomenon.  In as early as the late 1960s, university students had 
already pondered the idea of China-orientated nationalism.  The Campaign to 
Make Chinese an Official Language (爭取中文成爲法定語文運動/中文運動) of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s carried a nationalistic tone, although it was a Hong 
Kong-orientated movement and had little to do with nationalism.
422
  It is clear 
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that through their essays, university students reflected on Chinese identity as well 
as issues related to China.  Two other features can also be noted concerning these 
discussions about China.  First, on many occasions, rather than providing an 
informed discussion about China, students often asked a series of questions about 
China.
423
  Second, in their discussions of China-orientated nationalism, university 
students inevitably reflected on Hong Kong identity and, to some extent, 
colonialism as well.  Some lamented that although ‗China‘ was often the subject 
of discussion, most of the Hong Kong people neglected the injustices and 
problems of colonialism in the colony.  One author wrote in an article in the 
University of Hong Kong student publication Undergrad: 
I don‘t believe that anyone who refuses to fight the injustice and inequality 
right before their eyes, anyone who refuses to sacrific [sic] for his own 
community will someday sacrifice and fight for the 700 million Chinese in 
China…After all, an average youth in Hong Kong has never touched, 
smelled, seen and experienced China…China is but an empty shadow.  Hong 
Kong is concrete.
424
 
New Leftists Ng Chung-yin and Mok Chiu-yu, too, pondered the problem 
of nationalism vis-à-vis colonialism.  The involvement of the anti-colonial, anti-
capitalist New Left was particularly significant for our understanding of the 
context of the 1970s youth/student movement, which I shall discuss later.  In any 
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case, what students and young people possessed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
might be called a ‗China complex‘,425  because they were still learning about 
China and there was no indication that they were clearly supporting the CCP at 
the time.  It should be kept in mind that the pro-China ‗China faction‘, which the 
majority of politically active students in universities belonged to and that 
dominated the student movement later in the 1970s, did not exist before or in 
1971.  The 1971 Baodiao campaign was an opportunity for them to reflect on 
Chinese identity and colonialism, and to express their ‗China complex‘.  
Following the 1971 campaign, there was a surge of nationalistic sentiments 
among university students.  I shall examine the post-1971 contexts later in this 
chapter, but first I shall discuss the background to the 1971 Baodiao campaign. 
Youth/Student Participation in 1970s Social Movements: The 
Background 
 Young people, particularly college students, played a major role in the 
movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
426
  Two points should be noted 
when studying the role university students played in the social movements of the 
early 1970s.  Firstly, it would be erroneous to simply refer politically active 
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university students of the 1970s as ‗left-wing‘.  Nor would it be appropriate, as 
the 1970s New Left leader Mok Chiu-yu has argued, to call the social movements 
of the early 1970s a ‗student movement‘, for many who participated in the social 
movements in the early 1970s were not students.
427
  The Baodiao demonstrations 
of 1971, for example, involved both students and non-students.  Secondly, 
because the New Left was involved in the social movements, it is not surprising 
that the 1971 Baodiao campaign carried with it an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist 
flavour.   
 The New Leftists in Hong Kong 
 Who were the New Left and why did they become involved in the 1971 
Baodiao campaign?  I shall examine in detail the background of two of its core 
members: Ng Chung-yin (吳仲賢) and Mok Chiu-yu (莫昭如).  Ng Chung-yin 
emerged as an activist in the late 1960s in the Chu Hai/Zhu Hai College (珠海書
院) student strike, and took part in the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official 
Language.  Ng was involved in the 1971 Baodiao campaign and the 1973 Anti-
Corruption Campaign (反貪污運動) as well.428  He also participated in a few 
other social movements such as the anti-inflation rally in 1974.
429
  Although there 
were two forces, namely the pro-China activists (not the same as the ‗China 
faction‘ in the universities) and the 70s Bi-weekly that led the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign in Hong Kong, Ng Chung-yin, according to a report in the South China 
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Morning Post published in September 1974, ‗played a key role in instigating the 
Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands demonstrations, and gained the ‗reputation‘ of being 
the first demonstrator arrested by police‘.430  In fact, the Hong Kong government 
became quite concerned about the emergence of the New Left and compiled a 
detailed report on it.
431
 
 Why and how did the New Leftists become involved in the nationalist 
Baodiao campaign?  To answer these questions one must examine the history of 
the 70s Bi-weekly, a group formed by New Leftists and was one of the leading 
activist groups in the 1971 Baodiao campaign. 
The 70s Bi-weekly: Hong Kong Anarchists and Marxists 
 The 70s Bi-weekly (七十年代雙週刊/七零) was founded on 1 January 
1971.
432
  Mok Chiu-yu and Ng Chung-yin were among the founders of the 
magazine.  Following the Chu Hai College student strike Mok and Ng believed 
that they needed an independent publication of their own.  In the beginning, there 
were four editors and the publication relied on donations.  The office of the 70s 
Bi-weekly was in Wan Chai.  Although all the members were editors, Mok was 
responsible for the finances of the publication.  Mok contributed a thousand Hong 
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Kong dollars, almost half of his salary from his daytime job, to the magazine.
433
  
At its peak, the publication sold 10,000 copies.  Mok said that 10,000 was not a 
small number considering the magazine was an individual publication for 
youths.
434
  A report in the South China Sunday Post Herald (SCSPH) on the 10 
April Baodiao demonstration confirms that the magazine was indeed read by 
university students and had some influence on them.  The SCSPH report states: 
Some demonstrators said they were university students and decided to 
take part in the demonstration after being ‗inspired by articles in the 70s 
Bi-weekly.‘
435
 
 The political inclination of many of the 70s Bi-weekly editors was 
internationalism (國際主義),436 humanitarianism (人道主義), and liberalism (自
由主義).  Mok Chiu-yu was an Anarchists (無政府主義者).  Ng Chung-yin 
might have started out as a Marxist or Anarchist, but it is certain that he later 
became a Trotskyist.
437
  To understand the mentality of the 70s Bi-weekly editors 
it might be useful to examine briefly the definitions and theories of Anarchism.  
Ng in one of his essays recommends the work of Alexander Berkman entitled The 
ABC of Anarchism, first published in 1929, as entry-level reading for 
understanding the basic concepts of Anarchism.
438
  Written in a conversational 
style, Berkman‘s work provides an overview of the key ideas of Anarchism in a 
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manner very accessible to the general reader.  Since Ng and Mok have claimed 
that they were engaged in an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist movement, and on 
many occasions confronted the colonial authorities, it would be worthwhile to 
analyse what the Anarchists say, on the theoretical level, about government.  
Alexander Berkman wrote in his book: 
It is capitalism and government which stand for disorder and violence.  
Anarchism is the very reverse of it; it means order without government 
and peace without violence.
439
 
Berkman further argues that the government forces people to do certain things 
and prohibits them from doing others, and that the government and the capitalist 
class would do everything to retain their power.
440
  Berkman also discusses the 
continuous struggle between capital and labour, and argues that the revolution 
would abolish not only the government but the ‗entire system of wage slavery‘ as 
well.
441
  It is not surprising, then, that the self-proclaimed Anarchists in Hong 
Kong would take very opportunity to confront the colonial authorities.  As I shall 
demonstrate later, the Baodiao movement provided the New Left with an 
opportunity to confront the colonial government and to promote their anti-
colonial agenda.  For Mok Chiu-yu, the fact that the police on many occasions 
attempted to crack down Baodiao demonstrations was a violation of human 
rights.  Mok went ahead to hold the 4 May demonstration even though he knew 
that he would be arresetd.
442
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 The Trotskyist Revolutionary Marxist League, known in Chinese as the 
Geming makesi zhuyi tongmeng (革命馬克思主義同盟), or Gemameng (革馬盟) 
for short, was another New Left group that emerged in the 1970s.  Ng Chung-yin 
was one of the founders of the League, following his departure from the 70s Bi-
weekly.  The official magazine of the League was the Zhan Xun (戰訊), published 
weekly.  Zhan Xun was quite similar to the 70s Bi-weekly in tone and content.  
The League was concerned about issues such as class struggle, democracy, 
imperialism and colonialism.  Like the 70s Bi-weekly, the League took an interest 
in the Baodiao movement, this time the Second Baodiao campaign of 1978.  
Although the League‘s target in the 1978 campaign was US and Japanese 
imperialism, it employed the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism.  
Expressions such as ‗Chinese people united‘ and ‗protecting territorial integrity 
of China‘ can be found in the articles published in the 1978 issues of the Zhan 
Xun.
443
  At the same time, the League clearly explained its opinion on the 
Baodiao campaign, which was quite different from what the pro-China faction 
proclaimed in the first wave of the movement in 1971-72.  The League claimed 
that the Baodiao movement could contribute to the ‗anti-imperialist 
consciousness‘ of the people and make them rethink the problems of 
colonialism.
444
 
 Another Trotskyist group was the Shiyue pinglun (十月評論), a magazine 
that was in fact the Hong Kong branch of the Fourth International (第四國際), an 
international Trotskyist group.  Both the Gemameng and the Shiyue pinglun had 
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links to the Fourth International.  These special relationships would become more 
apparent later as an incident occurred in 1978 that involved Ng Chung-yin being 
removed from the League due to pressure from the Fourth International.  These 
Hong Kong Trotskyites, and other young leftists who were non-Marxist and non-
Anarchist, and did not belong to the traditional pro-Beijing camp, were also 
known as the ‗New Left‘ (新左派).  It is clear, therefore, that the New Left was 
not pro-China, and thus the group‘s ideology was not based on the pro-PRC 
nationalist rhetoric.   
 The New Left and the Baodiao Movement: Nationalism as Tactic 
 Why would the Trotskyites and other ‗new left-wing‘ radicals, who often 
espoused the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, be interested in the Baodiao movement 
with its Chinese nationalist overtones?  As far as these radicals were concerned, 
there existed a symbiotic relationship between anti-colonialism and China-
orientated nationalism.  Ng Chung-yin himself has stated that when the Baodiao 
campaign broke out in 1971 he believed that China-orientated nationalism could 
be used as a means to mobilise the public for an anti-colonial movement.
445
  In 
other words, for these young radicals, nationalism functioned as a tool to draw 
the attention of the masses for the sake of their anti-colonialist campaign.  Mok 
Chiu-yu has argued that the result of the Baodiao campaign was that it became an 
anti-colonial campaign as the authorities attempted to suppress it.
446
  Mok‘s claim 
is true to an extent, as I shall demonstrate later in my discussion of the 7 July 
demonstration.  For these New Leftists, nationalism was only a tool to draw the 
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public‘s attention to the problems of colonialism.  Unlike the pro-China activists 
who worked with them, the New Left did not intend to run the Baodiao 
movement as a purely pro-China irredentist movement.   
Divisions and Differences among Baodiao Activists 
 Difference in opinion existed not only within the New Left.  There were 
tensions between pro-China activists and between pro-China and New Left 
activists as well.  This can be seen when examining in detail the agenda and 
activities of the major players in the Baodiao movement.  The 1971 Baodiao 
campaign in Hong Kong was inspired by the Baodiao campaign in the US, which 
took place earlier.
447
  While both the pro-Beijing and New Left camps protested 
against Japan‘s claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, they held very different 
political beliefs about irredentist nationalism.  The pro-China Hong Kong Protect 
Diaoyutai Action Committee (香港保衛釣魚台行動委員會), formed in February 
1971, believed that the islands should be ‗returned to the Chinese people, not just 
Taiwan or China.‘448  The ‗pro-Beijing‘ activists were at the centre of the group 
Protect Diaoyutai Action Committee, which organised the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign.  These ‗pro-China‘ activists included Chou Lo-yat/Zhou Luyi (周魯逸) 
and Bao Cuoshi (包錯石).  Conversely, radicals such as Ng and Mok joined the 
Baodiao campaign as part of their campaign to promote their anti-colonial (反殖) 
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and anti-imperialist (反帝) agenda.449  From Mok‘s point of view, being anti-
imperialist in the Baodiao movement was no different from being anti-war (反戰) 
and supporting revolutions in Third World countries.
450
  Mok stated that while 
studying in Australia from 1965 to 1968 he was influenced by the student 
movement and anti-war protests in Australia.
451
  Even before going to Australia, 
Mok had already thought about the problem of colonialism.
452
  Mok said that 
when he was in school in Hong Kong teachers talked about nationalism, yet he 
was thinking why they did not ask questions about colonialism in Hong Kong.
453
   
 According to Ng Chung-yin‘s account, the Baodiao campaign in Hong 
Kong began in February 1971.
454
  Ng also states that the campaign was not 
launched by university students and that at the time members of the 70s Bi-
weekly launched the Baodiao campaign in the early 1970s, there were different 
opinions within the group itself as to what the focus of the campaign should be.  
Mok Chiu-yu was in fact more concerned about Internationalism (國際主義) and 
perceived nationalism as reactionary (反動的).455  In my interview with him, 
Mok confirmed his position as such.  Mok stated in the interview that he 
approached the whole Baodiao phenomenon from an anti-colonial, anti-
imperialist (反帝國主義), and anti-US position.  He argued that the later stages 
of the Baodiao campaign showed how the pro-China faction was being ‗blindly 
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patriotic‘ (盲目地愛國).  As an Internationalist, Mok perceived the idea of 
nationalism as ‗very outmoded‘ (落伍的) and ‗reactionary‘.456   Mok was an 
Anarchist and the irony about the 1971 Baodiao campaign is that although the 
theme of it was China-orientated nationalism, some of the activists who 
participated some did not actually believe in China-orientated  Nationalism.  Mok 
argues that the fact that the colonial authorities took steps to suppress the 
Baodiao campaign further contributed to their anti-colonial agenda and turned the 
nationalist campaign into an anti-colonial campaign.
457
   
 Mok was not the only one who criticised the pro-Beijing position of the 
pro-China activists.  Even some of the activists that belonged to the pro-China 
group leading the Baodiao campaign disliked the fact that the group was 
becoming too pro-China and left the group.  Chui Pak-tai, a former member of 
the pro-Beijing Baodiao Hui, said that pro-Beijing activists in the Baodiao Hui 
such as Chou Lo-yat organised the campaign as a pro-PRC nationalistic 
movement.
458
  Chui‘s background explains to some extent why he participated in 
the Baodiao movement.  Chui‘s father was a GMD soldier.  Chui said that his 
nationalistic sentiments in his early years were influenced by his father‘s 
background and thus he was pro-GMD when he was young.  However, later he 
was influenced by leftist ideas, for Chui at one point joined a left-wing labour 
union.  As a joke, his friends called him a ‗small caterpillar‘, or xiao maochong in 
Chinese.  Mao was a punning reference to Maoism and Mao Zedong.
459
  Unlike 
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many others who participated in the July 7 demonstration, Chui was not a student 
when he took part.  Chui recalled that during the 7 July demonstration the 
demonstrators confronted the police while holding hands.  He participated in 
other demonstrations as well.  For instance, he was involved in a protest that took 
place in front of a Japanese department store.  Chui and his friends joined the 
pro-Beijing Baodiao Hui (保釣會) from the very beginning.  However, Chui‘s 
friends such as Liu Jian-wei (劉建威), also known as Liu Shuang-yang (劉霜陽), 
disliked the fact that the Baodiao Hui was becoming increasingly pro-Beijing.  
Eventually, approximately ten members, including Chui and his friends, left the 
group.  Some of them later joined the United Front Senkakus Committee (聯合陣
線), of which the 70s Bi-weekly was a core member.460 
Although the pro-China group and the New Left were able to work 
together and factionalism was not openly apparent during the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign,
461
 there were tensions between the two groups.  That the pro-China 
group and the New Leftists did not always share an amicable relationship is 
evidenced by Ng Chung-yin‘s criticism that the pro-China faction was attacking 
as well as using the 70s Bi-weekly group to further its own agenda.
462
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The 1971 campaign as further undermined by several splits that took 
place in late 1971 and 1972.  In November 1971, it was reported that supporters 
of the United Front Senkakus Committee ‗were drifting away‘ and that Mok 
Chiu-yu admitted that some organisers did not attend meetings.
463
  Although 
Mok claimed that the reason supporters did not attend meetings was that they 
were tied up with studies and work, I believe it was the political differences 
among Baodiao activists that caused the loss of supporters.  There is certainly 
some truth in the report published in The Star on 1 November 1971, which stated:  
It is believed the protestors who have come under fire from the police are 
regarded as the ‗trouble making‘ fringe by Committee leaders.  They are 
thought to be more interested in causing violence and taking part in extreme 
activities rather than seriously furthering the Senkakus cause.  Many claim the 
trouble-makers are not really members of student movements but simply louts 
who are either unemployed or labourers.
464
 
 In May 1972, another split occurred when the Federation of Catholic 
Students and the College Students‘ Association quit as organisers of a planned 
protest rally.  Although the president of the Hong Kong Federation of Students 
(HKFS, 香港專上學生聯會), one of the organisers of the rally, declined to 
reveal the reason for the split,
465
 I believe it was due to political differences 
among the student activists and probably the loss of interests in the Baodiao 
campaign among students in general. 
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 Internally, activist groups involved in the Baodiao campaign suffered 
from loose organisation.  It was not only the student activist groups that suffered 
from this.
466
  The 70s Bi-weekly group was loosely organised, mainly due to the 
Anarchist nature of the group.  Mok Chiu-yu commented that it was difficult to 
identify precisely who the members were.
467
  Activities of the group involved 
primarily discussion and interaction among its members.  More importantly, the 
70s Bi-weekly‘s was in principle against restrictions resulting from tight 
organisation.
468
  Another feature of the 70s Bi-weekly was its emphasis on the 
need for action.
469
  The group‘s emphasis on action is clearly illustrated by its 
participation in many of the Baodiao demonstrations in 1971.  As a result of the 
differences in opinion, some of the members of the 70s Bi-weekly eventually left 
the group to pursue their own interests and careers.
470
   
 In nationalist movements, or any social movement, it is unavoidable that 
activists would have different opinions as to the ideology behind the movement 
and specific tactics.  Nationalism is open to interpretation and there is no 
guarantee that those who participated in nationalist movements did so simply 
because of nationalism.  In the case of the 1971 movement, these differences in 
opinion were obvious.  While these groups with different agendas managed to 
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work together, the fact that these groups joined the movement for different 
reasons contributed to the tensions between them.  Instead of focusing all their 
energy on organising the movement, at times Baodiao activists had to deal with 
differences in terms of both ideology and tactics.   
Significance of the New Leftists in the 1971 Baodiao Campaign 
 The 70s Bi-weekly group was instrumental in organising a series of 
Baodiao demonstrations in 1971 including those that took place on 20 February 
(二·二○示威), 10 April (四·一○示威), 4 May (五·四示威), 16 May (五·一
六示威) and 13 June (六·一三示威.)471  Archival evidence reveals that editors of 
the 70s Bi-weekly often participated in the Baodiao demonstrations including the 
ones held on 13 August and 7 July.  On both occasions, among those arrested at 
least one of them was a 70s Bi-weekly editor.   
 On Saturday 10 April 1971, approximately 30 to 40 people, many of 
whom were tertiary students participated in a demonstration in front of the 
Japanese Cultural Centre at the Junction of D‘Aguilar Street and Queen‘s Road 
Central.  The demonstration was organised neither by the HKFS nor the 70s Bi-
weekly.  The Deputy President of the HKFS, Kwan Pun-fong, said at the time that 
the HKFS had not sponsored the demonstration.
472
  According to Ng Chung-yin, 
the demonstration was organised by a committee, which consisted of an editor of 
the 70s Bi-weekly, students from various schools and colleges such as Chu Hai 
College, King‘s College, and the New Asia College of the CUHK, and two 
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working young people.
473
  According to the Chinese-language press before the 
demonstration started about 200 police officers were already stationed at the 
scene.  From the point of view of the authorities, the demonstration was illegal, 
and in fact the police had denied a request by Mok Chiu-yu to hold a 
demonstration on 10 April.  However, Mok was not a member of the group that 
organised the 10 April demonstration.
474
  The incident was widely reported by the 
press.  In addition, an article in the Chinese University student magazine, written 
by Chen Dong (陳東), a participant in the demonstration, gives a first-hand 
account of what happened during the event.  According to Chen, who was 
marching at the front, as the demonstrators were approaching the Japanese 
Cultural Centre the police intervened.
475
  Twenty-one people, nineteen males and 
two females, with two as young as sixteen, were arrested by the police and 
charged with unlawful assembly.  Among the 21 arrested were students from the 
HKU and CUHK, an editor of the Ming Pao Weekly magazine, a shipyard 
mechanic, a ballroom waiter, a clerk, a female artist, and Ng Chung-yin of the 
70s Bi-weekly.
476
   
 May Fourth is a national holiday in China, celebrating a famous 1919 
student demonstration against Japanese imperialism.  However, in Hong Kong in 
1971 the participants included both students and non-students such as workers.  
On 4 May, a small demonstration was held in the Queen‘s Pier area by a group of 
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twelve young people.  Some of the demonstrators were carrying banners.  The 
group arrived at 2:30 pm ‗to protest Japanese claims to the Senkaku Islands‘.477  
After repeated warnings to disperse were ignored by the demonstrators they were 
arrested by the police and charged with unlawful assembly, for the 
‗demonstration was held without the necessary police permit being obtained‘.478  
The police report dated 4 May 1971 reveals that, among the twelve people 
arrested, while all were under the age of 30, only one person was a student, and 
the others were workers.
479
  Of the twelve arrested, three were editors of the 70s 
Bi-weekly.  They were Chan Ching-wai (陳清偉),  Mok Chiu-yu (莫昭如), and 
Sze Shun-tun (施純頓). 
 The above incidents show that the 70s Bi-weekly was in the forefront of 
the Baodiao campaign as they attempted to promote its anti-colonial, anti-
capitalist agenda through the campaign.  The incidents also show how local 
young adults were an increasingly important factor in the nationalist movements 
in Hong Kong.  However, the incidents examined above were only a prelude, for 
there would be a much larger, violent confrontation between police and the young 
protesters on 7 July.   
 The 7 July demonstration was a turning point in that it marked a change 
in the nature of the Baodiao campaign.  The events at the 7 July demonstration 
further contributed to the anti-colonial rhetoric of the New Left because Hong 
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Kong Police used violence in an attempt to end the demonstration, and that it 
marked the transition from nationalism to anti-colonialism. 
 On 7 July 1971, which marked the 34
th
 anniversary of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident (盧溝橋事變) that sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War, a 
Baodiao demonstration was held in Victoria Park in Causeway Bay at about 7pm.  
There are two documentary sources on the course of events: the official police 
report and reports in the newspapers.  The demonstration was in the headlines in 
almost all the major newspapers the next day.   
 The police report, compiled on the same day the demonstration took place, 
provides the most comprehensive account of what happened in Victoria Park.
480
  
According to the report, a crowd started to gather in the park at approximately 
5pm and an hour later, there were about 300 people, most of whom were 
spectators and members of the press.  Tension started to build up after 6pm.  At 
6:40pm, the report states, ‗two youths with furled banners walked across a 
football pitch in the park and approached to within 100 yards of parked police 
vehicles‘.  The two youths were surrounded by the crowd and the police 
repeatedly gave warnings in Chinese to the crowd to disperse.  The police 
arrested six people after these warnings were ignored.  By 7pm the crowd had 
swelled to 3,000, most of whom were spectators.  A crowd sitting on the ground 
displayed ‗four banners and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen‘.481  There are several 
explanations as to why there was a portrait of Sun Yat-sen displayed in the 
demonstration.  I shall come back to them later. 
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 Warnings by the police to disperse were ignored by the crowd.  Arrests 
were made and in the process, some of the police officers were assaulted.  When 
the crowd again ignored warnings to disperse ‗baton charges were made‘.482  The 
police began a sweep through Victoria Park shortly thereafter.  In the chaos, two 
motorcycles, one a police motorcycle, were set on fire.  Six people were taken to 
hospital for treatment of injuries, all of whom were discharged late in the evening. 
 Reports in the newspapers tell a similar story, with only minor differences 
to the police report.  The pro-China Wen Hui Bao reported that in the morning 
some youths and students had visited the Japanese Consulate in the Central 
District to hand in a petition, and that the sit-in demonstration in Victoria Park 
was attended by approximately a thousand young people, most of whom were 
students.
483
  Demonstrators held banners and distributed flyers with anti-Japanese 
slogans.  The South China Morning Post reported that the number of 
demonstrators increased to about 2,000, and that the crowd eventually swelled to 
3,000 ‗as they were joined by watching students and rowdy spectators‘. 484  
Before the demonstration started there were already police within and outside 
Victoria Park from early afternoon, with units stationed outside the Daimaru and 
Chancellor departmental stores.  As soon as the demonstration began, the police 
intervened.  Riot police were called in.  According to the Sing Tao Daily News 星
島日報 the disturbances spread to nearby areas as the crowd set fires at two spots 
near the park.
485
  In the aftermath of the disturbances, the Sing Tao Daily 
                                                     
482
 Ibid. 
483
 Wen Hui Bao 文匯報, 8 July 1971, p.4. 
484
 South China Morning Post, 8 July 1971, p.1. 
485
 Sing Tao Daily, 8 July 1971, p.23. 
169 
 
reported that 21 people were arrested, and six injured, five of whom were 
students.   
 As far as the Hong Kong Government was concerned, the 7 July 
demonstration was illegal.  The application to hold the demonstration was 
provisionally approved by the Police, but it was later rejected by the Urban 
Council.
486
  At that time, the authorities had set out strict guidelines and rules 
regarding holding meetings or processions in a public place.  Persons wishing to 
hold such meetings were required to make an application to the police 
beforehand.  Having refused to give the organisers permission, the authorities 
took a tough approach towards the demonstration, which eventually turned into a 
violent confrontation between participants and the police.   
 At the 7 July demonstration the colonial government, for whom internal 
security was the top priority, took steps to suppress a supposedly nationalist 
movement.  The government used the same approach to deal with the young 
demonstrators as they did with the leftists in 1967.  However, unlike the leftists 
in 1967, the young Baodiao demonstrators did not use violence to promote their 
cause, while the government used violent means in an attempt to suppress a non-
violent demonstration.
487
  For that reason, the Hong Kong government‘s actions 
soon came under criticisms. 
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Nationalism versus Colonialism: Hong Kong Government 
Criticised 
 The events of 7 July in effect acted as a catalyst to the gradual 
transformation of the Baodiao campaign into an anti-colonial movement by the 
New Left.  The New Left could now use the 7 July demonstration as evidence in 
their argument that the colonial government was being an oppressor.  What is 
interesting is that the government decided to put an end to the demonstration 
using violence, despite the fact that it had probably been aware that the 7 July 
demonstration was widely reported by the Chinese press before it took place.  For 
the Government Information Service (GIS) kept a close watch on reports in the 
Chinese press.  For example, in relation to press coverage before the 
demonstration, the GIS made several comments in a press review it compiled: 
Local newspapers have been very interested in reporting the progress of 
the ‗7/7‘ Senkaku Island demonstration.  Before the demonstration, a 
number of newspapers already published their opinions on the ‗man-made‘ 
complicated application procedure and their advice to the demonstrators 
and authorities…
488
 
 As soon as the disturbances were over, the Hong Kong government came 
under attack by not only students but also the public for its handling of the 
incident.  The Chairman of the Urban Council defended the Council‘s decision 
not to allow students to use Victoria Park for a demonstration.  The HKFS 
criticised the police for its ‗excessive use of violence‘.489  In fact, the 7 July 
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demonstration would not be the last instance in which the students ignored the 
authorities‘ rejection of their application and went ahead to hold demonstrations 
not approved by the authorities.  In the following year, on 13 May, students held 
another demonstration in the Central District without prior approval from the 
authorities. 
 The 7 July demonstration drew the attention of not just local students and 
residents.  Overseas student organisations, too, raised their criticisms against the 
Hong Kong government.  The Chinese Student Associations and Protect 
Diaoyutai Action Committee of different US colleges signed and sent a protest 
letter, dated 12 July 1971, to the Hong Kong government.  In the letter, the 
groups made several demands: 
(1) Open apologies from the Hong Kong government to the public. 
(2) Drop all charges and release all who were illegally arrested. 
(3) Compensate those who were injured by the police. 
(4) Respect human rights, cancel the illegal assembly law and 
guarantee no further suppression of any future patriotic movement.  
The Hong Kong government will be held responsible for all the 
serious consequences if it continues to neglect the public 
opinions.
490
 
 Following the three demonstrations that saw government intervention, the 
70s Bi-weekly and the United Front (聯合陣缐) began to focus their energy on 
turning the Baodiao campaign into one with an anti-colonial agenda ‗as a way 
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forward.‘491  This time the colonial administration, in their attempt to suppress 
the demonstrations in the same way they did in the 1967 riots, ended up creating 
a negative image for itself in the eyes of the public.  One lesson we can learn 
from this incident is that peaceful demonstrations would be a more acceptable 
and effective means to promote nationalism and, for the New Left, anti-
colonialism.  After 1971, Hong Kong young people participated in social 
movements aimed at addressing these injustices such as the Anti-Corruption 
Campaign in 1973, which saw the participation of the New Left, as did the Anti-
Inflation Movement in 1974. 
 The significance of the 7 July demonstration as the beginning of the 
transformation of the Baodiao campaign from a nationalist campaign into an 
anti-colonial one is not the only point worth noting.  The 7 July demonstration 
also illustrates the importance of symbols in nationalist movements, for Sun Yat-
sen‘s portrait was displayed during the demonstration.   
Symbolism in the Baodiao Campaign: Pro-Nationalist Sentiments 
and Use of Sun Yat-sen’s Portrait 
 Symbols, whether they are state flags or portraits, were often used in 
nationalist movements in Hong Kong.  Two questions can be asked: why was 
there a portrait of Sun displayed?  Why did the demonstrators not use the flag of 
the PRC?  One possible explanation is that there were pro-GMD demonstrators in 
the crowd.  An article in the 70s Bi-weekly published in October 1971 reveals 
that there were pro-Nationalists among those involved in the Baodiao 
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campaign.
492
  Another reason, as Chui Pak-tai, who was at the scene of the 7 July 
demonstration, said in my interview with him, was that no one doubted the 
importance and reputation of Sun in Chinese history.
493
  Therefore, the use of 
Sun‘s portrait should not come as a surprise.  The use of Sun‘s portrait shows that 
that nationalist movements often sought the participation of people with different 
political agendas from the organisers.  Further, the portrait of Sun Yat-sen was a 
neutral nationalist symbol acceptable to both pro-CCP and pro-GMD 
sympathisers participating in the Baodiao campaign.   
Significance and Influence of the 1971 Baodiao Campaign  
 The 1971 Baodiao campaign was in part a product of the anti-colonial 
movement started by students and the ‗New Leftist‘ radicals, and of pro-PRC 
nationalism of the pro-China activists.  Although the ‗New Leftist‘ young 
radicals took part in the Baodiao campaign as part of their anti-colonial campaign, 
it was the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism, rather than that of anti-
colonialism, that gained public support.   
 Compared to the traditional leftists in 1967, the New Left was very clever 
in terms of its use of tactics.  Although both the traditional leftists and the New 
Left had anti-colonial agendas, the New Left did not make use of violence to 
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promote its agenda.
494
  The New Leftists simply focused on nationalism knowing 
that any attempt by the government to crack down on the Baodiao campaign 
would spark criticisms.  The events at the 7 July demonstration meant that the 
New Leftists‘ plan to use nationalism as a tactic to promote its anti-colonial 
agenda was for the most part successful. 
As far as Hong Kong‘s social history was concerned, the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign and the student movement of the 1970s could be regarded as 
precursors of the social movements of the 1970s aimed at addressing social 
problems in Hong Kong,
495
 and the democracy movements of the 1980s.  Some 
of the activists who participated in the movements in the 1970s would later 
become the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic 
Democratic Movements in China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會) in the 
late 1980s.  Lastly, a major significance of the 1971 Baodiao campaign was that 
it marked a surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth.  While 
there is no evidence which suggests that the 1971 campaign directly led to the 
rise of the China Faction in universities in the mid-1970s, the movement 
certainly set the stage for the rise of China-orientated nationalism in universities 
in later years.  Ng Chung-yin commented that the major impact of the 1971 
Baodiao campaign was that it resulted in students‘ rethinking the affairs of China 
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and Hong Kong from two perspectives: identification with China (認同) and 
anti-colonialism (反殖).496  Indeed, the 1971 campaign prompted future pro-
China students such as David Chan Yuk-cheung (陳毓祥) to ponder the future of 
the Baodiao movement.
497
  Chan in his writings states that as a student at the 
University of Hong Kong he had some discussion with other students and they 
believed that the next step of the Baodiao movement should be seeking an 
understanding of China (認識中國) and promoting a unification movement (統
一運動).498 
Nationalism in Student Movement: Rise and Dominance of the 
China Faction 
 Following the 1971 Baodiao campaign, politically active students and 
activists outside the universities were divided into three factions based on their 
ideology.  Most of the politically active university students belonged to the 
Guocuipai (國粹派),  or China Faction, which identified with the CCP.499  The 
                                                     
496
 Wu, Dazhi weijing, p.269. 
497
 Chen Yuxiang 陳毓祥, Zuori jinri Chen Yuxiang 昨日今日陳毓祥 (The Past and Present 
Chan Yuk-cheung) (Xianggang: Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxiangongsi, 1989), pp.25-30.  The 
original article was written and published in April 1972 in the official HKFS publication 
Xuelianbao, when David Chan was a first-year student at the University of Hong Kong. 
498
 Ibid., p.30. 
499
 Various sources confirm that the pro-China faction was the mainstream among university 
students. See Chen, Shihou bentu wenhuazhi, p.24; Alvin Y. So., ‗The Transformation of Urban 
Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90‘, in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 24, 4, 1992, 
pp.32-43; and Tsoi Yiu Cheong, ‗The Hong Kong Student Movement‘s ‗China Complex‘‘, in 
Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 
1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92.  Tsoi Yiu Cheong was a 
member of the Hong Kong Federation of Students in the early 1990s.  The tone of the documents 
published in the annual reports of the HKFS also indicate that the China Faction was the 
dominant group in student activism.  The term ‗China Faction‘ was in fact coined by Tsang Shu-
ki (曾澍基) of the Social Faction in 1973.  See Zeng Shuji 曾澍基, Guocuipai shehuipai yuankao 
―國粹派‖、―社會派‖源考 (Tracing the Origins of the China Faction and Social Faction), 
176 
 
China Faction dominated the student movement in the 1970s up until 1976.  
While there might have been pro-Beijing students before 1971, the Guocuipai did 
not come into existence in universities until after the 1971 Baodiao campaign.  
The pro-Beijing group in the 1971 campaign could be considered a predecessor 
of the China Faction that dominated the student movement in the 1970s, for the 
China Faction, too, was pro-Beijing.  It has been said that the China Faction was 
turning a blind eye to the dark side of the Cultural Revolution.
500
  Another group 
of students, more concerned about ‗redressing the injustices of colonial rule‘,501 
was known as the Shehuipai (社會派), or Social Faction.  The Social Faction was 
a minority among left-wing students,
502
 and criticised the China Faction for 
blindly identifying with the CCP.
503
  The last group consisted of radicals, most of 
whom later became Trotskyites (托洛斯基份子) and were simply known as the 
Tuopai (托派).504  Some of these radicals were originally in the 70s Bi-weekly, 
which continued to exist after the 1971 Baodiao campaign.  Of course, the New 
Leftist 70s Bi-weekly differentiated itself from the ‗China group‘ or the traditional 
left-wing that supported the CCP.
505
  These three groups continued to be active in 
the student/youth movement of the 1970s.   
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 The 1970s saw the emergence of political and social activists including 
Szeto Wah, Leung Kwok-hung, Ng Chung-yin, and Mok Chiu-yu, all of whom 
also responded passionately to the democracy movement in China in the late 
1980s.  The stories of these activists show, in particular, that the struggle for 
democracy in Hong Kong and Hong Kong‘s support for the democracy 
movement in China of the next 20 years and beyond had their roots in the 1970s, 
a time when the Hong Kong identity was starting to take shape, and young 
people began to ponder nationalism and the problems of colonialism.   
Factionalism and the China Faction’s Domination at Universities  
 That students in the 1970s placed China first and Hong Kong second 
meant that they were more interested in China.
506
  There are several reasons the 
student movement was dominated by the China Faction in the 1970s.  First, from 
the 1950s to the early 1970s generations of Chinese students studied Chinese 
history and culture in schools.  The history curriculum in effect encouraged them 
to identify culturally with China.
507
  Second, Chinese-language publications with 
information on China such as the Ming Pao Monthly (明報月刊) and Qishi 
Niandai (七十年代) were readily available.508   The official CCP publication 
Hong Qi (紅旗) was also available in the University of Hong Kong library.509  
Third, despite the New Leftists‘ involvement in the 1971 movement their 
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influence on university students in the 1970s was limited.  Although 70s Bi-
weekly worked with university students at some point in the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign, the 70s Bi-weekly was not a student activist group.  Most of the 
members were not students and leading members such as Mok Chiu-yu and Ng 
Chung-yin were working adults.  Fourth, the 1970s saw the rise of China as a 
political state gaining international status as evidenced by the PRC‘s entry into 
the United Nations (UN) in 1971 and US President Richard Nixon‘s visit to 
China in 1972.
510
  Moreover, the 1971 Baodiao campaign was in the eyes of the 
public a nationalist movement despite the fact that the New Left was attempting 
to give it an anti-colonial tone.  The 1971 Baodiao campaign saw the display of 
nationalistic sentiments by Hong Kong youth and I believe it might have sparked 
their interest in learning about China and thus set the stage for the rise of the 
China Faction in subsequent years.  David Chan Yuk-cheung, for example, was 
involved in the 1971 campaign as a secondary school student and he would later 
become one of the most important leaders of the China Faction
511
 and participate 
in the 1996 Baodiao campaign in which he died.  Lastly, the Cultural Revolution 
in China and the related propaganda up until 1976 was a strong external factor 
providing university students with nationalist as well as political inspirations.
512
   
 There are other theories regarding the causes of the rise of the China 
Faction in the 1970s.  Former Social Faction member Lai Chak-fun, for example, 
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argued that Li Yi (李怡), chief editor of Qishi Niandai (七十年代), provided 
guidance to students in their quest to learn about China.  Lai also argued that the 
leftist newspaper Ta Kung Pao (大公報) had contact with university students.513  
Chan Koon-chung (陳冠中), who studied at the University of Hong Kong in the 
1970s, argued that until the late 1970s Qishi Niandai served as a propaganda 
apparatus for the CCP.
514
  From 1981 onwards, however, due to a change in its 
political stance, Qishi Niandai was no longer part of the leftist camp.
515
 
 Until the late 1970s, the China Faction in universities was quite critical of 
the Trotskyists, and often criticised them severely in their writings in student 
publications.  For example, the pro-China student activists criticised the 
Trotskyists for ‗jeopardising the interests of Chinese and Hong Kong comrades‘ 
and ‗interfering in the student movement‘.516  With the emergence of the China 
Faction at universities, factionalism became much more apparent in the student 
movement than in the 1971 Baodiao campaign. 
 An example that reflects the strong interest among university students in 
understanding China was the China Week (中國周) exhibitions.  Student unions 
of different universities in Hong Kong organised the first China Week exhibition 
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in 1973.
517
  More exhibitions were held in the following years.  David Chan, for 
example, represented the HKFS, one of the organisers of the China Week 
exhibitions.  The aim of the China Week exhibitions was to help the public 
understand mainland China.  In fact, the slogan ‗renzhong guanshe‘ (認中關社), 
which means ‗identification with China, pay attention to (Hong Kong) society‘, 
was the popular slogan among students and those interested in China‘s affairs.  
The pro-China students also claimed that they were promoting the ‗spirit of the 
May Fourth Movement‘ (發揚五四精神).518  The HKFS in the 1970s adopted the 
slogan: ‗keep the world in mind, understand our motherland, be concerned with 
society, fight for the rights of our fellow students‘ (放眼世界，認識祖國，關心
社會，爭取同學權益).519  Hong Kong university students began visiting China 
during this time.  The visits to China undoubtedly contributed to their pro-China 
sentiments. 
 Pro-China sentiments and supporters of the China Faction existed outside 
universities as well.  Joseph Lian Yizheng (練乙錚),520 for example, was one of 
those from outside universities who supported the pro-China Guocuipai.  Like 
Chui Pak-tai, Joseph Lian inherited his sense of nationalism from his father who 
was a GMD official.
521
  Lian participated in the Renzhong guanshe movement, 
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although he was not a student at the time.  He was teaching at a secondary school 
and helped organise the 1975 education exhibition to criticise the colonial 
government‘s ‗enslavement education‘ (奴化教育).  The exhibition was a China 
Faction initiative.
522
  As far as factional differences were concerned, the situation 
outside universities appeared to be different from that inside universities.  Joseph 
Lian, in my interview with him, said that there did not appear to be strong 
hostility between China Faction and other groups outside universities.
523
 
Analysis: Rise of the Student-Led China Faction after 1971 
Baodiao Campaign 
For the pro-China university students, who grew up and were educated in 
Hong Kong, being pro-China was not about fighting the Hong Kong colonial 
government;
524
 it was about rediscovering their Chinese identity by first learning 
about China.  However, these pro-China students ignored the problems of 
Cultural Revolution.  Until the truths about the Cultural Revolution began to 
surface in the late 1970s, pro-China students only spoke of the positive aspects of 
China under the rule of the CCP.  Those under the influence of a nationalist fever 
could not, or did not wish to see the dark side of it.  In this sense, the China 
Faction was similar to the leftists in the 1967 riots.   
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Decline of Pro-China Forces Inside and Outside Universities 
 The dominance of the China Faction did not last.  Various sources 
confirm that following the fall of the Gang of Four in China in 1976, the China 
Faction in universities began to lose its influence.
525
  Pro-China forces outside 
universities, too, went into decline.  Those possessing pro-China sentiments 
began to re-think the Cultural Revolution and some left the pro-China camp.
526
  
The fall of the Gang of Four destroyed the ideals of many who belonged to the 
China Faction, and as a result, they lost interest in politics.
527
  Joseph Lian, in my 
interview with him, related that it took some of the pro-China people as long as 
ten years to ‗wake up‘ to face the truths about the Cultural Revolution.528   
Student publications reveal that there was a change of tone within the 
HKFS after the fall of the Gang of Fall in 1976.  Before 1976, the HKFS only 
spoke positively about the PRC,
529
 as though the status of the CCP as the ruling 
party was unquestionable.  After 1976, the HKFS began to ponder the question of 
                                                     
525
 Lian, Xicao weifeng, p.192.  See also Cai Ziqiang 蔡子強 et. al, Tongtushugui qiantu tanpan 
yilai de xuegangxue yun 同途殊歸：前途談判以來的香港學運 (From Identity to Indifference: 
Hong Kong Student Movement since 1991 [sic]) (Xianggang: Xianggang renwen kexue 
chubanshe, 1998), p.367. 
526
 Li yi (李怡), for example, was an editor of the Qishi niandai and was a pro-China person.  Li 
eventually left the Qishi niandai following the fall of the Gang of Four.  See Chen, Shihou bentu 
wenhuazhi, p.36.  See also, Li Zefen 黎則奮, Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong 
huigu 香港青年激進運動回顧 (A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 
1970s), 7 June 2008, http://www.grass-
root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695.  See also, Special Report, 
‗Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai‘ 香港校園的火紅年代 (The Crimson Years in Hong 
Kong Universities), Yazhou zhoukan, 10, 20, 1996, p.38. 
527
 Special Report, ‗Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai‘ 香港校園的火紅年代 (The 
Crimson Years in Hong Kong Universities), Yazhou zhoukan, 10, 20, 1996, p.38. 
528
 Interview with Joseph Lian, 15 December 2008. 
529
 Xianggang zhuanshang xuesheng lianhui 香港專上學生聯會 (Hong Kong Federation of 
Students), Di shiqi jie zhou nian dahui wenji 第十七屆周年大會文集 (Selected Documents of 
the 17th Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Federation of Students) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Federation of Students), 1975, pp.32-33. 
183 
 
identifying with a political state.
530
  As in the 1967 riots, the China factor 
contributed both to starting and to ending nationalist fever among university 
students in Hong Kong in the 1970s.
531
   
Conclusion: Hong Kong Youth and the Politics of China-
orientated Nationalism in the 1970s 
This chapter demonstrates that despite their lack of interest in nationalism, 
the New Left activists played a leading role in the 1971 Baodiao campaign.  
They participated in what appeared to be a nationalist movement in order to 
promote their anti-colonial agenda.  The study of the 1971 campaign tells us that 
those who were involved in a nationalist movement often had different motives.  
From the pro-China activists‘ point of view, it was simply an irredentist 
movement based on pro-China sentiments.  The New Left, on the other hand, 
aimed to use nationalism as a tactic to bring people‘s attention to the injustices of 
colonialism.  The 7 July demonstration was a turning point as the events at 
Victoria Park contributed to the New Left‘s anti-colonial agenda.  The New Left 
was quite clever in simply focusing on the nationalist rhetoric so that when the 
colonial authorities attempted to suppress the Baodiao campaign with violence, 
the colonial government would be blamed.  In that respect, the New Left was 
successful in using the supposedly nationalist movement to further their anti-
colonial cause. 
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 The 1971 Baodiao campaign, along with the Campaign to Make Chinese 
the Official Language and the rise of the China Faction after 1971, marked a 
surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth.  As in the 1966 riots, 
the 1971 Baodiao campaign saw the participation of Hong Kong youth as the 
protagonists in these events.  Although it was apparent that political divisions 
existed among Hong Kong youth, it can be argued that the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign accelerated the factional divisions between university students in the 
1970s, with the emergence of the China Faction and Social Faction in 
universities.  While the China Faction promoted its nationalist rhetoric based on 
pro-China sentiments, the Social Faction focused on the injustices and problems 
of colonialism in Hong Kong.  The student activists belonging to the China 
Faction ignored the dark side of the Cultural Revolution and vigorously defended 
their political position by ignoring and criticising those who had different 
political ideas.   
 The 1971 Baodiao campaign and the story of the China Faction illustrate 
the temporal nature of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong since the 
early 1970s.  In the case of the student-led China Faction of the 1970s, the end of 
the Cultural Revolution marked the end of the China fever in universities, and 
thus the dominance of the China Faction in student activism.  Overall, once the 
activists who organised these nationalist movements shifted their focus away 
from nationalism, as a result of differences in political agenda, there were no 
more actors, or actions that were able to give meaning to the nationalist rhetoric.   
185 
 
 The New Leftists of the 70s Bi-weekly who participated in the 1971 
Baodiao campaign were never interested in nationalism.  The main agenda of 
these New Leftists were anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism.  Following the 
1971 Baodiao campaign, as admitted by members of the 70s Bi-weekly, the group 
experienced a ‗couple of internal divisions‘. 532   With pro-China activists 
becoming disillusioned with the nationalist rhetoric inspired by the Cultural 
Revolution, and the New Leftists‘ lack of interest in nationalism, the 
disappearance of major nationalist movements in the late 1970s was to be 
expected.  Of course, young people‘s focus on social problems might also explain 
the gradual decline of China-orientated nationalism towards the late 1970s.  
Compared to the 1971 campaign, the second Baodiao campaign of 1978 did not 
have much impact, nor did it gain much attention. 
 The 1971 Baodiao campaign, the participation of the New Left in it, and 
the short-lived ascendance of the China Faction and disillusionment of its 
members after 1976 all meant that the ‗Hong Kong factor‘ became more 
significant in Hong Kong after 1967.  The continued significance of the ‗Hong 
Kong factor‘ in later years is reflected in the fact that the promotion of 
nationalism in the student movement laid ‗the groundwork for the impetus 
towards unification during the early eighties‘.533  Moreover, the Baodiao, student 
and social movements in the 1970s saw the emergence of many activists who 
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later led the democracy movement in the 1980s.
534
  Ng Chung-yin and Lau San-
ching (劉山青) of the Revolutionary Marxist League, for instance, became early 
supporters of the democracy movement in China in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
535
 
 In the next two chapters, I will demonstrate that the ‗Hong Kong factor‘ 
became even more important in the expression of China-orientated nationalism in 
later years.  Both the Hong Kong people‘s response to the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and the 1996 Baodiao campaign were directly related to the Hong 
Kong people‘s concern over the future of Hong Kong.  The two events illustrate 
how the ‗China factor‘ and the ‗Hong Kong factor‘ became intertwined in the 
expression of nationalism. 
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Chapter Six: Tiananmen 1989: Nationalism, Democracy 
and the 1997 Question 
Hong Kong felt like a morgue after Tiananmen, yet it was very much 
alive.  We lived through a moment in time when heart, mind and soul 
came together for the community.  The sense of resolve and camaraderie 
was transforming for those who experienced it.
536
 
    - Christine Loh, Being Here: Shaping a Preferred Future 
In the previous chapters, we have seen how the China factor and local 
politics had a significant impact on the nature and expression of China-orientated 
nationalism in Hong Kong.  This chapter continues to follow that theme by 
examining how the local political situation shaped Hong Kong people‘s response 
to the massacre in Beijing on 4 June 1989.  Writing about the June Fourth 
incident means stepping into very divisive territory.  This is particularly the case 
when one writes about Hong Kong people‘s responses.  However, it is clear that 
June Fourth has become a ‗scar‘ not only in the memory of the Hong Kong 
people, but also of the Chinese people as a whole.  This chapter argues, first, that 
the Hong Kong people‘s response to the 1989 Chinese democracy movement was 
a result of both their feelings about China and their concern over the 1997 
Question.  Democracy became the central theme in the rhetoric of their China-
orientated nationalism.  Nationalism created solidarity among a large sector of 
the Hong Kong Chinese community.  It prompted the people of Hong Kong to 
think about what China meant for them.  Some Hong Kong-based political groups 
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used nationalism to mobilise the masses and to promote their pro-democracy 
agenda. 
To understand the link between the nationalistic rhetoric about China and 
Hong Kong‘s struggle for democracy, one must understand the context in which 
the movement in Hong Kong after June Fourth emerged. Moreover, it is 
necessary to understand who was responding to June Fourth.  I examine two 
forces in particular: the Democrats and university students.  This is to support my 
argument that the development of China-orientated nationalism was triggered by 
both the China factor and Hong Kong politics.  In particular, I will examine the 
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香
港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會), the role played by its chairman Szeto Wah 
(司徒華), and the April Fifth Action group (四五行動). 
The historical, cultural, and political contexts of colonial Hong Kong 
made the events in 1989 in Hong Kong all the more complex, for three reasons.  
First, well before June Fourth there had been a steady development of a Hong 
Kong identity.
537
  A new breed of Hong Kong Chinese, with their own distinct 
identity and lifestyle, had emerged from the 1970s onwards.
538
  Second, up until 
1989, the impact of China-orientated nationalism as a phenomenon in Hong 
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Kong society was very small, for only a small minority of the Chinese 
community was involved in its expression.  In contrast, June Fourth had a much 
larger impact on Hong Kong society.  Not only did it spark nationalistic 
sentiments among the Hong Kong Chinese community, but it also forced the 
majority of Hong Kong Chinese to reconsider their Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis 
their sense of being Chinese. This impacted directly upon their view of the 1997 
return to Chinese sovereignty, which was directly related to Hong Kong‘s future.  
As will be shown later in this chapter, although the Hong Kong people had a 
great deal of sympathy for the students in Beijing during the democracy 
movement, they also realised that Hong Kong was different from mainland China.   
Third, the 1980s saw a politically troubled Hong Kong.  A debate about 
democratic government had been in train and gaining momentum since the early 
1980s.  The struggle for democracy in Hong Kong saw the emergence of various 
groups of democracy activists, some of whom would eventually become leaders 
in mobilising local support for the democracy movement in China.    In short, 
three factors contributed to Hong Kong‘s passionate response to the Chinese 
democracy movement: the local democracy debate; the 1997 Question; and 
China-orientated nationalism.  
The Political Context in the 1980s 
 Although economic growth had slowed in the 1980s, the period had 
witnessed rapid and significant political developments.  Before 1989, two 
historically monumental events had taken place: the Sino-British negotiations and 
the debate about democracy within Hong Kong.   
190 
 
The Sino-British negotiations, renowned for the fact that Hong Kong 
people were never consulted at any stage of the process, were held between 1982 
and 1984.  In December 1984, the Chinese and British governments signed the 
Joint Declaration.  This was the result of two years of negotiation and its 
consequences determined the future of Hong Kong after 1997.  Following the 
signing of the Joint Declaration the colony became embroiled in a debate about 
democracy, as the Hong Kong government took steps in an attempt to introduce a 
democratic system before 1997.
539
   
It was also during this time that a number of pro-democracy political 
pressure groups began to emerge.  It has been argued that the emergence of these 
political groups in was the result of the decolonisation process, which gave rise to 
a new political environment.
540
  In July 1984, the Hong Kong government issued 
a consultative green paper on political reform.  Three years later, an official 
review was carried out on the 1984 political reform plans.  The 1984 political 
reform proposal and the subsequent review sparked off a debate on 
democratisation by local political leaders as well as Hong Kong people.  The Gao 
Shan Theatre meetings (高山大會) of the early 1980s marked a new phase of the 
campaign for democracy led by these political pressure groups.  Specifically 
through these meetings the groups campaigned for direct elections to the 
Legislative Council in 1988.   
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In the years between 1985 and 1990, when the Basic Law was being 
drafted, there were constant battles and negotiations between pro-democracy and 
pro-China groups, and within the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC).  The 
campaign for democracy in Hong Kong also saw the emergence of the Joint 
Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government (民主促進聯合會/民促會).  
After 4 June 1989, the Joint Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government 
became the primary leader of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic 
Democratic Movements of China whose main agenda was to support the Chinese 
democracy movement. It is not surprising that  the movement in Hong Kong to 
support the democracy movement in China merged with Hong Kong‘s own 
struggle for democracy as both struggles were emphasised by local pro-
democracy activists. 
Hong Kong’s Response to the Chinese Democracy Movement 
The 1989 Chinese democracy movement awakened a sense of being 
Chinese among the Hong Kong population.  It has been argued that the Chinese 
democracy movement ‗unleashed the suppressed sense of Chinese national 
identity and the patriotic sentiments of many Hong Kong Chinese‘. 541   It 
contributed to their imagination of China being the ‗fatherland‘, and that they 
were Chinese even though politically they were colonial subjects.  Terms such as 
‗patriotic‘ (愛國), ‗Chinese people‘ (中國人民), and ‗Hong Kong compatriots‘ 
(香港同胞) were often used by activist groups in Hong Kong supporting the 
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Chinese democracy movement in their discussion about the Hong Kong 
movement.
542
  The dominant motif was that supporting the democracy movement 
was an expression of patriotism.  Even the normally pro-PRC government circles 
in Hong Kong supported the movement.  The FTU, a well-known pro-PRC 
organisation with approximately 170,000 members, made it clear that it would 
support the Chinese student movement, and referred to the democracy movement 
as a ‗patriotic democracy movement‘ (愛國民主運動).543  FTU chairman Cheng 
Yiu-tong (鄭耀棠 ) commented at that time that the FTU had long been a 
‗patriotic‘ organisation, whether it be supporting the Chinese government‘s 
policies or criticising the government for its mistakes.
544
  Cheng also emphasised 
that the FTU was based in Hong Kong and had no connections with trade unions 
on the mainland, and that it encouraged its members to participate in the protest 
rallies.  Indeed, Cheng led the FTU to participate in the mass rally on 21 May.
545
  
When blood was spilled in Beijing, in short, Hong Kong people of all stripes and 
factions became upset and furious.  Protest marches were held, and funds were 
raised to support the Beijing students.  The Democrats, too, made it clear that 
their support for pro-democracy movement in China was a patriotic activity, as 
they named their new umbrella organisation the Hong Kong Alliance in Support 
of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合
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會 , the Alliance).  Many of the protests were organised by the Hong Kong 
Alliance.  
The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic 
Movements of China 
It becomes important to focus on the groups of people who led the 
campaign of mobilising Hong Kong people to support the democracy movement 
in China: the Democrats and the Alliance in Support of Democratic Movement in 
China, which was formed on 21 May.
546
  The Alliance was formed amidst the 
demonstrations that took place in Hong Kong in the weeks before June Fourth, in 
response to the student movements in mainland China.  The group‘s main goals 
were to provide material and financial support to the ‗patriotic democracy 
movement‘ (支援愛國民主運動) and to ‗overthrow the clique in power led by 
Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun‘ (推翻當權者鄧、李、楊集團).547  
As of November 1990, the Alliance had approximately 200 member groups, local 
political, student, religious, and community organisations.
548
  Before the 
establishment of the Alliance, there was no unified organisation to mobilise 
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support for the Chinese student democracy movement.  In an interview with 
Szeto Wah, he told me that he had asked the student union federation, the HKFS, 
to organise a large-scale protest march but the group declined.  The Joint 
Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government, a loosely organised group, 
then took it upon itself to organise the march. 
When the democracy movement in China first erupted, some of the Hong 
Kong Democrats in the Joint Committee on Promotion of Democracy 
Government had not wished to become involved in the campaign to support the 
Chinese democracy movement,
549
 but instead still wanted to focus on local affairs.  
The Committee members soon changed their attitude.  Initially, one of the 
Committee‘s members announced that he would leave the Committee if it did not 
wish to become involved, and many supported his call.  According to Cheung 
Man-kwong‘s account, it was after listening to Li Peng‘s speech announcing the 
Beijing curfew that the Committee members as a whole were determined to 
become involved in supporting the democracy movement in China.  Indeed, 
Cheung commented in May 1989 that the Democrats normally kept their hands 
off the affairs of China.
550
  The earliest activity of the Committee was on 17 May.  
On 20 May, the Committee held a rally in Victoria Park attended by 40,000 
people.
551
 
On 21 May 1989, the Committee put together the largest protest rally in 
the history of Hong Kong. An 8-hour march saw a fifteen-kilometre procession 
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marching from Central to North Point and ended with a mass rally with close to a 
million people at the Happy Valley racecourse.  Protesters wore headbands and 
held banners as they marched from Central starting from 2:15pm.  It was during 
the rally, which took place eight hours later, that the Alliance was inaugurated.   
The reason for the Alliance‘s formation that day, Szeto has emphasised, is 
that the Democrats and their Committee were not the only one supporting the 
Chinese democracy movement.  He commented to me: 
We were not the only ones…all the people of Hong Kong were supporting 
[the Chinese democracy movement], if that was not the case there would 
not have been the million-people protest march…people whose names 
appeared in the [pro-democracy] political advertisments in the newspapers 
such as Leung Chen-ying, Tam Yiu-chung, Cheng Yiu-tong were all 
supporting.
552
  Who was the first one to yell ‗down with Deng, Li, Yang‘?  
It was Tam Yiu-chung.  Cheng Kai-nam was in the first central committee 
of the Alliance…it was not just us, all the Hong Kong people were 
supporting it.
553
 
For the last 20 years, Szeto Wah has been the Chairman of the Alliance.  
Why and how did he become a democracy activist who often spoke out against 
the CCP, and a central figure of the Alliance?   
Szeto Wah: Chairman of the Alliance 
 Although Szeto Wah is well known as a central figure of the Alliance for 
his anti-Communist sentiments and for his call for regime change in China, Szeto 
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Wah was in fact a leftist in his early years.  Szeto Wah‘s father was a dockyard 
worker who came to Hong Kong in the early 1910s at the age of twelve and 
participated in the Hong Kong Seamen‘s Strike of 1922 and the Canton-Hong 
Kong Strike-Boycott of 1925.
554
  However, Szeto stated that it was not his father 
who influenced his strong feelings for China.  His father was not actually a 
patriot.  Szeto claimed that it was his own experience during WWII that had a 
strong influence on his opinions and feelings for China.  He fled to Guangdong 
during the war and witnessed the hardship endured by the peasants and the 
corruption of the government.  The war experience contributed to Szeto‘s desire 
for a China that is ‗strong and prosperous‘.  As a fifteen-year-old teenager, Szeto 
paid much attention to news about China.  He was optimistic for the PRC when it 
was founded in 1949.  Even before the founding of the PRC, he had joined a  
leftist group, the  Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club (學友中西舞
蹈研究社), now known as the Hok Yau Club (學友社), which was formed in 
January 1949.
555
  However, in 1958 Szeto was labelled a rightist by the group and 
removed from it.  He admitted that at that time there were ‗many things‘ about 
mainland China that he did not understand. 
 In 1973, he led a successful strike by teachers in protest against salary 
cuts, for which he is well known, and formed the Hong Kong Professional 
Teachers‘ Union (HKPTU), which currently has approximately 80,000 members.  
The Xinhua News Agency had asked Szeto not to organise the strike, on the 
grounds that it would have an adverse effect on the stability of the colony.  Szeto 
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Wah disregarded this appeal.  When Deng Xiaoping gained power in 1979 and 
announced plans for reform, once again Szeto was optimistic for the PRC.  
However, seeing that there was no political reform, coupled with his experience 
in the BLDC and events in 1989, resulted in Szeto becoming completely 
disillusioned with the PRC.  I shall discuss his involvement in the BLDC in 
relation to Martin Lee‘s story later. 
 As far as his personal feelings are concerned, Szeto Wah had never 
expected that the Chinese government would use ‗tanks and machine guns to kill 
its people‘. 556   When asked about his first reaction on hearing about the 
crackdown of 4 June 1989, Szeto stated during my interview with him: 
Why would a government which called itself a people‘s government 
and a military which called itself the people‘s army massacre its own 
people?  It was beyond my imagination…Through June Fourth I 
now fully understood the true nature of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
Martin Lee and Other Pro-Democracy Activists in the Alliance 
Like Szeto Wah, Martin Lee has been an important figure in the Hong 
Kong political scene since the 1980s.
557
  Martin Lee‘s father was a GMD officer 
who settled in Hong Kong after the civil war.  Lee studied at the University of 
Hong Kong in the 1950s and graduated in 1960.  He first became known in Hong 
Kong politics in the mid-1980s when he concurrently served as a Legislative 
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Council member from the legal constituency and as a drafter in the BLDC 
alongside Szeto Wah. 
It is unclear how much influence Martin Lee‘s father had on his views on 
China and whether Lee had an emotion attachment to China like Szeto Wah.  
Martin Lee participated in the pro-Chinese democracy movement in 1989 due to 
his political agenda and frustration with the BLDC.  Ever since Lee was elected 
to the Legislative Council in 1985, his primary concern was fighting for greater 
democracy for future Hong Kong.  Lee was in fact handpicked by the Chinese 
government to serve in the BLDC.  The speeches Lee made while he was a 
BLDC drafter indicate that he was determined to make the idea of ‗one country, 
two systems‘ a success and that he was concerned about Hong Kong‘s future 
more than anything else.
558
   
The relationship between Martin Lee and Szeto Wah on the one side, and 
other BLDC drafters on the other, was not amicable.  Beijing‘s desire to have a 
tight rein over the design of Hong Kong‘s future political system upset Lee and 
Szeto and their opinion that the Basic Law should give Hong Kong a full 
democracy was largely ignored by other members of the BLDC.  Despite their 
objections the final version of the political blueprint set out in the first draft of the 
Basic Law, which in the view of Lee and Szeto Wah was too conservative, was 
passed in 1988.  Lee and Szeto then teamed up to continue fighting for greater 
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democracy late 1988.
559
  Thus, Lee and Szeto‘s status as leaders in Hong Kong‘s 
response to June Fourth should not come as a surprise. 
Following the outbreak of the Chinese democracy movement Lee served 
as the vice-chairman of the Alliance and was responsible for contacting foreign 
governments and Chinese overseas in support of the Chinese democracy 
movement.
560
  Other Alliance committee members included Lee Wing-tat (李永
達), Cheung Man-kwong (張文光) and Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁).  They had 
grown up in the 1970s, experienced the student movement, and were involved in 
the Hong Kong democracy movement starting around the mid-1980s.
561
 
The April Fifth Action Group 
Another important group that organised protest rallies during the spring of 
1989 in support of the Chinese democracy movement was the April Fifth Action 
group (四五行動).  It was founded by Leung Kwok-hung and other local activists.  
Leung, better known in Hong Kong as ‗Long Hair‘ (長毛), was also an important 
member of the Alliance.  His nickname is derived from his hairstyle, which he 
has kept since 1989, as an expression of protest against the Chinese government‘s 
verdict to label the democracy movement as counter-revolutionary.
562
  The April 
Fifth Action group was named after the first Tiananmen incident of 5 April 1976.  
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In the beginning, the group actually had no name.  Leung claimed to me in an 
interview that he was one of those who gave the group its name.
563
 
In my interview with him, Leung claimed that the April Fifth Action 
group‘s activities predated those of the Alliance, and that the group had been 
active as early as January 1989.
564
  While there is no evidence that Leung and his 
group were organising activities in January 1989, a report in the South China 
Morning Post confirmed that the rally held by the April Fifth Action group on 22 
April was the first local response to the Chinese democracy movement.
565
  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, members of the Revolutionary Marxist 
League Ng Chung-yin and Lau San-ching had been in contact with democracy 
activists in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Since the early 1980s, the 
League became increasingly concerned about the Chinese democracy movement 
as well as the future of Hong Kong.  In the League‘s official publication Zhan 
Xun (戰訊), it argued that the issue of democracy reforms in China should be 
combined with that of Hong Kong‘s return to China.566  Thus, Leung, who was 
also a member of the League, was probably correct in saying that his group was 
already doing similar work in early 1989. 
When the Chinese democracy movement erupted in Beijing a few months 
later, the April Fifth Action group argued that only when China had democracy 
could Hong Kong have a democratic future (中國有民主，香港才有民主的前
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途).567  Leung Kwok-hung argued that the April Fifth Action group was the first 
to organise rallies in response to the Tiananmen protests, and criticised the 
Democrats for their tardy response to the democracy movement.
568
  Even after 
the founding of the Alliance, both the April Fifth Action group and the Alliance 
were organising their own protest rallies.  Just before the bloody crackdown of 4 
June the April Fifth Action group was organising a round-the-island protest rally 
(環島遊行).  In criticising the Democrats for their tardy response to the Chinese 
democracy movement, Leung told me: 
As far as the 1989 democracy movement goes, the April Fifth Action 
group was the first one to respond to it…what you call the Democrats 
today were not even there at that time.  We responded as early as 1 
January the same year.  The reason was that we had the same ideas as the 
people on the mainland. Regarding timing of the Three Anniversaries of 
that year -- the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the 40th 
anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and the 70th anniversary of the 
May Fourth Movement -- we all knew something big was going to happen.  
The April Fifth Action group was formed at that time to push for greater 
democracy in Hong Kong and to support the democracy movement in 
China.
569
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What is interesting is that in May 1989 Ng Chung-yin, representative of the Hong 
Kong Journalists‘ Committee in Support of Beijing Student Movement and head 
of the Alliance‘s information group, made the same criticism as Leung‘s: 
The slow response of the liberals in this issue reflects that they are 
politically insensitive.  They are supposed to provide political leadership 
for the people, but it turned out they were behind the people.
570
 
Given Leung and Ng‘s background as Trotskyist activists of the 
Revolutionary Marxist League, their participation in Hong Kong‘s response to 
June Fourth was to be expected.  However, we also need to consider carefully 
what Leung said about the reason the April Fifth Action Group was founded, and 
what the group said at the time.  I believe that both Leung and the democrats 
responded passionately to June Fourth for the same reason: to show their concern 
over the democracy movement in both China and Hong Kong.  It was apparent 
that in the view of Leung, the Democrats, and Hong Kong citizens, the 
democracy movement in China and that in Hong Kong became inseparable. In 
fact, the April Fifth group was a founding member of the Alliance, and Leung has 
been an executive committee member of the Alliance since the 1990s. He 
simultaneously serves in Hong Kong‘s Legislative Council as a thorn in the side 
of the Hong Kong government.  
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Activities and Fund-raising in Hong Kong Supporting the 
Student Movement in Beijing 
From its founding on 21 May, the Alliance continued to be extremely 
active.  On 25 May, the Alliance announced that it would set up a central fund, 
the purpose of which, according to Alliance member Lee Wing-tat, was to 
support both the Beijing students and the work done in Hong Kong to support the 
movement in China.
571
  It was announced that the initial amount of donations 
received reached one million Hong Kong dollars.
572
  Representative of the 
Alliance Lee Cheuk-yan (李卓人 ), who took the million-dollar donation to 
Beijing, was arrested on 5 June by Chinese authorities and the donation was 
seized.
573
  Three days later, after signing a confession, Lee was allowed to 
leave.
574
  
The Alliance was not the only organisation arranging for funds to be 
brought to Beijing.  The students of the HKFS also set up funds.  On the same 
day as the Alliance announced their plan for a central fund, the HKFS sent a 
group of students to bring $900,000 to Beijing to support the students there.  In 
fact, as early as 1 May, the HKFS had set up its own central fund, which it 
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claimed up until late May had amounted to $6 million.  The HKFS also supplied 
Beijing students with loudspeakers.
575
   
University students had been vocal about their views of China and their 
sense of China-orientated nationalism, particularly in the 1980s.  Several events 
had provided opportunities for university students to express their opinions about 
China, and highlighted their sense of nationalism: the Japanese textbook 
controversy in 1982, Margaret Thatcher‘s visit to China in the same year, and the 
Sino-British negotiations.  Major players in the student-led nationalistic 
movements included student unions at Chinese University of Hong Kong and the 
University of Hong Kong.   
The university students‘ responses  both to the democracy movement at 
Tiananmen and to the subsequent brutal crackdown of it were vivid and strong. 
Issues of the University of Hong Kong student magazine Undergrad published at 
this time were filled with passionate, at times poetic, discussions of June Fourth.  
In earlier weeks, a number of university students from Hong Kong went to 
Beijing and witnessed the turbulent events leading up to June Fourth.
576
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However, going to Beijing made them realise that they were very different from 
their mainland comrades.  It was difficult for Hong Kong students to come to 
terms with how to identify and position themselves in what was essentially a 
‗Chinese‘ student movement taking place in mainland China.  A university 
student who went to Beijing at that time wrote in Undergrad that compared to 
students in China, 
Hong Kong university students and teachers enjoy considerable material 
wealth, and do not need to worry about future job opportunities.  For Hong 
Kong students, joining the mainland Chinese student movement carries a 
sense of strangeness.  For myself, I do not wish to identify myself as a Hong 
Kong student in a mainland student movement…I am willing to do my best to 
fulfill my dream of reviving and strengthening the Chinese nation, and 
develop democracy.
577
   
Interestingly, members and staff of traditional pro-China/pro-Communist 
groups also participated in supporting the Tiananmen protests, and Communist 
staff members even joined the giant 21 May rally. According to a report in the 
South China Morning Post dated 22 May, at the massive protest rally of 21 May 
in which close to a million people participated, Cheng Yiu-tong (鄭耀棠 ), 
chairman of the pro-Communist trade union federation, the FTU, said that 
‗Beijing students sacrifice their bodies to contribute to the future and the 
democratic development of the country.  We should learn from them and cherish 
and protect their patriotism‘.578 
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In the evening of 3 June, after hearing the news of the bloody crackdown 
in Beijing, the Alliance called for a sit-in protest rally.  The rally would be known 
as the Black Mass Sit-in (黑色大靜坐), held the next day, with approximately 
200,000 participating in the event.  Both Szeto Wah and Martin Lee, as 
organisers of the rally, spoke to the crowd.  Wearing a black headband, Martin 
Lee urged other BLDC drafters to suspend their work.  Szeto Wah, after 
delivering an emotional speech, collapsed due to heat exhaustion.
579
 
The Immediate Aftermath of the 4 June Massacre 
Hong Kong‘s populace was shocked by the killings, and took to the 
streets in massive marches and rallies, to voice their anger over the bloody 
crackdown by the Chinese government on the democracy movement. Even the 
official Communist groups in Hong Kong, including the NCNA,
580
 the pro-PRC 
newspapers Ta Kung Pao (大公報), the New Evening Post (新晚報), and the 
FTU.  Xu Jiatun (許家屯), chief of the NCNA in Hong Kong at that time, wrote 
in his memoirs that many within the agency were upset by the events in Beijing, 
and that he let his staff, whether they be staff within the Agency or staff of the 
left-wing newspapers, participate in the rallies in the names of their respective 
organisations.
581
  There were discussions within the Agency as to whether to 
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allow staff to respond in support of the democracy movement.  Of course, the 
Agency decided that although the staff would be allowed to support the 
movement, yelling slogans such as ‗down with Deng (Deng Xiaoping), Li (Li 
Peng), and Yang (Yang Shangkun)‘582 would not be appropriate.583   
The activists of the Alliance, in contrast, took decisive actions that were 
strongly anti-regime. This included Operation Yellow Bird (黃雀行動 ), an 
underground operation to smuggle Chinese pro-democracy leaders out of China 
after June Fourth. Eighteen years later, neither Leung Kwok-hung nor Szeto Wah, 
whom I interviewed in 2007, were yet willing to say much about it: 
I always say we would do things that we should do and could do.  At the 
same time I always say to my fellow Alliance members, to quote 
Confucius, ‗if one remains unknown and is not bothered, is one not a 
gentleman?‘
584
  It means that even if others do not know what you could 
do you will not be upset…So when people asked me about the Operation I 
would not answer. 
  Leung, the leader of the April Fifth Group and a committee member of 
the Alliance, commented that ‗if people did not say anything then it means that it 
did happen; they cannot talk about it because people‘s lives are still at risk‘.585  
Former actor and comedian Johnny Shum Kin-fun (岑建勳) did disclose some of 
the details of the operation in a BBC interview.
586
  According to Shum, the 
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operation was led by the pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong who formed the 
Alliance. It was also said that the Hong Kong pro-democracy sympathisers turned 
to smugglers to carry it out,
587
 and that the operation was funded by a Hong Kong 
entrepreneur.
588
   
The events in Beijing took the media as well as the people of Hong Kong 
by storm, largely because of concern over the future of Hong Kong in light of the 
events in Beijing.  Events leading up to, and the final bloody crackdown that took 
place on 4 June invoked a sense of fear and despair among the Hong Kong 
population, now very concerned about 1997.
589
  The killings in Beijing forced 
them to rethink their political relationship, present and future, with mainland 
China.  Sifting through the various responses, written and verbal, that appeared in 
the newspapers in the days following the shootings one can clearly see Hong 
Kong people‘s loss of confidence in the future.  Let us consider this response 
from a Westerner living in Hong Kong at that time:  
With one incident I have been convinced that there is, after all, no future 
in Hong Kong.  My Chinese friends have tried to persuade me of this in 
the past.  I didn‘t believe them, but they were absolutely right.
590
 
Similarly, but in a more sarcastic tone, and referring specifically to the 
drafting of the Basic Law that would govern Hong Kong after the hand-over of 
sovereignty in 1997, another South China Morning Post reader wrote: 
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To all those who are still willing to continue their roles in the drafting 
of the Basic Law, I am sure when this document is complete, they will 
feel an enormous sense of achievement in being involved in something 
that is worth less than its equivalent weight in toilet paper.
591
 
Some of the members responsible for drafting the Basic Law did suspend their 
work on it as a form of protest.  These members included the FTU chairman 
Cheng Yiu-tong, newspaper tycoon Louis Cha (Jin Yong), Reverend Peter 
Kwong Kong-kit (鄺廣傑), and Professor Yeung Yue-man (楊汝萬).  Martin Lee 
and Szeto Wah immediately decided that, although they were members of the 
BLDC, for the time being they would not be involved in the drafting process, 
although they did not resign officially.
592
  Lee and Szeto were eventually 
removed from the drafting committee by China‘s National People‘s Congress.593   
It would not be appropriate to say there was a mass exodus, but Hong 
Kong people did try to secure their future and to find a way out by emigrating, as 
noted by Cheng: 
Given the present fears, demands for the right of abode [in Europe] for 
the 3.25 million holders of British Dependent Territory Citizen (BDTC) 
passports have stepped up, while attempts have also been made to seek 
some form of international guarantee for Hong Kong people‘s rights and 
freedoms beyond 1997.  In their panic, Hong Kong people also renewed 
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such proposals as purchasing South Pacific Islands passports, placing 
Hong Kong under United Nations Trusteeship, independence, etc.
594
 
A survey conducted for the South China Morning Post revealed: 
49 per cent of 479 respondents felt that independence was a viable option 
for Hong Kong…Of these 31 per cent would prefer that Hong Kong be a 
self-governing member of the Commonwealth while 18 per cent want 
independence.
595
 
It is debatable as to whether surveys like this truly reflected the views of 
the millions of Hong Kong people at that time.  Nonetheless, as Szeto Wah, 
Chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance, commented, there was fear among the 
Hong Kong population.    Szeto commented in an interview with me: 
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Hong Kong people did not have much of a sense of belonging.  But after 
the Joint Declaration was signed they knew Hong Kong would be returned 
to China in 1997.  I remember that during a march two slogans gave me 
the deepest impression: ‗today‘s Beijing is tomorrow‘s Hong 
Kong‘…Everyone was afraid.
596
 
  The business sector, too, was restless.
597
  Top companies in Hong Kong 
joined forces to campaign for the right of abode in the United Kingdom for the 
people of Hong Kong.
598
  Founding members of this group included Swires, 
Jardines, Hong Kong Telecom, Inchcape, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, 
Hutchinson Whampoa, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, DHL, Cluff Oil, and 
Legislative Councillors Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen (張鑑泉) and Ron Arculi 
(夏佳理 ). 599   Interestingly, it was reported that the group would ‗not be 
campaigning for an increase in the pace of democracy in Hong Kong or for the 
adoption of a Bill of Human Rights‘ for which other groups had been fighting.600  
It is obvious that they did not want to upset the Chinese government for the sake 
of their business interests in mainland China.  This shows that there were always 
interests at stake.   
What happened in 1989 in the business sector was therefore similar to 
how in the 1920s and 1930s the Chinese bourgeoisie, faced with crises 
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threatening their economic interests, sought ways to protect their interests.
601
  The 
actions of the Chinese businesspeople in Hong Kong illustrate how, just as 
throughout Hong Kong‘s history, the interests of Hong Kong Chinese businesses 
were tied to British colonialism as well as China, and these businesspeople would 
support policies to protect their economic interests.  In any case, for both the 
Chinese businesspeople and ordinary Hong Kong citizens in 1989, the future of 
China seemed linked to that of Hong Kong. 
Convergence between Concern over Hong Kong’s Future and 
Nationalism 
Although June Fourth invoked strong sentiments about the people of 
China among Hong Kong‘s residents, at the same time the events in Beijing 
confirmed in the minds of Hong Kong people the image of the PRC as a brutal 
regime.  These feelings and responses reflected not only Hong Kong people‘s 
anxiety over their future, but their sense of identity and value judgments as well.  
China-orientated nationalism was represented by Hong Kong people‘s sympathy 
for students on the mainland, as far as the struggle for democracy was concerned. 
Edward Vickers has observed: 
The crushing of the mainland pro-democracy movement, with which 
millions of Hongkongers had come to sympathise, shattered overnight the 
mood of cautious optimism concerning the retrocession that had prevailed 
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prior to this, and brought home to local people the fragility of the promises 
of autonomy for Hong Kong made by Beijing.
602
 
Juxtaposing the aforementioned historical contexts with statements in the 
newspapers issued by various groups in response to June Fourth,
603
 I believe that 
Hong Kong‘s response to June Fourth marked a convergence between Hong 
Kong‘s people‘s concern for China‘s future and that for Hong Kong‘s future.  
June Fourth forced the people of Hong Kong to come to terms with their Hong 
Kong identity as defined by their colonial experience, Hong Kong‘s return to 
Chinese rule in the future, and their concept of China as a nation.  For the people 
of Hong Kong, the future of the colony was just as significant as the student 
movement in Beijing, with democracy being the underlying issue.  In short, the 
evidence shows how Hong Kong people attempted to renegotiate the meanings of 
Chinese and Hong Kong identities, and to rethink Hong Kong‘s future political 
relations with China. 
With the events in 1989, a supposition took root that ‗1997 would be the 
end for Hong Kong‘.  It was not only Hong Kong people who contributed to this 
myth, but also commentators from both within and outside Hong Kong. 
604
 
 In the aftermath of the 4 June massacre in Beijing, a student with the 
pseudonym of Zhongqiu (‗Mid-autumn‘) discussed the conflict between being 
nationalistic and choosing to emigrate: 
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Of course, I am not making assumptions as to how to be nationalistic.  In a 
free society, every person has the right to choose which country they want 
to live in, but if we are to claim to be nationalistic, the bottom line is to be 
a Chinese.
605
 
Non-ethnically Chinese intellectuals living in Hong Kong, too, became 
worried about the China factor and how this would play out.  Hong Kong 
University law lecturer Nihal Jayawickrama wrote in the South China Morning 
Post: 
Over a century and a half [Hong Kong people] have created, within 
clearly defined historical boundaries, a nation…Should the people of the 
future Hongkong SAR express their solidarity with a liberal reformist 
movement on the mainland, as they did in the spring of 1989, they are 
unlikely to be spared the wrath of the People‘s Liberation Army 
commandeered into action in defense of the other system.
606
 
 The response as such should not come as a surprise if we take into 
account the fact that well before June Fourth some of the Hong Kong-based 
intellectuals had been discussing the status of Hong Kong and her future.  It has 
been argued that these intellectuals had formed very specific views. Quoting an 
article: 
1. In any case, Hong Kong should be a bridge between China and the 
outside world. 
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2. Although the people of Hong Kong would very much like to 
maintain the status quo, objectively speaking changes would be 
inevitable. 
3. The future of Hong Kong concerned every Chinese living in Hong 
Kong.  The Chinese government should listen to their views.
607
 
 Judging from all the sources it can be argued that Hong Kong people‘s 
passionate response to June Fourth represented both their colonial identity and 
China-orientated nationalism.
608
  In their response to June Fourth, Hong Kong 
people expressed their concerns over Hong Kong‘s future as well as China‘s; and 
redefined themselves as colonial subjects who had to make decisions as to 
whether they were also China-orientated nationalists.  However, it was obvious 
that in the minds of Hong Kong people Hong Kong came first, and China second.  
June Fourth was one of those occasions where politicians and the public became 
united as they all shared concerns about the future of Hong Kong.  Ironically, the 
more Hong Kong people tried to frame their agenda in the name of ‗nationalism‘, 
the more their own confusion as to who they were was exposed.  Historian Steve 
Tsang recognises this ‗identity crisis‘: 
[The] lack of clarity in their minds had important implications.  On the 
one hand, as Hong Kong citizens, they wanted to preserve their own way 
of life under the ‗one country, two systems‘ formula…On the other hand, 
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feeling that they were Chinese too, they believed they had a right to have 
a say in vital matters affecting the future of the nation…
609
 
Exactly how ‗patriotic‘ the pro-democracy activists and activist groups 
were remains debatable.  They and the people of Hong Kong opposed the use of 
force by the PRC in the suppression of the student movement, and thus many 
criticised the PRC in a highly anti-Communist tone. Below is a passage from a 
Hong Kong pamphlet of that period: 
Someone will ask: is victory possible?  Our answer is: it is possible!  As 
long as the people are committed, not afraid of sacrifice, and continue to 
struggle…Chinese workers in particular have a special 
responsibility…they can go on strike on the one hand, arm themselves 
with whatever is available in the factories, and organise self-defense 
forces, and continue the struggle.
610
 
Looking at documents and speeches by the Hong Kong Alliance in 
Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China during the months and 
years that followed, one often find phrases such as ‗the second year after June 
Fourth‘ or ‗the first October 1 after June Fourth‘.  ‗June Fourth‘ became a 
chronological symbol and important rhetorical phrase in the pro-democracy 
group‘s writings.  For the democracy activists, it was not only a date but also a 
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symbol signifying political meanings as well as personal feelings.
611
   The annual 
June Fourth protests in Hong Kong became a means of expressing this. Notably, 
too, the pro-democracy activists, the Hong Kong Chinese as a whole during the 
early 1990s, and their colonial master were now on the same side, in being 
concerned about the future of Hong Kong.
612
 
 The Alliance has long regarded itself as being on the frontline of the 
political struggle for democracy, freedom and human rights in Hong Kong.  How 
does this relate to China-orientated nationalism?  The annual reports released by 
the standing committee of the Alliance over the years are replete with such 
rhetorical themes as ‗the Chinese people‘ and ‗nationalism‘ or ‗patriotism‘.  For 
them the underlying theme of nationalism has been democracy.  It was through 
the Alliance and its members that the rhetoric of nationalism and democracy 
became linked. 
Many of the original founders of the Alliance later became members of 
the Democratic Party (DPHK), founded on 4 October 1994.  Why were these 
Democrats (民主派), such as Szeto Wah, Martin Lee, Ho Chun-yan, and Cheung 
Man-kwong, interested in the democracy movement in China?  Was their support 
linked to the political situation in Hong Kong?  While there is no evidence that 
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suggests that it was directly related to their fight for democracy in Hong Kong, if 
one analyses the political agenda and background of these Democrats it is not 
surprising.  Cheung Man-kwong has stated that in the early years of the 
Democratic Party‘s activities, although the Democrats in Hong Kong did not 
wish to become involved in the affairs in China, they did hope that by achieving 
democracy in Hong Kong they would be able to push for democracy in China.
613
 
Conclusion: The Politics of Response to the Chinese Pro-
Democracy Movement 
Taking into account the political context of Hong Kong before 1989, the 
populace‘s passionate response to June Fourth was to be expected.  June Fourth 
changed the way they viewed China.  Although at least some of them high hopes 
for the CCP before June Fourth, the events in 1989 resulted in their loss of 
confidence in the CCP.  Second, there emerged once again the notion that the 
nation was different from the state. 
It is also worth noting that Hong Kong‘s response to June Fourth 
challenged the myth of the Hong Kong people‘s being politically apathetic.  By 
political participation, I am not referring to specific legal political procedures 
such as elections as a yardstick to measure the degree of a people‘s participation 
in politics.
614
  Instead, I refer to the making of political statements and expressing 
legitimate concerns for their future, in mass gatherings and protests, by the 
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people of Hong Kong in the days, weeks and even years following Tiananmen.  
In this sense, June Fourth resulted in greater participation in politics by the 
people of Hong Kong, as well as a shift in terms of political attitudes.
615
  
 June Fourth has become a ‗scar‘ in the history of Hong Kong.  Two 
factors contributed to Hong Kong‘s response to it: China-orientated nationalism 
and the 1997 Question.  June Fourth heightened both the Hong Kong people‘s 
sense of their own identity, their feelings for China, and awareness of the 1997 
Question.  Hong Kong‘s response to June Fourth reflected both a China-
orientated nationalism and the Hong Kong people‘s anxiety over their own future.  
Hong Kong‘s response also marked a convergence of the local democracy 
movement and the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.  It 
signified an evolution in the debate about nationalism in the colony as democracy 
became a central theme.  Interestingly, the 1989 Chinese democracy movement 
brought together people from both sides of the political spectrum.  Both the 
Democrats and the pro-China groups were upset by the events in Beijing.  As far 
as the issue of identity is concerned, it was not only the people of Hong Kong 
who contributed to the discourse about their own identity.  The British public, too, 
believed that Hong Kong people deserved a ‗reprieve‘.  A poll taken in the days 
after June Fourth for the Daily Telegraph revealed that 48 per cent of the British 
did not want see Hong Kong returned to China.
616
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As far as the local political scene was concerned, while there is no doubt 
that June Fourth brought together the Democrats, conservatives, and pro-China 
groups, it also exposed the rift between them.  Solidarity between different 
political groups would not last long.  Soon after July 1989, the Hong Kong 
support movement went into decline.  With each passing year after 1989, the 
number of people participating in the rallies decreased.
617
  This is because the 
Democrats‘ campaign for greater democracy in China as well as Hong Kong, 
which had begun in the early 1980s and was vindicated by the events of 1989 as 
fears for the future of the colony grew, was not acceptable in the eyes of Beijing.  
Beijing soon embarked on a campaign to discredit the Democrats, through the 
People’s Daily.618  Following Beijing‘s criticisms against the Democrats, pro-
China organisations such as Cheng Kai-nam‘s (程介南) Hong Kong Federation 
of Education Workers (香港教育工作者聯會) withdrew from the Alliance, and 
conservatives even recommended dissolving it to avoid upsetting Beijing any 
further.
619
  Further, for certain political and community groups, there were other 
more important issues.  As a result, the unified campaign born out of an 
awakened sense of nationalism and concern for Hong Kong‘s future went into 
decline due to political differences, just as the Baodiao movement of the early 
1970s was undermined by conflicts between the groups leading the campaign.  
This shows the temporal nature of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.   
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After the events of 1989, many changed their attitudes towards the CCP.  
As far as the rhetoric of nationalism was concerned, the events led to Hong Kong 
people‘s viewing the state as different from the nation.  Szeto Wah and the pro-
democracy activists were not the only ones.  Students, too, changed their views 
towards the CCP and came to differentiate state from nation.  Interviews with 
student leaders of the 1980s, published in Ivan Choi Chi-keung‘s From Identity to 
Indifference reveal this.
620
  After the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the HKFS 
refused to recognise the CCP as the current regime.
 621
   
Regardless, Hong Kong‘s future was already set in stone as it was to be 
handed over to China in 1997.  In the final chapter, I will examine how some 
Hong Kong people, on the eve of the 1997 handover, attempted to rediscover 
their Chinese identity and voice their concern about the future of Hong Kong by 
constructing an anti-imperialist rhetoric and participating in the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign, which had a strong irredentist nationalist theme. 
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Chapter Seven: Irredentist Nationalism as Construction: 
The Politics of the 1996 Defend Diaoyu Islands (Baodiao) 
Campaign622  
In Chapter Five, I examined the 1971 Baodiao campaign and the 
significance of local politics in influencing the nature and course of the 
campaign.  The subject of this chapter is the 1996 campaign, the larger of the 
two campaigns.  The 1996 campaign was the fourth wave of the Baodiao 
movement.
623
  Historically, the movement had its origins in the 1971 campaign 
and thus the 1996 campaign should be viewed not as a separate campaign but an 
extension of the previous ones.  The chapter begins with a brief examination of 
the background to the 1996 campaign and then discusses the events that 
occurred between September and November 1996.  The remaining sections of 
the chapter analyse the specifics of the major events in relation to the following 
themes: symbolism in the use of the PRC flag by Hong Kong activists; divisions 
among the activists; media responses to the Baodiao campaign; and the various 
debates in the media.  In the last section, I examine the construction of the anti-
imperialist nationalist rhetoric by the leading Hong Kong activists.   
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Although the 1996 campaign appeared to be a nationalist movement, it 
was to a large extent sparked by Hong Kong‘s social and political contexts. The 
Baodiao phenomenon provided Hong Kong people an opportunity to rethink 
their Chinese identity at a time when British colonial rule was ending and Hong 
Kong would soon be returned to China.  The 1996 campaign also exposed the 
limitations of China-orientated nationalism on both local and macro-levels.  
Some of these limitations were represented by conflicts between Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese activists who had different political agendas, and disagreements 
among Hong Kong activists during their first trip to the Diaoyu Islands.  Further, 
the anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese rhetoric was nothing more than an empty 
slogan constructed by leading activists who had different reasons to participate 
in the 1996 Baodiao campaign.  Like Hong Kong‘s response to the 4 June 
killings in Beijing in 1989, the 1996 Baodiao campaign was a display of Hong 
Kong people‘s concern over Hong Kong‘s future under the guise of nationalism.  
The real target was probably Beijing, not Japan or Japanese militarism.  Some 
Hong Kong-based political groups used the Baodiao phenomenon to promote 
their pro-democracy agenda.  I shall briefly discuss in the next section the 
developments concerning the sovereignty issue that triggered the 1996 campaign. 
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Background to the Baodiao Movement: The Problem of 
Sovereignty since the 1970s 
Although the sovereignty issue regarding the tiny uninhabited Diaoyutai 
islands was an unresolved issue in Sino-Japanese relations after WWII,
624
 up 
until the 1970s the PRC government remained largely silent, and the ROC 
government in Taiwan and the Japanese government were the parties openly in 
dispute.  However, since the early 1970s, the islands had been under the spotlight 
at the PRC-Japanese negotiation table.
625
  Actions by the US government 
complicated the sovereignty issue further.  The US included the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands in the Reversion Treaty which took effect on 15 May 1972 and under 
which the islands, along with Okinawa, were returned to Japan.  As a result, the 
US recognized that legally the islands should come under the control of the 
Japanese government, although the US government stated that the dispute over 
the islands should be dealt with by Japan and China.
626
  When Sino-Japanese 
relations were normalised in 1972, both governments made the decision to put 
aside the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issue for settlement later.
627
  In 1978, the PRC 
and Japanese governments signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, 
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and both countries once again decided to shelve the issue, to be settled by ‗future 
generations‘.628  The problem of sovereignty over the islands was never resolved 
officially.  Since the early 1970s, the treaty actions by the US and Japanese 
governments, and by right-wing super-patriots in Japan helped give rise to 
several waves of the Baodiao phenomenon among Chinese communities in the 
US, Canada, and Hong Kong.   
The 1990 Baodiao Campaign in Hong Kong 
 The first Baodiao campaign in Hong Kong of 1971, as noted in Chapter 
Five, was a response to the movement started by Chinese students in the US.  
After 1971, two waves of the Baodiao movement erupted in Hong Kong in the 
1990s.  In September 1990, the Diaoyu Islands came under the spotlight again 
when the Maritime Safety Agency of Japan announced its recognition of the 
lighthouse built by a Japanese non-governmental body, as a ‗lawful navigation 
mark‘. 629   This announcement triggered another wave of the Baodiao 
phenomenon in Hong Kong.  Community groups and university students were the 
major forces leading the 1990 Baodiao campaign.  The HKFS in particular was 
extremely critical of the Chinese government‘s response to the sovereignty issue.  
In an article containing five statements the HKFS criticised the Chinese 
government for remaining silent, and ‗American imperialists‘ for handing the 
islands over to ‗Japanese imperialists‘.630  The HKFS also accused the Chinese 
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government of ‗bringing shame to national dignity‘ in seeking a ‗20 million-
dollar loan‘ from Japan.631 
 On 28 October 1990, more than 10,000 people gathered at Victoria Park 
to participate in a protest march to the Japanese consulate.
632
  The march was 
organised by the HKPTU, of which Szeto Wah, well known for his participation 
in the 4 June 1989 protests in Hong Kong, was one of the leaders.  However, the 
HKFS, after meeting with the organiser, decided not to participate due to 
‗differences in opinion‘.633  Two things are of note with regards to the 28 October 
protest march.  First, about a hundred participants were holding the ROC flag and 
portrait of Sun Yat-sen; the flags were handed out by a right-wing pro-ROC 
organisation.
634
  Secondly, about 20 secondary school students participated in the 
protest, so it was not only tertiary students who were involved.  Former chief of 
the Wen Hui Bao Li Zisong (李子誦), who was removed from his post after June 
Fourth, spoke at the gathering at Victoria Park.
635
  A small incident occurred 
when the chief of the Baixing Bi-monthly magazine (百姓半月刊) Lu Keng (陸
鏗) spoke. He said that he had contacted those who were close to Deng Xiaoping 
and talked about Deng‘s opinion on the issues regarding the Diaoyu Islands.  
Lu‘s comments angered those who held the ROC flag, who stood up and accused 
Lu of being a ‗traitor‘ (賣國賊)636 because they thought Lu was speaking on 
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behalf of Deng Xiaoping.
637
  Others who spoke at the gathering included Cheung 
Man-kwong and Szeto Wah.  The small incident at Victoria Park illustrates how 
the Baodiao campaign was plagued by politics, whether it be Chinese politics or 
local politics.  Even in 1996, the legacy of the CCP-ROC struggle still had some 
influence on the expression of China-orientated nationalism. 
Continuity: Actors in the Two Baodiao Campaigns in Hong Kong 
in 1971 and 1996  
Some of the 1996 activists, such as David Chan Yuk-cheung (陳毓祥) 
and some members of the Democracy Party,
638
 who participated in the 1996 
campaign had already been involved in the 1970s campaign and in the protest 
against Japan in 1982 regarding the textbook controversy.  David Chan in 
particular served as a significant symbol for the 1996 campaign. He had been 
involved in the first campaign in 1971 as a high school student,
639
 and his 
presence provided both continuity and a source of inspiration for other activists, 
both old and new to the campaign.  Although the leading activists‘ involvement 
provided continuity, their involvement alone does not explain why the 1996 
campaign broke out.  Moreover, why did the 1996 campaign attract more 
attention and responses compared to the previous campaigns?  To answer these 
questions we need to examine the wider social and political contexts and the 
Baodiao leaders‘ background. 
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The 1997 Psyche: The Social and Political Factors 
The 1996 Baodiao campaign must be analysed against the social and 
political contexts of Hong Kong on the eve of the 1997 handover.  While there is 
no concrete proof to show that every Hong Kong citizen who participated in the 
1996 campaign did so because of a need to show loyalty on the eve of 1997, there 
is some evidence that the psychological pressure in relation to 1997 might have 
prompted some Hong Kong people to participate in the Baodiao phenomenon.  
First, according to one survey conducted in July 1996, there was a noticeable 
increase in the number of people who identified themselves as ‗Chinese‘, from 
nineteen per cent in 1993 to 30 per cent in April 1996.
640
  However, in another 
survey, over 50 per cent of Hong Kong youth identified themselves as ‗Hong 
Kong people‘.641.  These surveys show that although the Hong Kong identity 
remained strong, the handover did have a psychological impact on Hong Kong 
people‘s attitude towards China.  Therefore, the large-scale participation in the 
1996 campaign could be in part explained by the 1997 psyche and the sudden 
surge of nationalistic feelings.   
Secondly, Hong Kong had been in a struggle regarding greater democracy 
since the late 1980s and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the massive 
response to June Fourth was the product of the Chinese democracy movement as 
well as Hong Kong‘s own struggle for democracy.  The late 1990s saw much 
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greater participation by Hong Kong people in local politics.  In March 1995, 
elections for the Urban Council and the Regional Council were held and 560,000 
electors turned out to vote.  In September, the Legislative Council elections were 
held and it was the first time in Hong Kong history the Council was wholly 
elected.  The geographical elections had a record turnout of 920,000 and the 
functional constituency elections had a record turnout of 460,000.
642
 
Therefore, while some of the participants in the 1996 Baodiao campaign 
might have been driven by a sense of nationalism in opposing Japan‘s claims to 
the islands, it is possible that the 1996 campaign provided some with an 
emotional outlet for their concern over the future of Hong Kong on the eve of 
1997.
643
  Of course, the lack of action on the part of the Chinese government 
could be another contributing factor.
644
  However, can we use the same 
arguments to explain the leaders‘ intentions and participation in the 1996 
campaign?  I shall examine the motives of the leading activists separately, for 
some of them were political activists and/or had a very different background 
compared to the masses, and thus I believe they had specific reasons to 
participate in the campaign. 
For leading Baodiao activist David Chan Yuk-cheung, the reasons for 
participating in the campaign appear to have been personal.  Chan was in the 7 
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July demonstration during the 1971 Baodiao campaign and was a prominent 
figure of the China Faction during his studies at the University of Hong Kong in 
the 1970s.
645
  Chan originally held a negative view of the Cultural Revolution in 
China, but a trip to Yan‘an sparked his nationalistic sentiments as he was inspired 
by Mao‘s teachings.646  Chan graduated from the University of Hong Kong in 
1975, worked for Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) for over ten years and 
hosted public affairs shows on television.   After the Tiananmen Square protests 
of 1989, Chan was so shocked by the events of 4 June that he became a monk for 
a week.
647
  In an essay written in 1990, Chan admitted that June Fourth shattered 
his ‗China dream‘ and that he decided to remake his ‗Hong Kong dream‘ and 
‗China dream‘.648  In 1991, Chan was a candidate in the Legislative Council 
elections where he adopted the slogan ‗staying in Hong Kong and building Hong 
Kong‘ (留港建港).  Chan lost in the Legislative Council elections in 1991 and 
again in 1995, and in the 1995 Urban Council elections.
649
  It was reported that 
Chan lost the elections because a group of people, including the political activist 
entertainer Johnny Shum, exposed his background as a member of the China 
Faction in a newspaper advertisement.
650
  In my opinion, the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign provided Chan an opportunity to renew and promote not only his 
nationalistic ideals, but his political aspirations for Hong Kong‘s future. 
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 Ho Chun-yan (Albert Ho) was another leader in the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign, but his background was different from that of David Chan.  Although 
Ho was active in student politics when he was a student at the University of Hong 
Kong in the early 1970s, he was not in the China Faction.  In fact, he was not on 
good terms with the China Faction, and he attempted to challenge the China 
Faction‘s domination over the student movement.651  Ho graduated in 1974, but 
even after his graduation, he was criticised, in 1976, by pro-China students as a 
troublemaker who had attempted to cause divisions in the student movement in 
1973.
652
  Ho believed he was criticised because of his critical views on the 
Cultural Revolution.  In 1996, Ho was a legislator of the Democratic Party and 
had been involved in the Hong Kong democracy movement in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  It is apparent that Ho participated in the 1996 Baodiao campaign 
not because he was pro-China, but rather for Hong Kong-orientated political 
reasons.  The reported arrest of Chinese Baodiao activist Tong Zeng (童增) in 
mid-September might also have provoked the Democrats in Hong Kong, 
including Tsang Kin-sing (曾建成), who had been a democracy activist since 
Hong Kong‘s response to June Fourth in 1989 and perceived the arrest as a sign 
that the Chinese government was suppressing the Baodiao campaign.
653
  Why did 
the Democratic Party and democracy activists participate in the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign?  To answer this question it might be useful to examine the political 
context before and after the 1996 campaign. 
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Political Factors: The Democrats in 1996 
 Relations between the Democrats and Beijing became severely strained 
after the 1989 pro-democracy movement.  It was suggested that the Democrats 
were involved in the 1996 Baodiao campaign as an attempt to repair their 
relations with Beijing.  There is no solid proof for that theory.  In fact, the 
Democrats had been very outspoken about their political stance since the 1980s 
particularly following their response to June Fourth in 1989.  In any case, with 
the benefit of hindsight, there is no doubt that the months in which the 1996 
Baodiao campaign occurred were also a politically turbulent period in Hong 
Kong politics.  There was a race involving over 5,800 people trying to get into 
the 400-member Selection Committee,
654
 the official body with the power to elect 
the first chief executive and shape ‗the major arms of the first SAR 
government‘. 655   The Selection Committee and the candidates in the chief 
executive election made headlines in the press at the same time as the Baodiao 
fever did.  Moreover, shortly after the decline of the Baodiao phenomenon, the 
new post-1997 Legislative Council was announced and no one from the 
Democratic Party was included.
656
  On 2 October, Hong Kong‘s last Governor 
Chris Patten made his final policy address, which caused a stir in the media, for 
in it Patten made the accusation that ‗some people‘ in Hong Kong could be 
giving away Hong Kong‘s autonomy ‗bit by bit‘.657  The Democrats were known 
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for their opposition to the Provisional Legislative Council.
658
  Taking all the 
political factors and Albert Ho‘s personal background into account, it would not 
be unreasonable to argue that the democrats probably used the Baodiao campaign 
as part of their political campaign to voice their frustration at Beijing‘s control 
over the future of Hong Kong.  Notably, though, they did so by means of 
expressing patriotic sentiments over the Biaodiao issue at a time when Beijing 
was relatively silent on the issue., Thus, when confronted with the criticism that 
the Democrats participated in the Baodiao campaign to show their loyalty to the 
central Chinese government at an auspicious time before the handover, Cheung 
Man-kwong of the Democratic Party, for example, argued that when it came to 
matters regarding Chinese patriotism, political interests were not part their 
consideration.
659
  Both Cheung and Albert Ho constructed the Baodiao campaign 
as an ‗anti-imperialist‘ campaign.660  I shall examine Ho‘s rhetoric in more detail 
in the final section of the chapter.  
Immediate Trigger: Japan’s Claim to the Islands in 1996 
  While the psychological pressure on Hong Kong people on the eve of 
1997 and the Democrats‘ political agenda were the main causes of the 1996 
Baodiao campaign, one should also take into consideration the more immediate 
external trigger: Japan‘s claim to the islands in 1996.  In 1996, several Japanese 
government officials, including Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko, claimed that 
the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan.  Ikeda on several occasions, including 
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during his visit to Hong Kong, asserted Japanese sovereignty over the islands.
661
  
The Consul-General of Japan in Hong Kong stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue 
was merely a minor incident, and, like Ikeda, asserted Japanese sovereignty over 
the islands.
662
  Adding insult to injury, members of the Japan Youth Federation, 
an extreme nationalist group, constructed a lighthouse and a war memorial on one 
of the islands.
663
  These events sparked off major repercussions in Hong Kong.  
On 16 September 1996, 13,000 people including representatives from Taiwan 
and Macau participated in a protest march. During the march, Jin Jieshou from 
Taipei waved the ROC flag while some waved the PRC flag.  The protest called 
for a boycott of Japanese goods and participants yelled slogans such as ‗down 
with Japanese militarism‘.664  However, not all responded to the call for a boycott 
of Japanese goods.
665
   
On 18 September 1996, which marked the sixty-seventh anniversary of 
the Shenyang Incident (瀋陽事變/九一八事變), the Hong Kong Democratic 
Party held a protest at the Cultural Centre in Kowloon.  Five hundred thousand 
students from 600 schools mourned in a moment of silence to commemorate the 
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anniversary.  The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) 
organised a signature campaign, which saw the collection of about 760,000 
signatures, which were given to the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong.  
The Hok Yau Club submitted 50,000 signatures.
666
  While nationalistic 
sentiments were surging in the colony, the most daring of the activists, in order to 
escalate the protest, made plans to sail to the islands. 
First Trip to the Diaoyu Islands: Kien Hwa 2’s Baodiao Activists 
Divided 
On 26 September 1996, seventeen activists led by David Chan Yuk-
Cheung embarked for the Diaoyu Islands.  The trip was organised hastily as the 
planning took only a month or so before the group‘s departure.  Wong‘s memoir 
provides many details of the first trip, particularly interactions between the 
activists.
667
  Officially, tanker captain Ngai Lup-chee and David Chan were the 
‗commanders-in-chief‘.668  The rest of the team were divided into three groups, 
with five members in each, all led by Chui Yuk-chun (徐玉親), a full-time 
fireman and part-time lifeguard, who was handpicked by Ngai to be leader of the 
team.  Other members such as Wong, Kwok Chung-man, and Fung Ho-shum had 
experience on the sea.  Conversely, David Chan had almost no nautical 
experience.  It is not surprising that there would be conflicts between the 
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members when it came to execution of plans.  In fact, when the activists decided 
to have people jump into the water they could not agree on the method to tie them 
together.
669
  There were also other times when there were arguments between the 
activists.
670
 
It was reported that five members including Chan threw themselves off 
the 32-year-old vessel Kien Hwa 2 (建華二號) as a gesture symbolising Chinese 
sovereignty over the islands.  According to the memoir by Wong Wai-ming (黃
偉明), a Baodiao activist on board Kien Hwa 2, three of the five who jumped 
climbed back up onto the deck, while Chan and another person were still 
struggling in the water.  Three were tied together by ropes.
671
  Chan was the last 
to be rescued, but was pronounced dead from drowning by a Japanese doctor 
three hours after the accident.
672
 
 Who should be blamed for the accident?  The question was discussed in 
the media following the group‘s return to Hong Kong.673  Wong Wai-ming never 
blamed anyone in particular, although he did question the captain‘s decision to let 
the activists jump into the water.  Wong remarked that the captain was under 
much pressure from the activists, who certainly did not want to return to Hong 
Kong without doing something significant.
674
  The fact that the captain gave his 
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permission too quickly was confirmed by a newspaper report as well.
675
  Other 
activists who were on the boat never blamed Ngai Lap-chee.  In fact, they clearly 
showed their support for Ngai on their return to Hong Kong.
676
  Even experts 
commented that although Ngai was the captain, the activists were not officially 
under his command like professional sailors, and that their activities were of a 
political nature, something Ngai could not have had complete control over.  
According to Wong‘s account, Ngai himself urged the activists to jump into the 
water as he thought it was their only chance to do so.
677
  According to a magazine 
report, Ngai admitted that he allowed the activists to jump into the water because 
he saw that they were disappointed when the original plan to land on the island 
was cancelled.
678
  The tragedy illustrates how in a nationalistic movement 
emotions could run high to the point where they overrode rational thinking, and 
how a nationalist fever could affect the activists. 
The death of David Chan reinforced the Baodiao sentiments of Hong 
Kong people.
679
  In Hong Kong approximately 30,000 gathered in Victoria Park 
to mourn Chan‘s death, hailed him as a martyr, and stressed unity in the Baodiao 
campaign.
680
  Chan was hailed by the Hong Kong media such as the Ming Pao 
Daily News as a martyr for the cause.  One commentator in Apple Daily hailed 
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Chan as a ‗true patriot‘ and criticised Hong Kong politicians as ‗fake patriots‘.681  
Cheung Man-kwong (張文光), a member of the Legislative Council (Legco) and 
of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of 
China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會), stated that the death of Chen 
united all political groups and Baodiao activists in Hong Kong.
682
 
Li Yi, who had been critical of the surge of nationalistic sentiments from 
the beginning, stated that the two governments should make clear their positions 
on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute otherwise more ‗would sacrifice themselves for 
the sake of protecting Chinese territory‘.683  Like the case of Tsang Tak-sing in 
the 1967 riots, the death of David Chan in 1996 shows how martyrs of 
nationalism were constructed by the media, and stories of these martyrs sparked 
more discussions about patriotism.  At the same time, Chan‘s death brought 
Chan‘s family and fellow Baodiao activists pain.  Johnny Shum, a Baodiao 
activist in 1971 and a well-known democracy activist in 1989, was devastated by 
Chan‘s death.684   
October 1996: Second Trip to the Diaoyu Islands 
 The second trip to the Diaoyu Islands was a joint operation of Hong Kong 
and Taiwan activists.  They were led by Hong Kong activist Albert Ho Chun-yan 
(何俊仁) of the Democratic Party, and Taiwanese activist Jin Jieshou (金介壽).  
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The fact that both Albert Ho and Tsang Kin-sing were members of the 
Democratic Party did not mean that all members of the Democratic Party 
supported Tsang‘s plan to sail to the Diaoyu Islands.  It was reported that initially 
his plan was criticised by the majority of Democratic Party members.  Under the 
influence of the media as well as the surge of nationalistic sentiments among the 
masses, the Democratic Party eventually decided to lead the Baodiao 
campaign.
685
 
On the night of 6 October, activists embarked on a joint expedition to the 
Diaoyu Islands on 39 fishing boats carrying about 200 activists as well as 
journalists, from the Taiwanese port Jilong/Keelung (基隆).  Of the 200 activists, 
about 90 were from Hong Kong and the rest were from Taiwan.  Officially, the 
objective of the trip was the ‗display of sovereignty‘, but Ho, the leader of Hong 
Kong activists, did not rule out the possibility of landing on the islands and 
dismantling the lighthouse built by the Japan Youth Federation.
686
  On 7 October, 
at approximately 3am, as the activists were about 20 miles from the Diaoyu 
Islands, Japanese coast guards appeared attempting to intercept the fishing 
boats.
687
  Two activists, Chan Yu-lam (陳裕南), a taxi driver from Hong Kong,688 
and Taiwanese representative Jin Jieshou of the pro-unification New Party 
successfully evaded the Japanese coast guards and landed on one of the islands at 
6:14am.  Chan planted the PRC flag while Jin planted the ROC flag.
689
  Chan Yu-
                                                     
685
 Ming Pao Daily News, 16 December 1998. 
686
 Ming Pao Daily News, 5 October 1996, p.A2. 
687
 Ming Pao Daily News, 8 October 1996, p.A2. 
688
 Ibid.  See also Next Magazine, 344, 11 October 1996, pp.43-55. 
689
 Giovanni Segni, ‗The Diaoyu Tai Dispute Implications Regarding Chinese National Identity 
and Cross-straits Relations‘, Asian Profile, 26, 1, 1998, pp.1-8.  See also Next Magazine, 344, 11 
October 1996, pp.43-55; and Ming Pao Daily News, 8 October 1996, p.A2. 
240 
 
lam, who happened to be standing next to Tsang Kin-sing, second-in-charge of 
the operation, when Tsang was giving orders to the group in Keelong the night 
before the operation, was asked by Tsang to participate in the landing.
690
  Chan 
and Tsang were good friends and were on the same boat as Jin Jieshou during the 
operation.
691
  Chan planted not only the PRC flag but also a yellow flag 
containing hundreds of Hong Kong people‘s signatures proclaiming ‗Chinese 
territory Diaoyu Islands‘.692 
Politics of the 1996 Baodiao Campaign on a Macro-level: Hong 
Kong versus Taiwan 
On the surface when the PRC and ROC flags were planted side by side it 
looked as if Hong Kong and Taiwan activists worked together in the campaign to 
defend the Diaoyu Islands, but there was an occasion where Taiwanese activists 
clashed with Hong Kong activists due to the former‘s political agenda.  In fact, 
the planting of two flags only served to signify how problematic and limited 
China-orientated nationalism was in the Baodiao movement in the context of 
cross-strait relations between greater China and Taiwan.  Several observations 
can be made regarding the complex nature of the politics of the movement.  First, 
some of the Taiwanese activists were fighting for Taiwan‘s fishing rights and 
believed the islands belonged to Taiwan. It has been argued that for the 
Taiwanese, Baodiao was about  the ROC‘s claim to the islands and, as part of this, 
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Taiwanese fishing rights.
693
  This is not at all surprising considering it has been 
stated that the islands are surrounded by rich fish stocks and undersea oil 
resources.
694
  The pro-independence Taiwanese activists in fact had a negative 
opinion of the Hong Kong Baodiao campaign and even held a hostile attitude 
towards Hong Kong people during the campaign,
695
 believing that the islands 
belonged to the ROC.
696
  In fact, there was an incident in which pro-
independence Taiwanese activists shouted at Hong Kong activists outside their 
hotel. 
An analogy has been drawn between the case of the PRC and that of the 
ROC in terms of official attitudes and interests: that both mainland China and 
Taiwan had their own political and economic considerations and were therefore 
reluctant to take rash political actions regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.
697
  
In this sense, the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue became not just an outlet of Chinese 
nationalistic sentiments, but also a battleground taken up by dissidents in China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan who could use the issue to portray themselves as the 
defenders of Chinese or Taiwanese sovereignty and economic interests.   
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Divisions among Local Politicians in Hong Kong 
 In Hong Kong, not all politicians participated in the Baodiao campaign.  
Some of them simply had no interest in the campaign at all.  Tsang Yok-sing (曾
鈺成) of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong 
(DAB), for instance, believed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute should be settled 
through diplomatic means, and urged that people in Hong Kong stay calm in the 
‗fight against Japanese militarism‘.698  Christine Loh Kung-hui (陸恭蕙) did not 
participate in Baodiao, and, like Tsang, believed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue 
should be settled by the Chinese and Japanese governments.
699
   
The Baodiao phenomenon also reflected divisions among Hong Kong 
people, especially among the democratic camp.  Some of the local politicians of 
the democratic forces, such as Emily Lau Wai-hing (劉慧卿) of The Frontier (前
綫) Party, stated that her party gave priority not to Chinese patriotism but to local 
issues such as democratisation in Hong Kong and the welfare of Hong Kong 
people.
700
  Emily Lau in fact regarded herself as a ‗British citizen of Chinese 
descent‘. 701   However, Lee Cheuk-yan, from the same party as Lau, did 
participate in the Baodiao campaign.
702
  On the other side of the democratic camp, 
politicians such as Cheung Man-kwong (張文光), Szeto Wah (司徒華), and 
Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁), who were core members of the Action Committee 
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for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (保釣行動委員會), had actively supported the 
1989 Chinese student democratic movement, the protests against Japanese 
altering of textbooks in 1982, and the 1996 Baodiao campaign.
703
  In short, the 
1996 Baodiao campaign reveals the subtle differences among the democratic 
forces in terms of individuals‘ beliefs and actions when it comes to China-related 
issues and nationalist movements. 
Divisions among Tertiary Student Groups 
 Although tertiary students did participate in the Baodiao campaign, it was 
reported that they were divided in their opinions on the campaign.  In fact, some 
students decided not to join the large-scale protest march of 15 September and 
instead held their own protest.  The reason behind this move, according to the 
spokesperson of the group, was to show that students had a ‗separate identity‘, 
and that they were not involved in politics.
704
  However, a small number of 
representatives from the HKFS did participate in the 15 September protest march.  
On another occasion, students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong even 
complained how everyone was only concerned about the Diaoyutai islands but 
forgot about the issue regarding the HKSAR Chief Executive Selection 
Committee.
705
  A committee member of the HKFS remarked that students within 
the HKFS were divided into three groups as far as their opinions were concerned.  
There were those who did not wish to say anything about the sovereignty issue 
surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, although they would support activities with a 
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focus on the rhetoric of anti-imperialism (Japan‘s claim to the Diaoyu Islands).  
Another group of students believed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, 
and that group had a strong sense of nationalism.  The third group was 
completely against the Baodiao campaign because these students believed it was 
more important to protest against the Selection Committee and that the Baodiao 
phenomenon took the focus away from the more pressing issues regarding the 
future of Hong Kong.
706
 
Apathy: Limited Response from the Chinese Government 
The Beijing government‘s concerns were two-fold.  For the PRC 
government the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was about 
maintaining a balance between its own political legitimacy by appealing to 
popular nationalistic sentiments, and economic development by ensuring access 
to the international economy, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident.
707
  However, the 1996 Baodiao campaign was too important to 
ignore.
708
  It was reported that the official view of the CCP was that it 
sympathised with the grass-root movement but also wanted to ensure that it 
would not get out of control.
709
  Official responses from the PRC were vague and 
at times appeared to be contradictory.  The cautious approach employed by 
Chinese authorities is clearly reflected by their responses in both mainland China 
and Hong Kong. 
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The Chinese government attempted to distance itself from and suppress 
the Baodiao campaign within China.  For instance, it was reported in September 
1996 that authorities asked Chinese Baodiao activists to leave Beijing for fear 
that their activities would have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations.
710
  
Conversely, in Hong Kong, the campaign was both a political and grass-root 
campaign as politicians along with citizens from all walks of life participated.  
For example, Leung Chi-hung (梁智鴻), chairman of the House Committee of 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council, sent a letter on behalf of the Legislative 
Council to the Japanese Prime Minister‘s office to protest Japan‘s claim to the 
Diaoyu Islands.
711
 
Sympathy and Apathy: Responses from Chinese Officials in Hong 
Kong 
Responses from Chinese officials in Hong Kong illustrate the complexity 
of the Chinese government‘s attitude towards the Baodiao campaign.  On more 
than one occasion, Chinese officials dealing with Hong Kong spoke positively 
about the Baodiao campaign and about Chan‘s work and character.  Zhou Nan 
(周南), the head of the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong and the highest level 
Chinese official in Hong Kong, on hearing that Chan had drowned openly urged 
that others whose lives were at risk be helped by any boat nearby, ‗regardless of 
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which country it was‘, 712  and praised Chan for being  a patriot. 713   Zhang 
Junsheng of the Xinhua Agency also praised Chan for his work as a patriot.  The 
flag that was used to cover Chan‘s coffin at his funeral was donated by the 
Xinhua Agency.  Statements by Chinese officials in Hong Kong should not be 
construed as meaning the Chinese government fully supported the grass-roots 
Baodiao campaign.  The focus of Chinese officials‘ comments was on Chan‘s life 
and character rather than on the Baodiao campaign, although Zhang did speak 
positively about the campaign as a ‗patriotic campaign‘.714  
On 13 September 1996, it was reported that the Xinhua Agency in Hong 
Kong refused to accept a letter from the Action Committee for Defending the 
Diaoyu Islands (保釣行動委員會) protesting against the Chinese government‘s 
crackdown on the Baodiao campaign in mainland China.
715
  It is clear that the 
Chinese government‘s official attitude was to strike a balance between Baodiao 
patriotism and political stability particularly in terms of China‘s foreign policy.716  
It is important to recognise that the PRC government was put in a difficult 
position by the Baodiao campaign.  The nationalistic sentiments of Baodiao 
could be advantageous for the PRC.  Conversely, the PRC feared that Baodiao 
might turn into a democratic, anti-government movement like the Tiananmen 
protests..
717
  The Chinese government was often criticised by Hong Kong media 
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and commentators for its relative silence,
718
  despite the PRC‘s reiterations that 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were Chinese territory.
719
  Of course, the PRC‘s 
relative silence was neither unfounded nor unsound, for Japan was China‘s major 
economic partner.
720
 
What is striking about the 1996 Baodiao campaign is that groups in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and the overseas Chinese community were all major voices against 
Japan.
721
  The response from China, on both the official and popular levels, was 
not as strong as that from the periphery.  The official Chinese newspaper 
Guangming Ribao (光明日報), for example, did not mention anything regarding 
the Baodiao campaign or any issues about the status of the islands when the 
campaign was at its peak.
722
  The relative silence among the mainland media was 
in line with the cautious approach taken by the Beijing government.  In view of 
the reluctance of the PRC to deal with the issue, it is not difficult to understand 
why it came under attack particularly from Hong Kong-based journalists.  
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Commentators argued that although the PRC government verbally placed 
emphasis on territorial integrity, it was not prepared to take actions regarding the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku incident.
723
  They also argued that the PRC and ROC 
governments‘ relative silence upset Hong Kong Chinese and the 1996 protests 
were in fact targeted at the two governments.
724
  Therefore, instead of viewing 
the 1996 Baodiao campaign as simply a ‗nationalist‘ campaign, we can argue that 
it was also a campaign to criticise the Chinese government for its reluctance to 
take action against Japan‘s claim to the Diaoyu Islands. 
Media Responses to the 1996 Baodiao Campaign 
Throughout the Baodiao campaign, the Chinese-language media in Hong 
Kong acted as a significant agent in the dissemination of nationalistic sentiments.  
The English language reports contrasted sharply with Chinese language 
newspapers, which often contained passionate responses to the campaign, 
particularly in the editorial and letters-to-the-editor sections.    Terms such as 
‗aggression‘ and ‗threat‘ were used by the Chinese-language media to describe 
Japan‘s actions.725  .  Japan‘s role as the aggressor in WWII was constantly 
reiterated and emphasised in magazines and newspapers. 
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Hong Kong Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang (陳方安生), 
during her visit to Australia, when asked about the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue, used 
the Japanese term ‗Senkaku‘ instead of the Chinese term ‗Diaoyu‘.  After her 
return to Hong Kong Anson Chan was soon confronted by the media regarding 
her use of the Japanese name for the islands.  Anson Chan stressed that she used 
the Japanese term simply because it was a non-Chinese reporter who asked her 
the question, that she believed it would be clearer to use the English translation 
‗Senkaku‘, and that it was not her intention to convey any sort of subtle political 
innuendo by using the Japanese term.
726
 
War in the Media: Popular Nationalism as Censorship 
During the campaign, the Hong Kong media were criticised for 
overreacting.  Hong Kong-based Japanese journalist Arai Hifumi (新井ひふみ, 
新井 一 二 三 ), for example, criticised the Hong Kong media for inciting 
nationalistic sentiments.  In the Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily (蘋果日報) 
Arai argued that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue was blown out of proportion, that the 
issue should be left to the Chinese and Japanese governments to resolve, that the 
Baodiao phenomenon in Hong Kong was caused by Hong Kong‘s pre-1997 
political and psychological tensions and was utilised by some to expose the 
inability of the PRC, and that Japanese people became the victims of Hong Kong 
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people‘s ‗blowing off steam‘.727  Arai also noted in the 3 October issue of Far 
Eastern Economic Review: 
The Chinese government has been promoting nationalism in the territory 
as the handover approaches.  Hong Kong people have increasingly been 
under political pressure to keep in line with Beijing. 
It is no secret the citizens of Hong Kong are disillusioned by the Chinese 
government, feeling that the promise of ‗Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong‘ has become nothing more than an empty slogan.  Their frustration 
was suppressed until a handful of Japanese extremists provided them with 
an emotional outlet… 
The current fury over the Diaoyu Islands has more to do with Hong Kong 
people‘s frustration towards Beijing than anything else.  Japan is an easy 
target, not only because of its record of aggression but also because of its 
insensitivity towards Asian neighbours … I personally hope the two 
governments will resolve the dispute peacefully.  However, that might not 
be what nationalistic Hong Kong wishes to see.  They want to have a say, 
if only to blow off steam.
728
 
Taking into account Hong Kong‘s political circumstances in 1996, which 
I explained at the beginning of the chapter, we can see that there is some element 
of truth to Arai‘s comments.  However, I do not believe that Hong Kong people 
were trying to show their loyalty to Beijing through the Baodiao campaign, for 
they were very outspoken against Beijing‘s handling of the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989.  Further, Hong Kong people made it clear in their response to 
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June Fourth that they were concerned about the future of Hong Kong more than 
anything and this did not necessarily mean that they were trying to show their 
loyalty to Beijing through the 1996 Baodiao campaign.   
Nevertheless, I agree with Arai‘s view that the true concern of Hong 
Kong people in the 1996 Baodiao campaign was Hong Kong‘s future, not 
Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands; and that the real target was Beijing, 
not Japan.  Both the Diaoyutai issue and Hong Kong‘s return to China were 
related to the issue of territorial sovereignty.  It was natural for Hong Kong 
people to link them together not because of their desire to respond to China‘s call 
for patriotism, but because of their concern over the future of Hong Kong.  In 
short, the 1996 Baodiao phenomenon represented Hong Kong people‘s own 
interpretation of what it meant to be a patriot, which was fuelled by their concern 
over the colony‘s future and to some extent Hong Kong‘s struggle for democracy.  
In fact, a commentator argued if Hong Kong people were willing to defend some 
islands that were unrelated to them, then obviously they would be determined to 
defend Hong Kong‘s future.  Therefore, the Baodiao campaign represented Hong 
Kong people‘s expression of their determination to defend not only the Diaoyu 
Islands but also, more importantly, Hong Kong.
729
  Moreover, I believe that those 
participating in the Baodiao campaign, particularly the Democrats, probably 
wanted to voice their frustration not only at Beijing‘s inability to deal with the 
Diaoyutai issue but more importantly her tight rein over the development of 
democracy in Hong Kong.  Japan and ‗Japanese militarism‘ were merely a 
                                                     
729
 Jin Zhong 金鐘, ‗Minzu zhuyi zai fangxing‘ 民族主義再反省 (Rethinking Nationalism), Open 
Magazine 開放雜誌, 118, October 1996, p.6. 
252 
 
convenient scapegoat and tool for expressing that frustration.  However, such 
critical views were not welcomed when the Baodiao fever was at its peak.  Arai 
immediately came under attack from readers of Apple Daily as well as Hong 
Kong people from various backgrounds.
730
  In her column in Apple Daily, for 
example, Arai said that she received a letter from a reader accusing her for being 
‗shameless‘.731  She was under so much pressure that she stopped writing in 
Apple Daily starting from early October.   
Similar to Arai, Li Yi (李怡), founder of Qishi niandai (七十年代), was 
critical of the 1996 Baodiao campaign from the beginning and contended that it 
was linked to the 1997 psyche of Hong Kong people.
 732   
Li was severely 
criticised by Hong Kong commentators for distorting the truth about Baodiao, 
including the aims of the campaign and the intentions of the activists; and for 
ignoring the fact that the 1996 campaign had its origins in the 1970s student 
movement.
733
  The fact that Arai Hifumi and Li Yi were criticised illustrates the 
sensitivity prevalent among Hong Kong media and society during the 1996 
Baodiao campaign.  One‘s freedom to voice his/her own opinions were 
constrained when nationalistic emotions ran high, regardless of whether such 
opinions were reasonable or not.  This is ironic, for Hong Kong has been widely 
known to embrace and promote freedom of speech and expression, as opposed to 
the mainland China where censorship and central control were strictly reinforced.  
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Arai felt frustrated and argued that even though Hong Kong was not yet handed 
back to China, already Hong Kong people wanted to have her silenced.
734
 
Constructing a Rhetoric of China-Orientated Nationalism: 
Leading Activists’ Perspectives 
The Chinese-language press was not the only agent in the construction of 
the Baodiao nationalist rhetoric.  Leading Baodiao activists such as Albert Ho 
and Leung Kwok-hung developed a clear, detailed nationalist rhetoric based on 
the idea of ‗anti-imperialism‘, 735   a term that fit the fact that the Baodiao 
campaign was not simply about reasserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands.  
The leading activists simply argued that the whole Baodiao phenomenon 
represented a battle against the revival of Japanese militarism.  Albert Ho, in a 
foreword to a book on the Baodiao movement published in Taiwan in 1997, 
claimed: 
The Baodiao movement is not a narrow-minded nationalist movement, 
because we are not supporting China in regaining the Diaoyu Islands for 
the sake of expanding its borders.  Japan knew that the Diaoyu Islands 
were not part of their territory, but exploited the special circumstances in 
the postwar environment to continue her ambition to expand her territory 
and aggression.  For this reason, we promote the Baodiao movement for 
the sake of dealing a blow to Japan‘s ambition of aggression; and for the 
sake of making Japan come to terms with history and learn from the lesson; 
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and to apologise and pay compensation to the nations and peoples who had 
been victims of her invasion.
736
 
Ho‘s rhetoric was problematic for several reasons.  First, Japan was not 
rearming nor did she send troops to claim the islands in 1996.  The Japanese 
right-wing group Japan Youth Federation (日本青年社) that built the lighthouse 
on the Diaoyu Islands did not represent the Japanese government, nor was the 
group part of the Japanese military forces.
737
  Second, despite Ho‘s claim that the 
Baodiao campaign was not an anti-Japanese movement, it did become one 
because there was a boycott of Japanese goods and some Japanese residents in 
Hong Kong, including Arai Hifumi, were threatened.
738
  Further, given Ho‘s 
background as a Democrat, the fact that the 1996 Baodiao campaign coincided 
with the election of HKSAR‘s first Chief Executive, and the fact that shortly after 
the campaign all the Democrats were forced to step down because of Beijing‘s 
‗no-through-train‘ policy, it is quite possible that Ho and other Democrats 
participated in the campaign in an attempt to win the support of the public for the 
Democratic Party.  The Democrats probably used the Baodiao campaign as a tool 
to voice their frustration not only towards Beijing‘s inability to deal with the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku issue but more importantly Beijing‘s tight rein on the 
development of democracy in Hong Kong on the eve of 1997. 
Like Albert Ho, Leung Kwok-hung imagined the Baodiao campaign as a 
fight against Japanese imperialism.  In my interview with him in 2007 Leung still 
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claimed that the whole idea about the Baodiao movement was anti-imperialism 
(保釣運動實質在於反帝).739  We can trace Leung‘s rhetoric back to the late 
1970s when the small Trotskyist group Revolutionary Marxist League, of which 
Leung was then a member, used the same anti-imperialist rhetoric in its 
publication Zhan Xun to promote the 1978 Baodiao campaign.
740
  Leung related 
in the interview: 
It is just a protest against Japan‘s occupation of the Diaoyu 
Islands…You can say there is no need to protest, but if you do not 
protest against [Japan‘s] occupation [of the islands] how can you be 
against imperialism?  You can fight imperialism verbally, but in practice 
when all Chinese feel that this [Japan‘s claim to the islands] is an act of 
aggression, then we say this is an imperialist aggression and we are 
fighting it.
741
 
From the League‘s perspective, the Diaoyu Islands issue involved a collaborative 
relationship between Japanese imperialism and US imperialism, as it was the US 
that handed the Diaoyu Islands over to Japan.
742
  Taking into account the 
League‘s rhetoric in the 1978 campaign and the New Leftists‘ involvement in the 
1971 campaign, I believe Leung‘s participation in the 1996 Baodiao campaign 
was not necessarily because he was a patriot, but because of his background as a 
leftist whose main agendas were anti-capitalism and anti-colonialism.  Further, if 
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we take into account Leung‘s response to June Fourth in 1989, it is possible that 
Leung‘s real target was Beijing, and that Leung‘s real concern was the future of 
Hong Kong.  
What do Albert Ho and Leung Kwok-hung‘s rhetoric tell us about the 
China-orientated nationalism that they preached?  The nationalist rhetoric based 
on the concept of anti-imperialism was a deliberate construction by these leading 
Baodiao activists to represent their own political perspectives.  However, the 
Baodiao campaign grew out of Hong Kong‘s political circumstances in 1996.  
Arai Hifumi was correct in saying that anti-imperialism became a convenient 
banner for ordinary Baodiao participants in the movement, when their real 
concern was the future of Hong Kong.  However, the construction of the anti-
imperialist rhetoric by leading Baodiao activists was not the only striking feature 
of the 1996 Baodiao campaign.  The use of the PRC flag was also an important 
part of that construction. 
Symbolism: Use of the CCP Flag by Hong Kong Activists as a 
Symbol of Sovereignty 
As noted, during the 1996 campaign Hong Kong activists used the PRC 
flag as a symbol of Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, while 
activists from Taiwan used the ROC flag.  One question that might be asked is: 
why did Hong Kong activists use the PRC flag when those who participated in 
the campaign, particularly those from the Democratic Party and Leung Kwok-
hung, had been critical of the CCP, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen 
massacre?  Leung had long been involved in political movements since the 1970s 
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and is well known for his anti-CCP stance.  His leftist pro-democracy April Fifth 
Action group was formed in 1989 and called for more democracy and ‗an end to 
the dictatorship of the CCP‘.743  Leung had been involved in the 1971 Baodiao 
campaign when he was a 15-year-old student.  In 1996, Leung said that the flag 
represented not the CCP but the ‗spirit of 1.2 billion Chinese people‘.744  For 
Leung, it did not matter whether the flag was the ROC flag or the PRC flag; a 
Chinese flag that represented non-recognition of Japanese sovereignty was all 
that mattered.  Leung explained in my interview with him in 2007: 
‗If you were in a dispute with Japan, and you did not have another flag, then 
that flag  [the CCP flag] represented Chinese sovereignty, whether it be the 
Chinese Community Party or the Guomindang…unless we do not even talk 
about the state…Whether you planted the PRC or the ROC flag, at that point 
in time it represented a non-recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the 
islands.  But if this PRC flag were to be used for oppression of the Chinese 
people then I would not recognise it as the national flag.‘745 
Chan Yu-lam in fact helped Jin Jieshou plant the ROC flag after planting 
the CCP flag.  Therefore, it is clear that these activists were not concerned about 
the political agenda or the differences represented by the flags.  The use of the 
flag in the campaign shows that state flags could be used in nationalist campaigns 
by any activist who might not support the state represented by the flags.  In other 
words, there is no objective meaning to a state flag.  What the state flag 
represented was tied to the subjective interpretation or imagination of the activist 
who used it. 
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Decline and End of the 1996 Baodiao Campaign 
In Wong Wai-ming‘s memoir, written after the end of the 1996 campaign 
and shortly before the handover, he argued that activists‘ forced entry into the 
Japanese embassy on 9 October resulted in the decline of the campaign.  Wong 
argued that the incident created a negative image of the activists as well as of the 
campaign in the minds of the people of Hong Kong, and thus the incident ‗tainted 
the campaign‘.  Leung Kwok-hung, one of the 24 people who stormed into the 
Japanese consulate, refuted Wong‘s argument.  Leung believed that the Baodiao 
campaign quickly ended following the incident due to the lack of further action at 
that time, not because of his group‘s actions at the consulate.  However, Leung 
also commented in an interview: 
‗When you organise this kind of movement, it is often illegal.  What Mr. 
Wong said is meaningless because in 1997 we sailed to the islands 
again…What resulted in the decline of the movement was not because of that 
incident in the embassy; it was because the Chinese government repeatedly 
intervened, put pressure [on the people] and divided [us]… ‗The Chinese 
government always told the people not to organise the Baodiao movement, to 
sit down and talk and not to sail to the islands.  Later when we worked with 
Mainland activists the Chinese authorities took our boat‘746 
As to why the group forced its way into the embassy, Leung said they 
wanted to make Japanese authorities ‗experience what it was like to have its 
territory invaded‘.747  Wong also discussed this reasoning in his book, but argued 
against it.  In Wong‘s view, the laws must be observed, especially when Hong 
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Kong prides itself in the rule of law, and forced entry into an embassy is an 
irrational act.
748
   
In my opinion,  the real cause of the end of the Baodiao campaign 
involved Hong Kong politics.  After mid-October, there were no more reports on 
the campaign in the media, which turned its attention to the election of the first 
chief executive of the HKSAR, while activists such as Tsang Kin-sing and the 
Democrats turned their attention to the support of Chinese democracy activist 
Wang Dan.
749
  The 1996 Baodiao campaign illustrates that nationalistic 
movements in Hong Kong usually had a very short lifespan due to two factors: 
Hong Kong politics and the political agenda of the actors.  The 1996 Baodiao 
campaign lasted only four months and when leading activists turned their 
attention to other things the campaign quickly ended. 
Comparison between the 1971 and 1996 campaigns 
There are both similarities and differences between these Baodiao 
campaigns.  One similarity is that both the 1971 campaign and the 1996 
campaign were a product of Hong Kong politics.  Another similarity is that 
relations between the activists were not always amiable. It was unavoidable for 
Baodiao activists to disagree among themselves for various reasons.  In 1971, Ng 
Chung-yin and Mok Chiu-yu had different ideas about China-orientated 
nationalism, although both dismissed nationalism as an ‗outmoded‘ concept.  
Activists in 1971 were divided into two factions: a pro-China faction and an 
Anarchist/Trotskyist faction.  In 1996, despite differences in their political 
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agendas, groups from both the pro-democracy and pro-China camps participated 
in the campaign, including politicians who belonged to different political parties.  
However, Baodiao activists on the Kien Hwa 2 argued among themselves when it 
came to executing plans, as illustrated by the first trip to the Diaoyu Islands. 
Unlike the 1971 campaign, which at one point became a movement 
against colonialism due to the government‘s crackdown on the movement, the 
1996 campaign never became an anti-colonial government campaign.  In both the 
1971 and 1978 campaigns young people and students were the major forces, but 
the 1996 campaign, although led by the activists who had been politically active 
as students in the 1970s, included Hong Kong citizens from all walks of life, 
whether new to the Baodiao movement or ‗Baodiao veterans‘ (laobaodiao 老保
釣). 
Conclusion: Politics and the Construction of Irredentist 
Nationalism in the 1996 Campaign 
 The Baodiao campaign of 1996 followed the same pattern as other 
nationalist movements that had occurred in Hong Kong.  Although it appeared 
that the immediate, external trigger of the campaign was Japan‘s claim to the 
Diaoyu Islands, social and political factors were the true underlying causes of the 
1996 Baodiao phenomenon.  Like Hong Kong‘s response to June Fourth in 1989, 
the 1996 Baodiao campaign was largely a product of Hong Kong politics.  Hence, 
I argue that the Baodiao campaign was both a nationalist and political campaign. 
The campaign gave Hong Kong people the opportunity to rediscover and 
reconstruct their Chinese identity on the eve of the 1997 handover, and to 
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criticise Beijing for its reluctance to take action against Japan.  For Hong Kong 
politicians, it was an opportunity to promote themselves and to gain support from 
Hong Kong citizens. 
It is clear that the participants had differing motives.  Political pressures in 
relation to 1997 prompted some ordinary residents to participate.  For the 
Democrats, the Baodiao campaign was part of their political campaign to 
promote their agenda.  For David Chan, the Baodiao campaign provided an 
opportunity to promote his political career and to express his pro-China 
sentiments and his intention to ‗stay and build Hong Kong‘.  The 1996 campaign 
reflects not only the ‗identity crisis‘ that Hong Kong people had to face on the 
eve of 1997 but the complex political dynamics in the colony, particularly 
regarding the idea of democracy and how it could function as a motif in the 
nationalist rhetoric of the Democrats. 
Like all the other nationalist movements in Hong Kong that came before 
it, the 1996 Baodiao campaign was short-lived.  Politics, on both the local and 
macro levels, again came into play in the 1996 campaign.  Although it appeared 
that those involved in the campaign were united, some divisions could be seen 
among local politicians and student groups.  On a macro level, the 1996 
campaign exposed the weakness of China-orientated nationalism in the context of 
cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, as pro-independence Baodiao 
activists from Taiwan had their own agenda and their hostility towards the Hong 
Kong activists could be clearly seen when the latter stayed in Taiwan during the 
second trip.   
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Notably, from the perspective of some of the leading activists, the CCP 
flag that was planted by Hong Kong activist Chan Yu-nam in the second trip 
represented the Chinese nation, not necessarily the actual political state.  In this 
sense, what the flag represented was never set in stone.  The subjective 
interpretations of those participating in the Baodiao campaign determined what 
the flag represented, not objective interpretations.  
In the history of nationalism in colonial Hong Kong, both the 1989 pro-
democracy movement and the 1996 Baodiao campaign signified a new 
development.  While the rhetoric of nationalism remained tied to the political 
situation in greater China as well as Hong Kong, the rhetoric was no longer about 
the CCP-GMD struggle.  Local politics became increasingly significant as a 
dominant factor.  The rhetoric of nationalism starting in 1989 became linked 
particularly to the Democrats‘ political agenda..  In fact, the democrats made their 
mark in their support of 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement.   
In the previous chapter, I argued that Hong Kong people‘s nationalist 
response to June Fourth represented a convergence between Hong Kong‘s 
support of the Chinese democracy movement and Hong Kong‘s own struggle for 
democracy.  Similarly, I believe that the 1996 Baodiao campaign represented the 
construction and use of irredentist nationalism and anti-imperialism by certain 
Hong Kong people as a tactic to show their interests in both China and Hong 
Kong, political interests driven by the 1997 psyche.  Hence, I also argue that in 
both the 1989 and 1996 nationalist movements the China-orientated nationalism 
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was used by Hong Kong people as a way to express their determination to defend 
their political interests and concern over Hong Kong‘s future. 
 The Baodiao movement certainly did not end with the 1996 phase, even 
though it has not received as much media or public support as in 1996.  
Nonetheless, the movement has persisted during the years since Hong Kong‘s 
reversion to China in 1997.  With the gift of hindsight, taking into account the 
fact that since the handover relations between pro-democracy activists and 
Beijing were still strained, it is debatable that the campaign was ever a ‗show of 
loyalty to Beijing‘.   
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
Something called ‗China‘ unquestionably exists, but, more importantly, there is 
a multitude of expressions to denote different aspects of China and 
Chineseness.
750
 
                                          - Allen Chun 
For thirty years, I have been weaving my ‗Hong Kong dream‘, ‗China dream‘…. 
The sound of gun shots of June Fourth had shaken my ‗heart of China‘ and 
destroyed my ‗China dream‘.  But after much thought, I believe that staying in 
and building Hong Kong was the way to save Hong Kong and so I became 
involved in the ‗Hong Kong people building Hong Kong‘ movement to once 
again weave my ‗Hong Kong dream‘ and ‗China dream‘.751 
                                - David Chan Yuk-cheung 
China-orientated nationalism was a significant issue the Hong Kong 
colonial government, politicians, and some in the Chinese community had to 
grapple with from 1949 to 1997.  Nationalism was an important part of Hong 
Kong‘s political life in several ways: first, it prompted Hong Kong Chinese to 
think about what China meant for them.  Second, it provided Hong Kong Chinese 
an opportunity to express their concern over China as well as Hong Kong.  Third, 
nationalism was used as a tactic by Hong Kong-based political groups to promote 
their agenda and mobilise the masses.  Fourth, China-orientated nationalism had 
the dual effect of dividing and uniting some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese 
community.  Fifth, when nationalism jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens 
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and threatened the colony‘s security, the colonial government was forced to take 
action against it.  In that process nationalism brought the coloniser and the 
colonised closer as both sides desired security.  Sixth, nationalism was an issue 
generations of Hong Kong Chinese were exposed to whether they were politically 
active or not. 
This thesis has highlighted the fact that Hong Kong is a society of 
immigrants where people had both a Chinese identity and a colonial identity.  
China-centred nationalism contributed to political factionalism in Hong Kong 
political history.  Hong Kong Chinese, despite being colonial subjects under 
British rule, were willing to speak up for their concerns using nationalism.  Thus, 
Hong Kong people were clearly not politically apathetic.  Lastly, this thesis has 
highlighted the fact that political activism in Hong Kong on some occasions saw 
clashes between colonialism and some sectors of the Chinese community. 
This thesis is the first comprehensive study, in the field of Hong Kong 
colonial history that examines a series of episodes regarding China-orientated 
nationalism and links them together in a broader perspective, showing the 
continuities and changes in the meaning and politics of nationalism in the long 
period between 1949 and 1997.  It originated from a desire to understand why 
and how that nationalism was expressed.  This thesis demonstrates that the 
Chinese nation was imagined and acted out by a small minority of the Hong 
Kong Chinese community.  The historical, social, and political contexts of China 
and Hong Kong contributed to its construction and reshaping throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century.   In this period, the focus of that nationalism 
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was increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China, 
although the China factor remained a significant trigger of nationalist movements 
in the colony. 
Triggers and Patterns of Nationalism 
Post-1949 nationalist movements in Hong Kong were often short-lived for 
two reasons.  First, expressions of nationalism were tied to the volatile political 
situations both in modern Chinese history and in Hong Kong‘s modern history.  
Once triggered, nationalist sentiments swept across the colony as a minority 
within the Chinese community mobilised themselves quickly to express such 
sentiments openly.  At the same time, however, changes in the China factor and 
in the Hong Kong factor on several occasions directly resulted in the decline and 
end of nationalist movements, as illustrated by the 1967 riots, the case of the 
student-led China Faction in the 1970s, and the 1996 Baodiao campaigns. 
Second, because the people involved in these movements were not 
immune from the influence of Chinese and Hong Kong politics, their political 
focus at times changed quickly.  Moreover, activists leading the nationalist 
movements often had different opinions and political agendas, which created 
tensions among activists and undermined nationalist movements.  This is 
illustrated by the Third Force Movement in the 1950s, Hong Kong‘s response to 
June Fourth, and the 1971 and 1996 Baodiao campaigns.  That the nationalist 
movements and the actors involved in them were not immune from political 
influences also meant that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was open 
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to interpretation.  Actors constructed their own nationalist rhetoric and 
formulated their own strategy in expressing nationalism. 
Multiple Interpretations of Patriotism: Nationalism as a Tactic 
Before WWII, Hong Kong‘s Chinese elites were nationalistic yet they 
collaborated with the colonial government.  During the war against Japan, Hong 
Kong became a battleground in wartime political propaganda.  The Wang 
Jingwei faction promoted its collaborationist cause while mainland Chinese 
intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong supported the war effort.  In the 1930s, 
Chinese merchants promoted their products as ‗national goods‘ to protect their 
economic interests. 
In the 1950s, ‗China‘ carried different meanings for different sections of 
the Chinese community concerned about Chinese politics.  Those who were pro-
CCP believed that the ‗New China‘ was represented by the CCP, as opposed to 
those who identified with the GMD in Taiwan.  The Hong Kong-based Third 
Force activists believed that the ROC represented the ‗true China‘ and criticised 
both the CCP and the GMD and engaged themselves in political activities, while 
some Chinese intellectuals in exile promoted their nationalist rhetoric through a 
revival of traditional Chinese culture.  Starting from the 1980s, democracy 
became the central motif in the debate and construction of the rhetoric of China-
orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.  The fact that nationalism was open to 
interpretation and constructed by activists meant that motives and agendas were 
not always clear.  The cases of Hong Kong‘s response to June 4 in 1989 and the 
1996 Baodiao campaign show that while on the surface the focus of the two 
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nationalist movements was China, for Hong Kong people the real concern was 
for the future of Hong Kong.  These two cases also accentuate Hong Kong 
people‘s conceptual separation of the nation from the state. Nationalist rhetoric 
was at times also used as a tactic to protect or promote the interests of those 
involved.  The New Left in the 1971 Baodiao campaign used the movement to 
promote their anti-colonial and anti-capitalist agenda.  June Fourth in 1989 and 
the 1996 Baodiao campaign provided the Democrats an opportunity to promote 
themselves. 
 As a result of the different interpretations of the Chinese nation, three 
types of nationalism emerged in post-1949 Hong Kong: cultural nationalism, 
political nationalism, and popular nationalism. 
Symbols of Nationalism 
This thesis has demonstrated the importance of symbols in the expression 
of nationalism in Hong Kong.  The Tramway boycott of 1912, the 1956 riots, 
1967 riots, and the 1971 and 1996 Baodiao campaign show how symbols of 
nationalism, whether they be Chinese coins, Mao badges, or state flags, served as 
triggers and representations of rhetoric in nationalist movements.  In the 
Tramway boycott and the 1956 riots, Chinese coins and the ROC flag served as a 
trigger as these symbols had been, in the view of the participants, insulted and 
desecrated by colonial authorities.  In this sense colonialism, too, contributed to 
the outbreak of these events.  In the 1967 riots, symbols of the Cultural 
Revolution such as Mao badges and the Little Red Book represented the leftist 
nationalist rhetoric in their anti-British struggle. 
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The case study of the 1996 Baodiao campaign demonstrated how the 
meaning of a state flag was not set in stone.  Despite Hong Kong people‘s distrust 
of the PRC before and after 1989, the PRC flag was used in the 1996 Baodiao 
campaign to represent China.  Of course, using the flag was in no way an 
implication that Hong Kong people politically approved of the PRC.  The case of 
1996 showed that there was no objective meaning to the PRC flag.  There was 
only a subjective meaning attached to it by whoever used it at a particular time in 
history.  A state flag could be a symbol representing the nation instead of the 
state and its meaning evolved with Chinese history and Hong Kong history.  
Phase I: Evolution of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong 
Kong: 1949-1967 
 In the post-war years up until 1967, China-orientated nationalism in 
Hong Kong was, as an aftermath of the Chinese civil war, tied to the CCP-GMD 
struggle.  This was a contributing factor in Hong Kong‘s political instability, 
manifested in the 1956 and 1967 riots.  The violent expression of nationalism in 
both riots was condemned by both the colonial government and the public.  Yet 
some in the Chinese community who were neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD were 
more concerned about Chinese politics than Hong Kong politics.  This too 
contributed to the debate about nationalism in the 1950s. 
It remains unclear how much influence the different types of nationalism 
that were played out in the 1950s had on later developments.  Cultural 
nationalism of the 1950s might have had some influence on Hong Kong youth in 
the 1960s and 1970s, through the Chinese-language magazines containing 
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discussions about China.  Perhaps the major influence the 1950s had on later 
developments was that the 1956 riots contributed to the disappearance of violence 
in nationalist movements from the 1970s onwards.  Activists in later years 
probably knew the use of violence would not gain public support. 
In the decades before the 1967 riots, the China factor was a significant 
element in triggering expressions of nationalism in the colony.  However, after 
the 1967 riots, Chinese national politics, although remaining a contributing factor, 
became less significant in the debate, with the exception of the rise of the China 
Faction in universities in the 1970s.  Both pro-GMD and pro-CCP sympathisers 
lost public support for their actions in the 1956 riots and 1967 riots.  In the years 
after the 1967 riots local politics started to have a more significant bearing on the 
expression of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.  The four phases of 
the Baodiao movement, and the campaign to support the Chinese democracy 
movement in the 1980s, although triggered by events relating to China, were 
largely locally inspired.  China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong evolved 
over time in terms of both rhetoric and participation.  The focus of that 
nationalism became increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather 
than China.  This evolution accentuates the fact that Hong Kong people became 
more concerned about Hong Kong than China. 
Phase II: Hong Kong Youth and Nationalist Movements in the 
1970s 
In the post-1967 period, extreme pro-CCP and pro-GMD political 
sentiments disappeared from large-scale nationalist movements as they had lost 
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public support.  The 1971 and 1978 phases of the Baodiao movement were led by 
a new generation of young Hong Kong Chinese, some of whom were politically 
active and concerned about the injustices of colonialism and interested in the 
affairs of China.  The young Baodiao activists in the 1970s were not concerned 
about the CCP-GMD struggle.  Social movements in the 1970s were marked by a 
connection between local social and political issues, and affairs in China.  The 
first Baodiao campaign of 1971, the subject of Chapter Five, reflected the 
division between the activists who had a desire to take action against social 
injustices in the colony and those who were pro-China.  The 70s Bi-weekly, 
comprised of mostly Anarchists and Trotskyists, was not on good terms with the 
pro-China activists, although the two groups managed to work together to lead 
the 1971 Baodiao campaign.   
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the 70s Bi-weekly attempted to turn the 
1971 Baodiao campaign into an anti-colonial campaign by using China-
orientated nationalism in Hong Kong to draw young Hong Kong people‘s 
attention to the injustices of colonialism.  As a result, the Baodiao campaign also 
carried an anti-colonial flavour.  The 70s Bi-weekly succeeded to some extent in 
its goal, as the Hong Kong government‘s attempt to suppress the Baodiao 
campaign using violence attracted criticism from the public.  However, anti-
colonialism never became a major motif in subsequent nationalist movements as 
pro-CCP sentiments gained the support of students in universities around the 
mid-1970s. 
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The period between the mid and late 1970s saw the emergence and 
dominance of the pro-CCP China Faction in the student movement.  However, 
the dominance of the China Faction soon ended following Mao‘s death and the 
fall of the Gang of Four in the late 1970s.  After the 1970s, the pro-CCP and pro-
GMD political rhetoric almost completely disappeared from open, large-scale 
nationalist movements. 
Phase III: Popular Nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s 
From the 1980s onwards, as the Hong Kong youth who were active in the 
student movement came of age and played a leading role in political movements, 
Hong Kong‘s political situation became more important in the expression of 
nationalism than the China factor, as the colony evolved into a political 
community whose people were more willing to speak up for their interests and 
were rethinking their Chinese identity on the eve of 1997.  Hong Kong's response 
to 4 June 1989 and the 1996 Baodiao campaign were both fuelled by the 1997 
psyche, and occurred at politically turbulent times in the history of Hong Kong. 
China-Orientated Nationalism in a Supposedly Depoliticised 
Colony 
The haphazard rise of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong 
Kong between 1949 and 1997 was because Hong Kong was not immune from the 
influence of Chinese history and politics.  Part of the populace arrived from 
China after 1949.  Their personal experiences served as a source of their 
nationalistic sentiments.  The small minority of Chinese in Hong Kong involved 
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in nationalist movements and promoting nationalist rhetoric had an emotional 
attachment to China, albeit having different interpretations of China and 
patriotism.  These people included Chinese who had fled to Hong Kong after 
1949, the anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s, the pro-China 
students in the 1970s, and my interviewees.  For some of my interviewees their 
emotional attachment to China was a result of family influence. 
The Hong Kong-based Chinese-language press, too, played a major role 
in contributing to the promotion of nationalism, as it served as an important 
source of information about China and a platform for discussions about 
nationalism.  Both rightist and leftist publications were easily accessible.  Chapter 
Three demonstrated how the Chinese-language publications constructed different 
types of nationalist rhetoric, and as argued in Chapter Five, Hong Kong youth 
learned about China from the Chinese-language publications, which to some 
extent contributed to their nationalistic sentiments.  Chapters Four and Seven 
showed how the Chinese-language press promoted nationalism by portraying 
actors involved in nationalist movements as heroes. 
As Hong Kong people became actively involved in local political affairs, 
China-orientated nationalism and their concern over the political future of Hong 
Kong became intertwined.  The Hong Kong factor became so significant in the 
expressions of nationalism in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s that the colonial 
authorities‘ attempts at depoliticisation did not hamper the construction of 
Chinese nationalist rhetoric at all. 
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China-Orientated Nationalism and Colonialism 
For the Hong Kong government, internal security was the top priority.  
For many years, the government endeavoured to suppress the influence of 
Chinese politics in the colony as well as any expression of nationalistic 
sentiments, which in its view would threaten the colony‘s security.  In the 
education system, as noted in Chapters Two, Three and Five, the colonial 
government made a consistent effort to keep the influence of Chinese politics to a 
minimum.  Yet the colonial education system taught generations of Chinese 
students to identify culturally with China.  
The colonial government‘s attempt to suppress China-orientated 
nationalism at times served as the immediate trigger of an outbreak of violent 
nationalist movements in the colony.  The analysis of the 1956 and 1967 riots 
showed how actions of the colonial government provoked a politically conscious 
minority of the Chinese community to become involved in violent expressions of 
political nationalism.  Although the colonial government‘s suppression of the 
1967 riots gained a great deal of public support, its use of violence in handling 
the peaceful 7 July Baodiao demonstration in 1971 attracted much criticism.  On 
a more positive note, colonialism contributed to the development of nationalism 
as the Hong Kong government allowed press freedom, albeit for the sake of 
balancing political forces in the colony.  Thus, colonialism served as both a 
limiting and a contributing factor to the development of China-orientated 
nationalism. 
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One striking feature of post-1949 nationalist movements in Hong Kong is 
that, with the exception of the 1967 riots and the New Left in the 1970s, the 
colonial government was not the target and those involved were not attempting to 
discredit or overthrow it.  Hong Kong‘s proximity to China and political 
neutrality provided an ideal environment for various Hong Kong-based groups to 
promote their strategically constructed nationalist rhetoric.  The colonial 
government allowed the promotion of different types of nationalism as long as it 
would not destabilise the colony.  Interestingly, as demonstrated in Chapters Six 
and Seven, in the 1980s and 1990s the real target of nationalist movements was 
the PRC government, not the Hong Kong colonial government. 
Negative Impacts of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong Kong 
The analysis of the 1967 riots and the 1996 Baodiao campaign showed 
that a nationalist fever could cloud an individual‘s judgement.  The leftists in the 
1967 riots, under the influence of the political fever of the Cultural Revolution, 
ignored the PRC‘s long-standing principle of maintaining the Party‘s status quo 
in Hong Kong and rashly launched an anti-British struggle in the name of 
patriotism.  The violent expression of political nationalism in the 1967 riots 
disrupted Hong Kong people‘s lives and resulted in the deaths of innocent Hong 
Kong citizens.  Some of the leftists, too, suffered physically and economically 
due to their participation in the riots.  In the 1996 Baodiao campaign, David Chan 
died not because of ‗Japanese militarism‘, but because of nationalism. 
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Post-1997 Development of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong 
Kong 
 Expressions of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong did not end 
with the 1997 handover.  The Baodiao movement continued for at least ten years 
following the handover.  Hong Kong‘s struggle for greater democracy was 
manifested in a huge 1 July 2003 protest march involving 500,000 people, and 
the arrest of the Hong Kong journalist working for the Strait Times Ching 
Cheong (程翔) by Chinese authorities in 2005752 sparked much discussion about 
patriotism.
753
  What is patriotism?  What does it mean to be a patriot?  Such 
questions were often asked in the discussions about democracy in Hong Kong 
and after Ching Cheong‘s arrest.  As in the pre-1997 period, multiple 
interpretations of patriotism emerged. 
While there have been a few studies of China-orientated nationalism in 
post-1997 Hong Kong, this thesis could shed light on its development in the 
future.  I believe that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong will continue to 
                                                     
752
 Like David Chan Yuk-cheung, Ching Cheong was a member of the China Faction during his 
time as a university student.  Ching graduated from the University of Hong Kong (HKU) in 1973.  
Unlike most other HKU graduates who either joined the civil service or sought high-pay jobs , 
Ching became a reporter for the leftist newspaper Wen Hui Pao in 1974.  It was well-known that 
employees in leftist organisations had a much lower income than those in non-leftist companies.  
Ching worked in Beijing between 1982 and 1989.  In 1989,  together with the chief editor Li 
Zisong, Ching Cheong left the Wen Hui Pao following the Tiananmen Square Incident, as a form 
of protest against Beijing‘s handling of the Chinese democracy movement.  In 1996, Ching 
became a reporter for the Singaporean Strait Times.  Ching was arrested in Guangzhou on 22 
April 2005 and charged with espionage.  Ching was praised by his friends as a ‗true patriot‘. 
753
 See Situ Hua 司徒華, Shenme shi aiguo shenme shi minzhu 什麽是愛國，什麽是民主 (What 
is Patriotism, What is Democracy), in Yanyu pingsheng 煙雨平生 (Life with Misty Rain) 
(Xianggang: Ciwenhua tang chubanshe, 2008), pp.194-197; Ming Bao bianjibu 明報編輯部, 
Aiguo Lunzheng 愛國論爭 (Debates about Patriotism) (Xianggang: Ming Bao chubanshe 
youxiangongsi, 2004); and Cheng Xiang 程翔, Manman aiguo lu Cheng Xiang Wenji 慢慢愛國
路：程翔文集 (The Long Road to Patriotism: A Collection of Ching Cheong‘s Writings) 
(Xianggang: Cheng Xiang jijinhui, 2005). 
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be used as a tool and as rhetoric in political movements in Hong Kong.  I also 
believe that its content and political utility will continue to evolve alongside 
changes in Chinese and Hong Kong politics, and that democracy will remain a 
central motif in the rhetoric of nationalism.  
While there is no doubt that events in China will continue to contribute to 
the construction of nationalist rhetoric in Hong Kong, the China factor will be a 
much less significant factor compared to the Hong Kong factor.  As both Hong 
Kong and Macau have been returned to China, the kind of irredentist nationalism 
constructed in the Baodiao movement is unlikely to emerge again as a major 
rhetoric in Hong Kong. 
 In the construction of nationalist rhetoric in future nationalist movements 
in Hong Kong, it is very likely that the Chinese democracy movement will 
continue to be linked to Hong Kong‘s own struggle for greater democracy.  The 
fact that Hong Kong people are now much more involved in local politics than 
ever before means that the Hong Kong factor will continue to be the major 
driving force behind nationalist movements in Hong Kong. 
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